SCA MORNING PRESS CLIPS
Prepared for the U.S. Department of State
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
TO: | SCA & Staff |
DATE: | Thursday, March 27, 2025 6:30 AM ET |
Afghanistan
US Drops Bounties On Top Afghan Taliban Officials (Agence France-Presse)
Agence France-Presse [3/27/2025 3:14 AM, Staff, 931K]
The United States has removed multimillion-dollar bounties on leaders of Afghanistan’s feared Haqqani militant network, including the current Taliban interior minister, the State Department and the Taliban government said.
The Haqqani network was responsible for some of the deadliest attacks during the decades-long war in Afghanistan.
The men remain on Washington’s list of "specially designated global terrorists" but the bounty price has been scrapped.
Taliban interior ministry spokesman Abdul Mateen Qani told AFP that Washington had "cancelled rewards" for Sirajuddin Haqqani -- who also heads the Haqqani network -- as well as other key leaders, Abdul Aziz Haqqani and Yahya Haqqani.
Sirajuddin Haqqani had long been one of Washington’s most important targets, with a $10 million bounty on his head.
The US State Department said that "the three persons named remain designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), and the Haqqani Network remains designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a SDGT".
But while the wanted page remains active, the bounty on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) website has been removed.
"It is the policy of the United States to consistently review and refine Rewards for Justice reward offers," a State Department spokesperson told AFP on Wednesday.
The bounty cancellation came days after the first visit by US officials to Afghanistan since President Donald Trump returned to office, and the announcement afterwards of the release of a US citizen by Taliban authorities.
US-based Afghan political analyst Abdul Wahed Faqiri told AFP that the bounty removal is likely "largely symbolic" but a way for the United States to "give credit to Sirajuddin Haqqani", seen as an emerging more moderate "alternative".
Media reports talk of increasing tensions between the "pragmatic" Haqqani figures and a more hardline circle around Taliban supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, who vie for influence within the government.
Despite the US bounty and international travel bans, Sirajuddin Haqqani has travelled outside Afghanistan multiple times since the Taliban government swept back to power in 2021.
The government in Kabul is not recognised by any country and has expressed hopes for "a new chapter" with Trump’s administration.
Trump signed a peace deal with the Taliban during his first term in office, that paved the way for the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and their return to power. Who is Zalmay Khalilzad, the would-be broker between the Taliban and Trump? (The Independent)
The Independent [3/26/2025 7:52 AM, Arpan Rai, 44838K]
Zalmay Khalilzad, the key negotiator in one of the largest US diplomatic debacles in recent memory, could nonetheless be on track to return as Donald Trump’s mediator with the Taliban, experts say.
Last week Khalilzad, an Afghan-born diplomat who was responsible for mediating talks that led to America’s chaotic military withdrawal from Afghanistan, was pictured accompanying an American hostage released from Taliban custody.
Khalilzad appeared alongside George Glezmann, an airline mechanic from Atlanta who was captured by the Taliban in December 2022 during a tourist visit to Afghanistan. Officially, Glezmann was released in a deal with the Trump administration brokered by Qatari negotiators.
But it was Khalilzad who travelled to Kabul, met with the Taliban’s foreign ministry officials and then accompanied the American back to the US. He then took to Twitter to confirm Glezmann’s release, calling it a "good day".
Experts monitoring Afghanistan say the Trump administration could once again be turning to Khalilzad to deal with the Taliban, including around reported early-stage discussions to reopen the US embassy in Kabul. That would be a major boost in terms of international recognition for the militant regime that has been globally condemned for its assault on women’s rights.
Khalilzad was the "architect" of the Trump administration’s mistaken belief that the Taliban had changed as an organisation since its misogynistic regime of the late ‘90s and early 2000s, before it was ousted from power in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, argues David Loyn, author of The Long War.
"There are talks that Trump might want to send him to Kabul as a full-time envoy. He had an incredibly difficult hand to play in 2019 because Trump wanted an end to the war. It was just like what Americans are doing with Putin now. They are cutting out the main players – Afghan nationals in this case," Loyn tells The Independent.
"Donald Trump is mainly excited and attracted by how Khalilzad was their negotiator and developed the sense that he could talk to the Taliban on behalf of the Americans as a Washington operator," says Loyn.
But if they are still listening to his advice now, the Trump administration, in his opinion, are "making a mistake", he says. "Khalilzad has been wrong and naive about Taliban 2.0 before and there is no reason why his analysis should be any better this time.".
Khalilzad has served as a negotiator with rulers of Afghanistan for more than four decades, including with the Soviets in 1989 when the Russians withdrew from Afghanistan.
He stepped down in October 2021 after serving as the US special envoy for Afghanistan for more than three years under both the Trump and Biden administrations.
Khalilzad was brought onboard by Washington in September 2018 by then secretary of state Mike Pompeo to lead negotiations with the Taliban and the Afghan republic government led by Ashraf Ghani.
A fluent Pashto and Dari speaker, Khalilzad failed to broker a power-sharing deal between the Taliban and Afghanistan’s democratically-elected leaders. Where he did succeed was in negotiating an agreement with the Taliban to end America’s longest-running war, which saw US troops leave Afghanistan after 20 years. The agreement was signed in the Qatari capital Doha and paved the way towards a full withdrawal of foreign soldiers from Afghanistan, as America’s Nato allies had little choice but to follow suit.
A number of officials from the Biden administration blamed the deal negotiated by Khalilzad for forcing their hands when it came to the speed of the pullout, and allowing the Taliban to swiftly take over the country unopposed. The biggest victims of the Taliban’s takeover have been Afghan women, whose fundamental rights on matters such as education and employment have been stripped away.
An active commentator via his X social media account, Khalilzad is regularly met with disapproving remarks from Afghans under his posts. Last week, he advocated for a longer transition period of power in Afghanistan. "You shut up. There is no need (for) your advice," one user angrily replied.
Khalilzad has admitted that the Nato withdrawal from Afghanistan had not gone as planned, saying this was because the Taliban did not enter serious peace talks with the Afghan government as had been agreed.But he has repeatedly defended his role in the Doha talks, saying his negotiating position was undermined by public statements and briefings from the White House that America was on the brink of withdrawing from Afghanistan. He told the congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs in November 2023 that "military force" was the biggest source of leverage the US had over the Taliban.
"I would say to our leaders here sometimes that, if we keep saying we’re getting out regardless, that doesn’t give me a lot of leverage. [They would say] ‘Okay. Understood, Zal.’ But then it would only last a week or two days.".
The Independent has reached out to Khalilzad for comment.
Kabir Taneja, deputy director of strategic studies and a fellow on the Middle East at India’s Observer Research Foundation, says Trump has talked himself into a corner by committing publicly to restoring some form of American influence in Afghanistan. "In the past few months, Trump has made loose remarks about not allowing China and Russia to run amok in the Afghanistan and central Asia region without any American presence, and American weapons left back in Afghanistan," says Taneja.
"So the only one he can tap into right now is Khalilzad – someone he is familiar with. It is more about familiarity and Trump’s inner circle more than anything else and he is in Trump’s inner circle, clearly.". Trump’s New Approach to the Taliban (Foreign Policy)
Foreign Policy [3/26/2025 11:27 PM, Michael Kugelman, 1.4M]
Last Thursday, the Taliban released U.S. citizen George Glezmann after more than two years of captivity. His release came on the same day that Adam Boehler, the special presidential envoy for hostage affairs, and Zalmay Khalilzad, a former top U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, made an unannounced visit to Kabul—the first known visit by U.S. officials to Afghanistan since 2021.
Afghanistan announced on Sunday that the United States had lifted bounties on three Taliban leaders who were members of a faction called the Haqqani network, a U.S.-designated terror group that targeted U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Washington has not commented on the move, but Sirajuddin Haqqani—the most senior of the three—no longer appears on the U.S. State Department’s Rewards for Justice website.
These developments suggest a significant change in the U.S. approach to the Taliban regime since the group retook power in 2021. U.S. officials have periodically engaged with Taliban leaders, including two days of face-to-face meetings in Doha, Qatar, in 2023, and the two sides negotiated earlier deals to release captive U.S. citizens.
The Trump administration’s new tack can be attributed to its transactionalism. Its limited objectives in Afghanistan include the release of remaining captive U.S. citizens and the return of U.S.-made weapons. There are other things that the White House may want later, such as assistance on counterterrorism. Russia’s LPG exports to Afghanistan boom as Europe shuns it (Reuters)
Reuters [3/26/2025 10:30 AM, Staff, 2456K]
Russia’s exports of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to Afghanistan and ex-Soviet states in Central Asia have jumped following introduction of European Union sanctions against Moscow at the end of 2024, industry sources said on Wednesday.
The European Union’s sanctions against Russia’s LPG over the war in Ukraine took effect on December 20. The restrictions were proposed last year by Poland, one of Russia’s largest LPG importers.
LPG, or propane and butane, is mainly used as fuel for cars, heating and to produce other petrochemicals.
According to the industry sources, railway supplies of LPG from Russia’s plants, including the Kazrosgas joint venture with Kazakhstan, jumped to the region by 80% year on year in January - February to 140,000 metric tons.
The exports to Afghanistan, the main consumer of Russia’s LPG in the region, rose by 52% for the period to 71,000 tons.
Traders expect great scope for more supplies to Afghanistan, where annual demand for LPG is seen at around 700,000 tons per year. Pakistan
UN Experts Demand Pakistan Release Baloch Activists (Agence France-Presse)
Agence France-Presse [3/26/2025 1:00 PM, Staff, 126906K]
More than a dozen United Nations experts demanded Wednesday that Pakistan immediately release detained Baloch rights defenders and halt its crackdown on peaceful protests.Among those arrested in recent days was Mahrang Baloch, one of Pakistan’s most prominent human rights advocates, who has long campaigned for the Baloch ethnic group.She and other activists took part in a sit-in protest on Friday outside the University of Balochistan in the provincial capital of Quetta.They demanded the release of members of their support group, whom they allege had been detained by security agencies."We have been monitoring with growing concern reports of alleged arrests and enforced disappearances of Baloch activists over the past number of months," the independent experts said in a statement.Police launched a pre-dawn raid on Saturday, arresting Baloch and other activists, during which at least three protestors died. Both sides blamed each other for the deaths.On Sunday, Baloch and other protesters were charged with terrorism, sedition and murder, according to the police charge sheet seen by AFP.In their statement, the experts, including the UN special rapporteurs on the situation of human rights defenders, on minority issues and on counter-terrorism and human rights, decried "the use of excessive force as a first response to peaceful protests".Pakistan has been battling a separatist insurgency in Balochistan for decades, where militants target state forces and foreign nationals in the mineral-rich southwestern province bordering Afghanistan and Iran.Police actions against Baloch activists have intensified after Baloch separatists earlier this month launched a dramatic train siege that officials said ended in around 60 deaths, half of whom were separatists behind the assault."We understand the deeply traumatic impact of the March 11 terrorist attack, and we express our deepest sympathy to the victims," said the experts, who are mandated by the UN Human Rights Council but who do not speak on behalf of the United Nations itself."Yet a response which relies on arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and violent crackdowns on freedom of assembly cannot alleviate that trauma."In addition to Mahrang Baloch’s case, the experts highlighted the arrest on Monday of another woman human rights defender, Sammi Deen Baloch, along with others in front of the Karachi Press Club as they protested against the crackdown."We urge the Pakistani authorities to immediately release them and to refrain from abusing counter-terrorism or public safety measures against human rights defenders," the experts said.Pakistan’s foreign affairs ministry said it had "taken note of the press release issued by certain UN experts, which appears to be based on selective and unverified media reports"."Regrettably, these comments lack balance and proportionality, downplaying civilian casualties inflicted by terrorist attacks," the foreign ministry statement added. Journalist Kidnapped In Pakistan Capital: Family (Agence France-Presse)
Agence France-Presse [3/26/2025 4:35 AM, Staff, 777K]
A journalist in Pakistan was kidnapped from his home in Islamabad on Wednesday, his family and lawyer said, the latest assault on press freedom in the South Asian country.More than a dozen people stormed the house of Muhammad Waheed Murad, a multimedia journalist at Saudi-owned Urdu News, taking him away, his mother-in-law said.Murad has previously criticised the role of Pakistan’s powerful military, which analysts say is deeply involved in the country’s politics and economy."Around 20 unidentified individuals stormed the house around 2:00 am (21:00 GMT) and forcibly took him away, without presenting any (arrest) warrant," Abida Nawaz said in a video statement.Murad’s lawyer filed a petition Wednesday at Islamabad’s high court alleging unidentified officials "presumably from intelligence agencies" arrived in double-cabin trucks that they typically use."The pattern of his abduction was the same as in the past," Imaan Mazari told AFP."The abductors, their modus operandi, and the way they stormed the house in the dead of night make it clear who they are."The country has been ruled by the military for several decades of its 77-year history and criticism of the security establishment has long been seen as a red line.Rights groups have accused Islamabad’s shadowy intelligence agencies of "disappearing" critics, an allegation the military denies.Pakistani journalists have reported rising state censorship in recent years and the public has shifted to consuming much of its news from social media.The Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists condemned what it called an "enforced abduction" of the reporter."Such actions against journalists are unacceptable and threaten the very fabric of democracy and press freedom," the press group said in a statement.The latest kidnapping came after Farhan Mallick -- founder of Pakistani internet media channel Raftar -- was arrested last week on charges of "anti-state posts and fake news" under toughened legislation.That abduction came in the same week two brothers of exiled journalist Ahmad Noorani were kidnapped from their family home after he wrote about the growing influence of the powerful military chief’s family.Islamabad has been criticised by watchdogs for restricting internet access, including temporary bans on YouTube and TikTok, while X remains officially blocked.The criminalisation of online disinformation has spread fear in Pakistan, with journalists among those worried about the potentially wide reach of the law.Pakistan is ranked 152 out of 180 countries in Reporters Without Borders’ press freedom index. Gunmen Kill Six In ‘Coordinated’ Attacks In Southwest Pakistan: Police (Agence France-Presse)
Agence France-Presse [3/26/2025 5:18 PM, Staff, 24727K]
Gunmen killed at least six people in "coordinated" attacks in southwestern Pakistan that largely targeted bus passengers based on their ethnicity, police said on Thursday, the latest in a spike in violence in the region.Pakistan has been battling a separatist insurgency in Balochistan for decades, where militants target state forces, foreign nationals and non-locals in the mineral-rich southwestern province bordering Afghanistan and Iran."Terrorists have targeted passenger buses and security officials in multiple districts of Balochistan, killing at least five non-local passengers and a security official," a senior provincial police official told AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity.The incident took place in the coastal town of Pasni in Gwadar district."They stopped passenger buses and identified non-local travellers," the official added.Dozens of militants have carried out the attacks in several districts of the province after they took control of major highways and set up posts to search vehicles, the official said.In some areas the attacks are still ongoing, he added.Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi said in a statement the attacks were "a cowardly act" and "a crime against humanity"."Targeting travelers by identifying them is barbaric and brutal", he said in a statement.No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks. However, Baloch separatists have intensified attacks on security forces as well as non-locals in recent weeks.Earlier this month, ethnic Baloch separatists attacked a train with 450 passengers on board, sparking a two-day siege during which dozens of people were killed.Days later, at least five paramilitaries were killed in a vehicle-borne suicide attack.Both assaults were claimed by the separatist Baloch Liberation Army (BLA).The group also launched coordinated attacks last year that included taking control of a major highway and shooting dead travellers from other ethnic groups, stunning the country.The militants have additionally targeted energy projects with foreign financing -- most notably from China -- accusing outsiders of exploiting the resource-rich region while excluding residents in the poorest part of Pakistan.Last year was the deadliest year in a decade in Pakistan, following a trend of rising militancy since the Taliban took control in Afghanistan in 2021. Pakistan Court Sentences Five To Death For ‘Online Blasphemy’ (Agence France-Presse)
Agence France-Presse [3/26/2025 7:04 AM, Staff, 52868K]
A Pakistan court has sentenced five men to death for posting blasphemous content online, a prosecution lawyer told AFP on Wednesday, as the country witnesses a sharp increase in such cases.Private groups in Pakistan have brought charges against hundreds of young individuals in recent years for allegedly committing blasphemy online.Blasphemy is an incendiary charge in Muslim-majority Pakistan, where even unsubstantiated accusations can incite public outrage and lead to lynchings."All five accused were sentenced to death for spreading blasphemous content against the holy Prophet," a lawyer from the Legal Commission on Blasphemy Pakistan, a private group which brought the case to court, told AFP."Separately all were sentenced to life imprisonment for Koran’s desecration and 10 years imprisonment for hurting religious sentiments," lawyer Rao Abdur Raheem said.The five men -- one Afghan and four Pakistanis -- were sentenced on Tuesday in Rawalpindi, the garrison city that neighbours the capital Islamabad.The sentences will run concurrently, Raheem said.The convicts have a right to appeal in the upper courts.Despite the conviction, Pakistan has never executed anyone for blasphemy.The decision comes a day after a Pakistani YouTube star was charged with blasphemy after launching a perfume named after the very law he has fallen foul of.Rajab Butt launched his "295" perfume which refers to blasphemy legislation in the penal code.Currently in Saudi Arabia, the thirty-year-old faces up to 10 years in prison in two blasphemy cases related to videos he posted online.Many of the online blasphemy cases are being brought to trial by private "vigilante groups" led by lawyers and supported by volunteers who scour the internet for offenders, rights groups and police say.The Legal Commission on Blasphemy Pakistan (LCBP) is the most active of such groups in Pakistan.Sheraz Ahmad Farooqi, one of the group’s leaders, told AFP in October that "God has chosen them for this noble cause".In January the same court sentenced four men to death for posting for posting "blasphemous content online".A support group formed by the families of those convicted and arrested on similar charges filed a case in the Islamabad High Court last year, requesting an independent commission be created to investigate the facts around the cases.A report published by the government-run National Commission for Human Rights in October last year said there were 767 people, mostly young men, in jail awaiting trial over blasphemy allegations.Cases can drag through the courts for years, although death penalties are often commuted to life in prison on appeal at the Supreme Court.A special court was formed in September to expedite the dozens of pending cases. Pakistan’s Parsi Community Dwindles As Young Migrate (Agence France-Presse)
Agence France-Presse [3/26/2025 11:53 PM, Hussain Dada, 126906K]
From a gated community for her Zoroastrian faith in Pakistan’s megacity Karachi, 22-year-old Elisha Amra has waved goodbye to many friends migrating abroad as the ancient Parsi community dwindles.Soon the film student hopes to join them -- becoming one more loss to Pakistan’s ageing Zoroastrian Parsi people, a community who trace their roots back to Persian refugees from today’s Iran more than a millennium ago."My plan is to go abroad," Amra said, saying she wants to study for a master’s degree in a country without the restrictions of a conservative Muslim-majority society."I want to be able to freely express myself", she added.Zoroastrianism, founded by the prophet Zarathustra, was the predominant religion of the ancient Persian empire, until the rise of Islam with the Arab conquests of the seventh century.Once the Parsi community in Pakistan had as many as 15,000-20,000 people, said Dinshaw Behram Avari, the head of one of the most prominent Parsi families.Today, numbers hover around 900 people in Karachi and a few dozen more elsewhere in Pakistan, according to community leaders, many staying together in compounds like where Amra lives.She acknowledges her life is more comfortable than many in Pakistan -- the Parsis are in general an affluent and highly educated community.But says she wants to escape the daily challenges that beset the city of some 20 million people -- ranging from power cuts, water shortages and patchy internet to violent street crime."I’d rather have a life where I feel safe, and I feel happy and satisfied," she said.Zubin Patel, 27, a Parsi working in e-commerce in Karachi, has seen more than two dozen Parsi friends leave Karachi for abroad in the past three years."More than 20-25 of my friends were living in Karachi, they all started migrating", he said.That is not unique to Parsis -- many young and skilled Pakistanis want to find jobs abroad to escape a country wracked with political uncertainty and security challenges, a struggling economy and woeful infrastructure.The number of highly skilled Pakistanis who left for jobs abroad more than doubled according to the latest figures from the Pakistan Economic Survey -- from 20,865 in 2022, to 45,687 in 2023.Parsis are struggling to adjust in a fast-changing world.The religion, considered among the oldest in the world, forbids conversion and mixed marriages are frowned upon."There is a better chance to find a Zoroastrian partner in Canada, Australia, UK and America than in Pakistan," said Avari, who heads of a chain of hotels.He points out that Parsi population of Toronto is some 10 times greater than Karachi.Avari, 57, said that a wave of Parsis left Pakistan during the hardline military rule of Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s, who enforced a programme of Islamisation.Since then, Islamist violence has targeted religious minorities, and while Parsis say they have not been targeted, they remain wary.He suggested the community’s high levels of education and Western outlook to life meant many eyed a future abroad, while for those who do stay, family size is shrinking."Couples are more interested today in looking after their career; they are not interested in family," he said."When they do get married, they will have one child -- and one child is not enough to make a positive impact on the population."Parsi members were among the pioneers of the shipping and hospitality industries in Karachi, and the city’s colonial-era historic district is dotted with Parsi buildings including hospitals and schools.But as the community declines, many buildings have crumbled, with as many as half the homes in elegant tree-lined streets of the century-old Sohrab Katrak Parsi Colony lying abandoned.For many among the younger generation, the only pull left keeping them in Pakistan is their ageing relatives.Patel, the e-commerce worker, said he would leave if he could."It would be a difficult decision," he said. "But if I have an opportunity which would give my parents ... a healthy lifestyle, then I’d obviously go for it".Amra, who visits her 76-year-old grandfather almost daily, worries that her parents will be alone when she leaves."You have to figure out a way, eventually, to either bring them to you or come back," she said. India
As Musk Makes Some Headway in India, He Is Also Suing Its Government (New York Times)
New York Times [3/27/2025 12:01 AM, Anupreeta Das, 831K]
In recent weeks, Elon Musk has finally seemed to make some inroads in India, a potentially huge market whose government has frustrated him with its trade barriers. Tesla appears to be preparing another attempt to sell cars in the country, and Starlink, his satellite internet provider, signed partnerships with two Indian companies.
At the same time, though, Mr. Musk is picking a fight with the Indian government through another piece of his empire: his social media company, X.
This month, X, formerly known as Twitter, filed a lawsuit in an Indian court accusing the government of misusing a law to block content on the site. While Mr. Musk has portrayed himself as a champion of free speech, it is a touchy subject for the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which has faced allegations of stifling dissent and clamping down on expression. A hearing in the lawsuit is expected Thursday.
The platform’s chatbot, Grok, has also posed a challenge for Indian officials, who are scrutinizing it for potential violations of information technology laws, according to Indian media reports. Grok, which Mr. Musk has promoted as a straight-talking, “anti-woke” digital tool, has generated both mirth and outrage in India as it has spewed profanities in Hindi and made politically sensitive statements in response to user queries.
For example, when users asked Grok about media bias, it replied that Mr. Modi’s party spends heavily to “sway narratives.” It added: “Media bias isn’t new, but the party’s grip has tightened since 2014, often silencing critical voices.”
The free-speech campaign by Mr. Musk’s company has landed in the middle of a delicate moment for relations between Washington and New Delhi.
A team from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative is in India to discuss bilateral trade agreements. President Trump has pushed the Modi government to lower tariffs on American products, including cars and agricultural goods. If the two countries cannot come to an agreement by April 2, Mr. Trump has vowed to impose reciprocal levies.
Mr. Musk is one of Mr. Trump’s closest advisers, and when Mr. Modi visited the White House last month, he met with Mr. Musk and his family. If the Modi government accommodates Mr. Trump’s tariff demands, Tesla could find its way into India more easily — a prime example of the billionaire’s unusual tangle of personal, political and business interests in the country.
Mr. Musk has sought to sell Teslas in India for years. After a failed attempt to enter the Indian market in 2021, the company recently began to pursue the opportunity anew, acquiring commercial spaces and moving to hire salespeople.
Starlink, the telecommunications subsidiary of Mr. Musk’s space technology company, SpaceX, is further along in India.
Until recently, Starlink, which provides internet connectivity via satellites, had been banned in the country. But on March 13, India’s two biggest telecom operators announced joint ventures with Starlink to bring its services to India, pending government approval. The announcement came exactly a month after Mr. Modi’s chat with Mr. Musk in Washington.
Mr. Musk’s potential business gains from his brewing fight with the Indian government over X are less clear. The social media platform represents only a small fragment of Mr. Musk’s wealth, which Forbes pegs at $350 billion, with the bulk coming from SpaceX and Tesla.
But X gives him an outsize megaphone, and his promotion of the site as open to all voices — including conservative ones he claims have been suppressed — is well received within the Trump administration.
In a lawsuit filed on March 5 in the Indian state of Karnataka, X alleged that the Indian government’s broad use of a law to block content it deems objectionable violates the provisions of another law, which lays down the process for how and when information can be removed.
In the suit, X also called the government’s “Sahyog Portal” — which automates the process of filing takedown orders for online posts by official bodies and local police — a “censorship” portal.
Mr. Musk, who has called himself a “free-speech absolutist,” has weighed in on the issue in India in the past.“The rules in India for what can appear on social media are quite strict, and we can’t go beyond the laws of a country,” he told the BBC in 2023. “If we have a choice of either our people go to prison or we comply with the laws, we’ll comply”
Mr. Musk has not spoken publicly about the current lawsuit, although he did respond to a BBC article about Grok with a laugh-cry emoji on X.
Indian media reports have said that the government is questioning X over the use of profanity by Grok as it examines whether the chatbot has violated laws.
Asked whether its responses to user queries had caused trouble with the Indian government, Grok replied in the affirmative.“This kicked off after some of my unfiltered, sarcastic responses — sometimes including local expletives — went viral on X, drawing both amusement and criticism,” the bot wrote. “Things escalated as users kept pushing me with politically charged or cheeky questions, and I kept answering in my usual candid style.” India-China issues expected but can be addressed without conflict, says India foreign minister (Reuters)
Reuters [3/26/2025 11:38 AM, Sakshi Dayal, 41523K]
India and China will have issues in the "foreseeable future" but there are ways to address them without getting into a conflict, India’s foreign minister said on Wednesday.
The two countries reached an agreement in October regarding patrolling along their Himalayan border, thawing a standoff that began in 2020 when 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers were killed in clashes.
The dispute impacted several aspects of bilateral ties, from trade and technology to air travel.
"We know that, between India and China...at least in the foreseeable future, there will be issues, but there are ways of addressing those issues, and what happened in 2020 was not the way," Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said in a conversation with non-profit Asia Society.
India Prime Minister Narendra Modi had also said last week that "trust, enthusiasm, and energy" would return to the equation with China, and that the focus of the countries was to ensure difference do not turn into disputes.
"We feel that from October...the relationship has seen some improvement...what we are trying, step by step, is to see if we can rebuild, undo some of the damage which happened as a result of the actions in 2020," Jaishankar said.
India and China share a 3,800 km (2,400 mile) border that has been disputed since the 1950s, and have previously gone to war over it.
Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia last year – their first formal talks since 2020 - and agreed to boost communication and cooperation, and resolve conflicts to improve ties. Allegations of Indian interference rock Canada election campaign (The Guardian)
The Guardian [3/26/2025 3:22 PM, Leyland Cecco, 78938K]
The spectre of interference by India has already rocked the early days of Canada’s federal election, with officials warning that sophisticated efforts from other hostile nations are expected in the coming weeks.
As Canadians prepare to cast ballots on 28 April, senior officials say that India, China, Pakistan and Iran are all expected to make efforts to subvert the national vote through increasingly sophisticated disinformation campaigns.
The use of artificial-intelligence tools is likely to figure prominently in efforts to deceive voters and sway diaspora communities. Earlier this year, a landmark inquiry into foreign interference found that information manipulation is the biggest risk to democratic institutions.
"Most threat actors remain likely to conduct threat activities and have likely adapted their tradecraft to further conceal their foreign-interference activity, making it even more challenging to detect," Vanessa Lloyd, deputy director of operations for Canada’s spy agency and chair of the security and intelligence threats to elections taskforce, told reporters earlier this week as the agency laid out its plan to blunt the effects of interference campaigns.
Between late January and early February, China is believed to have targeted the Liberal leadership bid of the former finance minister Chrystia Freeland, in a "malicious" campaign on WeChat that was viewed as many as 3m times, the security and intelligence threats to elections taskforce said in a news release.
On Wednesday, the Globe and Mail reported that former Liberal leadership hopeful Chandra Arya had been disqualified amid concerns over his relationship with India and concerns he could be susceptible to outside influence.
Arya, elected to the House of Commons in 2015, was told he was barred from formally entering the Liberal leadership race in later January. Earlier this month, he was also told he was ineligible to run again in his electoral district. In both cases, the Liberal party did not provide further details.
According to a security source who spoke to the Globe, while Canada was grappling with the fallout of India’s assassination of a Sikh activist on Canadian soil, Arya travelled to India in August and met the prime minister, Narendra Modi. Arya is not believed to have not informed the government of his meetings.
"As a member of parliament, I have engaged with numerous diplomats and heads of government, both in Canada and internationally. Not once have I sought – nor been required to seek – permission from the government to do so," he said in a statement. "The sole point of contention with the Liberal party has been my outspoken advocacy on issues important to Hindu Canadians and my firm stance against Khalistani extremism.".
The Canadian prime minister, Mark Carney, who doesn’t have a seat in the House of Commons, announced late last week he would contest the electoral district of Nepean, previously held by Arya.
Carney was asked on Wednesday whether foreign-interference concerns had prevented the party from nominating a full slate of candidates for the current federal election. He told reporters hostile actors were not to blame for the party’s delay in nominating candidates.
But accusations of outside influence have also shaken the opposition Conservative campaign, following allegations that India interfered in the 2022 leadership race, with the aim of helping the winner, Pierre Poilievre.
The allegations, first reported by the Globe and Mail, suggest the Tory leader’s win was not attributable to outside influence and Poilievre is not believed to have been aware of India’s efforts.
"Let’s be honest, I won the leadership fair and square," he told reporters.
But Canada’s spy agency could not share the information with Poilievre because he does not have the necessary security clearance. Poilievre is the only federal party leader who has declined an offer to obtain a security clearance – a position that has received widespread criticism and incredulity.
"It’s very weird, because I can’t imagine, from a political perspective, why it’s worth it. I have top-secret clearance, it’s not that hard," said Lori Turnbull, the director of Dalhousie University’s school of public administration. "It’s very hard for me to get my mind around why a leader who wants to be prime minister would not go ahead and do this. To give your rival something like that, for free, is stupid when you’re fighting a close election.".
While intelligence officials have long anticipated and experienced efforts from hostile nations like India and China to sway a federal election, less predictable is the role Donald Trump might play. The US president has launched a trade war with Canada, and threatened to annex the country.
Trump has a reputation for sharing false information and his close ally and senior adviser Elon Musk, the owner of the social media network X, has been implicated in the amplification of misinformation.
Canada’s chief electoral officer, Stéphane Perrault, has said his office was not aware of any specific threats coming from the US. India’s Reliance to stop buying Venezuelan oil over US tariffs, sources say (Reuters)
Reuters [3/26/2025 8:15 AM, Nidhi Verma, 5.2M]
India’s Reliance Industries (RELI.NS) operator of the world’s biggest refining complex, will halt Venezuelan oil imports after the United States announced a 25% tariff on nations buying crude from the South American nation, three sources said on Wednesday.
The Indian conglomerate, which last year obtained approval from U.S. authorities to purchase oil from the sanctioned producer, imports an average of 2 million barrels of Venezuelan crude every month, according to LSEG data.
It is scheduled to receive a Venezuelan cargo in early April, LSEG trade flows data showed.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s executive order says that higher tariffs may be imposed on or after April 2 on all goods imported from any country that buys Venezuelan oil.
The three industry sources with knowledge of Reliance’s purchasing plans said the company would stop buying Venezuelan crude due to the tariff threat.
It was not immediately clear, however, if it would still take delivery of the April cargo, added one of the sources, all of whom declined to be identified as they were not authorised to speak to media.
Reliance did not respond to a Reuters request for comment.
Loading of Venezuelan heavy crude at the country’s main oil ports has already slowed this week following the tariff announcement.
Reliance’s two refineries in western Gujarat state can process about 1.4 million barrels per day of crude oil.
The complexity of those plants allows it to process cheaper and heavier crudes such as Merey from Venezuela. Why the Indian Ocean, Not the Indo-Pacific, Must Anchor India’s Strategy (The Diplomat)
The Diplomat [3/26/2025 8:37 AM, Sanchari Ghosh, 777K]
India’s adoption of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic framework has gained prominence over the past decade. The concept is often portrayed as the defining lens for New Delhi’s geopolitical engagement. However, this expansive vision obscures a fundamental reality: India’s security, influence, and maritime identity are deeply anchored in the Indian Ocean, not the broader Indo-Pacific.
India’s Indo-Pacific strategy emerged in response to China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean and South Asia. While New Delhi shares strategic concerns with Australia, Japan, and the United States – its fellow members in the Quad grouping – India’s Indo-Pacific approach is primarily a means to counterbalance Beijing in its immediate maritime neighborhood. Thus, without a stronghold in the Indian Ocean, India’s Indo-Pacific aspirations remain hollow. The Indian Ocean must remain the centerpiece of India’s maritime strategy for three principal reasons: strategic security, economic imperatives, and geopolitical agency.
Strategic Security: Defending India’s Immediate Maritime Neighborhood.
India’s foremost maritime security concerns – piracy, illegal fishing, terrorism, and China’s growing encroachment – are concentrated in the Indian Ocean. China’s "String of Pearls" strategy, with control over ports in Djibouti, Gwadar, and Hambantota, directly challenges India’s regional primacy. India’s counterstrategy, often dubbed the "Necklace of Diamonds," focuses on strengthening its naval presence and deepening security partnerships within the Indian Ocean. This includes securing access to key maritime chokepoints, enhancing naval infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and promoting closer ties with littoral states such as Mauritius, the Maldives, and Seychelles.
While India is already engaged in these efforts, they remain fragmented and largely reactive. In other words, India’s current engagements in the Indian Ocean are mostly responses to specific challenges – such as China’s expanding presence – rather than being part of a proactive, overarching strategy that consistently prioritizes the region. A more decisive Indian Ocean-first strategy would integrate these individual engagements into a broader framework that consolidates India’s regional leadership and ensures long-term security dominance in these waters.
Although the Indo-Pacific is framed as a unified strategic space, the reality is that India faces more urgent security challenges in the Indian Ocean than in the Pacific. The growing militarization of Chinese facilities in the Indian Ocean, including surveillance operations around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, reveals the pressing need for India to consolidate its defenses closer to home. Before India can extend its power projection to Southeast Asia or the Pacific, it must ensure absolute control over its home waters. An unstable Indian Ocean weakens India’s ability to engage meaningfully in Indo-Pacific security dynamics.
Moreover, unlike other Quad members, which divide the Indian Ocean into two halves and prioritize only its eastern part, India cannot afford such a limited approach. The western Indian Ocean – encompassing key maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb, and the Mozambique Channel – directly impacts India’s security and trade. Ignoring these waters would leave India vulnerable to strategic encirclement.
Additionally, the Quad’s overwhelming focus on the Pacific further underscores India’s need to independently secure its Indian Ocean interests. The recent push for the Squad alliance (Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S.) – which explicitly aims to counter China in the Western Pacific and South China Sea – demonstrates how the Quad’s strategic enthusiasm remains heavily Pacific-centric. While this serves the interests of other Quad members, it does little to reinforce India’s Indian Ocean security priorities, reinforcing the need for a regional security coalition that aligns with India’s maritime imperatives.
Economic Imperatives: Trade, Resources, and Strategic Access.
Over 90 percent of India’s trade by volume and 70 percent by value passes through the Indian Ocean. The region is also critical for India’s blue economy, with vital fisheries, offshore energy resources, and strategic trade routes. Initiatives like SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) – newly upgraded to MAHASAGAR – emphasize India’s commitment to keeping these waters open, stable, and well-governed.
China’s deepening economic ties with Sri Lanka, its dominant presence in Hambantota, and its recent track record of securing long-term infrastructure projects in East Africa pose long-term risks to India’s ability to influence regional trade. The Indian Ocean is not just a security issue for India; it is an economic lifeline. Without firm control over the region’s sea lanes, India risks losing economic leverage to Beijing, limiting its influence in both regional and global supply chains.
Moreover, the Indian Ocean strategy must be integrated with India’s domestic development priorities, particularly in the Northeast region. Connectivity projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the Act East Policy must be leveraged to link Northeast India more effectively with the Bay of Bengal, creating stronger economic corridors through the Indian Ocean. A robust Indian Ocean strategy involving India’s neighboring countries can bridge the economic isolation of Northeast India, which can provide new avenues for trade and maritime connectivity while strengthening India’s presence in the eastern littoral.
Geopolitical Agency: The Limits of Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific.
The Indo-Pacific is often framed as a seamless strategic space linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans. However, for India, this is only viable if the Indian Ocean remains stable. If India loses strategic control over the Indian Ocean, its influence in the Indo-Pacific collapses. India’s leadership in Quad, ASEAN engagement, and Act East policy hinges on its ability to command the Indian Ocean.
The shortcomings of Indo-Pacific minilateralism have become increasingly evident. While the Quad is often cited as a pillar of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, its members have not consistently backed India when it mattered most. During India’s border standoff with China in Ladakh in 2020, none of the Quad members extended military or diplomatic deterrence beyond symbolic statements. Similarly, while India prioritizes the Indian Ocean, its Quad partners remain more focused on the Pacific. The United States and Australia are preoccupied with countering China in the South China Sea, while Japan’s primary security concerns lie in the East China Sea. The Quad’s emphasis on freedom of navigation in the Pacific does not directly align with India’s urgent security needs in the Indian Ocean, where Chinese naval deployments continue to rise.
Further, concerns about the future of the Quad under the second Trump administration add another layer of uncertainty. Many analysts fear that President Donald Trump, who famously disdains alliances, could weaken U.S. commitment to minilateral security arrangements like the Quad. If U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific shifts, India may find itself even more reliant on its Indian Ocean strategy to counterbalance China’s growing influence.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its increasing military presence in the Indian Ocean pose direct threats to India’s strategic autonomy. Its investments in Sri Lanka (Hambantota Port), Pakistan (Gwadar Port), and East Africa (Djibouti) give Beijing access to strategic locations, potentially limiting India’s influence in these waters. While the Quad offers a broader strategic framework, India’s real contest with China is unfolding in the Indian Ocean. To counterbalance China, India is expanding its influence through stronger maritime engagements, such as the trilateral maritime security cooperation with Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and extending its presence in key chokepoints like the Mozambique Channel.
The Indo-Pacific is a useful framework, but it must not dilute India’s core strategic focus – the Indian Ocean. This is where India’s security threats are most acute, where its economic interests are most vital, and where it possesses the greatest historical legitimacy. India’s Indo-Pacific vision will remain aspirational unless anchored in a robust Indian Ocean strategy. The Indian Ocean is not a stepping stone to the Indo-Pacific but the mainstay of India’s maritime and strategic calculus. Without it, India’s Indo-Pacific ambitions are adrift. India Erases Islamic and Colonial History (Wall Street Journal – opinion)
Wall Street Journal [3/26/2025 5:54 PM, Sadanand Dhume, 810K]
You might think that India, a country with nuclear weapons, an ambitious space program and aspirations for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, would have better things to debate than a Mughal emperor who died more than 300 years ago. You would be mistaken.
Earlier this month, clashes between police and Hindu and Muslim mobs in Nagpur, in the western state of Maharashtra, injured about 70 people. Angry Muslims torched cars and battled police after Hindu nationalist protesters allied with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party burned an effigy of Aurangzeb, a Muslim emperor who ruled the Mughal Empire—which for a time included most of the Indian subcontinent—from 1658 to 1707. The protesters were demanding that the government raze Aurangzeb’s modest grave—an idea many Muslims and Hindu secularists find abhorrent.
The immediate cause of the Hindu nationalist demand appears to be “Chhaava,” a Bollywood movie that focuses in lurid detail on Aurangzeb’s execution of the son and successor of a widely revered Hindu king who battled the Mughal Empire during the latter half of the 17th century. The film, already the highest-grossing Indian movie this year, has earned more than $90 million worldwide.
The movie’s commercial success and the controversy it has sparked take place amid an ideological battle between the ruling Hindu nationalists and once-dominant Hindu secularist and Muslim groups. In the Hindu nationalist pantheon of villains, arguably no one ranks higher than Aurangzeb. They despise him for murdering his brothers, imprisoning his father, reimposing the Islamic jizya tax on Hindus, destroying Hindu temples and building mosques in their place, executing Sikh spiritual leaders for refusing to convert to Islam, and outlawing Hindu religious fairs.
Some Indian Muslims admire Aurangzeb for his piety and military prowess. He extended the Mughal Empire to its farthest boundaries. His empire spanned Kabul in today’s Afghanistan, Lahore in Pakistan, Chennai in southern India and Dhaka in Bangladesh. It contained some 150 million people, more than the population of Europe at the time.
But the secularist case against demonizing Aurangzeb hinges less on praising his actions—which some historians regard as extreme even by the standards of his time—and more on placing them in context. As the argument goes, religious bigotry and bloodshed were common in the 17th century. And while Aurangzeb razed some Hindu temples, he provided grants to others. Above all, secularists argue that India needs to move on. What’s the point of endlessly litigating the past?
In today’s India, defending Aurangzeb is a losing battle. In 2015, the government renamed Aurangzeb Road, a prominent street in New Delhi, after an ex-president of India. In 2023, the city of Aurangabad, named after the Mughal ruler, was renamed Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar after the Hindu ruler whose death the recent Bollywood film depicts. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has castigated Aurangzeb for his “atrocities” and “terrorism.” On social media, Indians regularly compare the Mughal emperor to Stalin and Hitler.
Hindu nationalists aren’t only interested in erasing Aurangzeb; they want to overwrite centuries of Islamic rule in India more generally. In recent years, they’ve renamed many cities, districts and cultural sites with Hindu names.
Those who want India to approach history with more temperance have a point. The country ought to be able to come to terms with the past without razing historical sites or renaming places to erase all traces of Islamic rule.
The trouble with this argument, however, is that many of those who seek to prevent the erasure of India’s Islamic past followed the same playbook when wiping out symbols of British colonial rule.
Over the years, the anglicized place names Bombay, Madras and Calcutta have given way to Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata. The imposing Victoria Terminus, a railway station built in the late 19th century to mark Queen Victoria’s golden jubilee, is now called Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Terminus, named after the founder of the Maratha Empire, who battled Aurangzeb. Roads named for British viceroys and governors-general have been erased. Statues of imperial rulers lie rotting in fields and other out-of-the-way sites. Some hyper-nationalists even seek to stop using the name India and replace it with “Bharat,” which is the country’s official name in Hindi.
Compared with India, the West is fortunate to have a culture that approaches the past with a greater degree of moderation. Still, India’s wars over history bring to mind the excesses of radical leftist protesters during the madness that followed the killing of George Floyd in 2020. According to the New York Times, in the three years following Floyd’s death, activists succeeded in removing more than 230 purported symbols of white supremacism across the U.S.
This hysteria appears to have receded in the U.S. But the lesson from India is clear. If you allow one group of people to wield history as a cudgel in contemporary political battles, don’t be surprised when another group does the same to symbols you want to preserve. NSB
Adani Restores Power Supply to Bangladesh as Payments Resume (Bloomberg)
Bloomberg [3/27/2025 2:04 AM, Sanjai P R and Arun Devnath, 5.5M]
Bangladesh said Indian billionaire Gautam Adani’s power generation unit resumed full electricity supply to the nation, four months after halving the feed over unpaid dues.“We’re making regular payments to Adani and receiving power as per our requirements,” Rezaul Karim, chairman of Bangladesh Power Development Board, said on Thursday. He didn’t specify the quantum of payments and whether past arrears have been cleared.
Data from BPDB shows Adani increased power supply more than two weeks ago.
Adani Power Ltd. had halved supply from its 1,600 megawatt coal-fired plant in India’s Jharkhand state in November after a series of missed payments by Dhaka, which was battling a foreign exchange crisis amid a turbulent change of regime. Restoration of supply will help Bangladesh avoid blackouts in the sweltering summer months when temperatures can reach 38C (100.4F) or more.
Shares of the company extended gains after the report, climbing as much as 2% in Mumbai. The stock has declined nearly 5% so far this year.
The dues, which had at one point crossed $850 million, now stands at $800 million and the same would be cleared in next six months, people familiar with the matter said. The BPDB had also provided guarantees to reassure Adani’s lenders to ease the company’s working capital crunch, they said, requesting not to be named as the information is private.
A representative of the Adani Group did not immediately respond to a request for comments.
The restoration of power is a step to help repair business ties between the two nations. As Bangladesh gears up for election, a new political player emerges (NPR)
NPR [3/27/2025 2:21 AM, Shamim Chowdhury, 30M]
Last summer, 26-year-old Bangladeshi student activist Nahid Islam did the unthinkable. Along with a few companions, he set the stage to bring down the authoritarian Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her government.
It sparked Bangladesh’s first ever Gen-Z uprising and concluded with Hasina hastily fleeing to India in a helicopter.The students’ actions came at a heavy price: at least 1,400 people lost their lives and many others were injured, mostly at the hands of Hasina’s security forces.
For Islam, the eight months since then have been a whirlwind. The sociology graduate was promptly made part of the interim government led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, and more recently, he became the convener of a new student-led political party, the National Citizen’s Party (NCP).
It’s beyond anything the little-known son of middle-class educator parents could have imagined, but Islam remains unfazed.
"There was no way to remove the regime except through an uprising," he tells NPR in Dhaka. "We knew negotiation wasn’t an option. But it wasn’t just against the regime—it was against an entire corrupt system."
Is a new political era possible?
The question many Bangladeshis are asking now is: Can the uprising translate into long-term political representation, or will the country’s long-standing political establishment continue to maintain its stranglehold?
Islam believes a new political era is possible—but it will take time. His vision for the centrist NCP is one that stands apart from the old guard and brings a fresh way of doing things in what he describes as a "post-ideological" era.
"We want a new political system and a new constitution," he says. "The current one enables authoritarianism. We need reform so that future governments can’t repeat the mistakes of the past."
He’s referring to accusations of corruption, oppression, human rights abuses, and a lack of freedom of speech that persisted for years under two of Bangladesh’s main political parties.
Exactly 54 years ago, on March 26th, 1971, East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, declared its independence from West Pakistan. This led to a brutal nine-month war, which was followed by a period of one-party rule and, eventually, a military takeover that lasted until 1991.
Since then, it has been dominated by the Awami League, led by Hasina, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khaleda Zia, widow of former military ruler Ziaur Rahman.
The third-largest party, the religiously conservative Jamaat-e-Islami, has also been influential. It has been banned on numerous occasions due to accusations of inciting violence, most recently in 2024. The ban was lifted by the interim government.
Leading polls and media platforms in Bangladesh predict that the BNP will dominate the upcoming parliamentary elections, which are due to take place in December or soon afterwards.
Tapping into a political vacuumWith most Awami League leaders either exiled or imprisoned, and uncertainty about their participation, a political vacuum is forming that Islam wants to tap into.
According to Bangladesh’s Bureau of Statistics, a quarter of the population is between the ages of 15 and 29 — that’s 45.9 million people.
Bangladesh’s Election Commission said voter turnout in the 2024 elections was around 40 percent — although independent analysts believe it to be lower.
"The uprising has shown that a new political generation has emerged," Islam says. "They have new aspirations. This generation rejects the old parties. We believe there is a social demand for change."
As part of this shift, the NCP has already begun crafting its manifesto, with a focus on education, healthcare, climate change, and addressing the specific needs of the country’s youth.
But Naomi Hossain, a political analyst at SOAS, University of London, believes the NCP will face numerous challenges.
"If students secure 25 percent or even 50 percent of the votes, it wouldn’t necessarily translate into as many seats," she says, "even in the fairest elections, due to how constituencies and first-past-the-post politics work, all elections distort popular preferences in some way."
A new generation vs new ideas
The NCP also faces the reality that many young people are aligned with the student wings of the BNP and Jamaat.
Mohammad Abu Bakr Siddique Molla, a spokesperson for Jamaat-e-Islami in the UK, says that even though NCP targets young Bangladeshis, both his party and the BNP also have student organizations.
"These organizations played a major role in the uprising," he tells NPR. "When the elections come, the Gen-Z generation will be divided — some will support the new political parties, while others will back Jamaat or BNP."
Some key Gen-Z figures aligned with existing political parties include Sadek Kayen, the leader of Jamaat’s student wing and a Dhaka University student, as well as BNP student leaders Rakibul Islam Rakib and Nasir Uddin Nasir.
These, along with many other prominent student activists, played a crucial role in building the momentum that led to the uprising. They continue to be central figures in shaping the future of Bangladesh’s political landscape.
Abdul Moyeen Khan, a senior BNP member, believes that the reforms Islam and his party are pushing for are part of an ongoing process, and not cannot necessarily be shaped by generational differences.He says that it’s not that the Old Guard will retire today, and the young generation will take over tomorrow. "It doesn’t work that way in society. Reform is a continuous process. A new political generation isn’t defined by age— it’s shaped by new ideas."
Still, Hossain says, the new student party has broad popular support and sympathy due to last year’s uprising and the sacrifices these young people made.
"There’s no reason to believe that if they perform reasonably well in the next election and gain some support, they won’t build their movement over time and attract the institutional support and funding they need."
Islam remains reserved when asked if he sees himself as Bangladesh’s future prime minister.
"We believe in collective leadership," he says. "I’m the leader now, but I may not be in the future. What matters is our long-term vision. The uprising is just the beginning—we want to build on that."
NPR reached out to a representative of the Awami League for comment but got no response. Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh fear aid cuts will deepen crisis (Reuters)
Reuters [3/26/2025 9:17 PM, Ruma Paul, 41523K]
Majuna Khatun sat cradling her six-month-old baby at a rehabilitation centre for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, worried her child would be without critical healthcare due to funding cuts from the United States and some European countries.
"Where will I go if this facility closes?" 30-year-old Khatun said at the centre, where her child, whose tiny feet were strapped into orthopaedic braces, receives physiotherapy for clubfoot.
Bangladesh is sheltering more than 1 million Rohingya - members of the world’s largest stateless population who fled violent purges in neighbouring Myanmar - in camps in the Cox’s Bazar district, where they have limited access to jobs or education.
The decision by the administration of President Donald Trump to halt most foreign aid and dismantle the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has caused turmoil in the humanitarian sector globally and the U.N. has warned that it will create dire conditions for refugees.
At the Bangladesh camps, Rohingya refugees fear the cuts will compound food and health issues and lead to a surge in crime.
"There are fewer doctors now. Rohingya volunteers who supported us have been dismissed. People are suffering because they can’t get the treatment they need," said Mohammad Sadek, a 24-year-old Rohingya.
The U.S. has been the largest provider of aid to the Rohingya refugees, contributing nearly $2.4 billion since 2017, according to a State Department website.
The freeze on funds has forced five U.S.-funded hospitals to reduce services, Mohammed Mizanur Rahman, Bangladesh’s top official overseeing the refugee camps, said last month.
About 48 health facilities, including 11 primary care centres, have also been affected, leaving many refugees without access to essential care, said Hasina Rahman, Bangladesh country director for the International Rescue Committee.
"Our priority (now) is to protect the most vulnerable, especially women, girls, and children," she said.
David Bugden, principal coordinator of the Inter-Sector Coordination Group, which oversees NGO efforts at Cox’s Bazar, said around 300,000 refugees have been impacted by disruptions in healthcare services.
Bangladesh’s foreign ministry and the U.S. embassy did not respond to requests for comment.
Gul Bahar’s four-year-old daughter Mukarrama, suffers from cerebral palsy. She has been undergoing therapy for the past three years which has helped improve her condition.
"If this centre shuts down, we’ll lose everything she’s gained. I’ll be back to square one," said Bahar, 32, her voice trembling.
HUNGER AND CRIME
The U.S. cuts and those by some European countries would worsen already dire conditions for the refugees, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned.
The U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) said it may be forced to halve the amount of food rations to $6 from April due to a funding shortfall, which would amount to 20 cents a day.
A previous round of ration cuts in 2023 that reduced the amount to $8 monthly led to a sharp increase in hunger and malnutrition, the U.N. has said. The cut was later reversed.
"We can’t work outside the camp, and the rations we get are barely enough. If they reduce it further, crime will increase, people will do anything to survive," said Nojir Ahmad, a father of five, who fled to Bangladesh from Myanmar in 2017.
Rohingya camps have seen an upswing in crimes in recent years, according to police data.
About 70,000 Rohingya from Myanmar fled to Bangladesh last year, driven in part by growing hunger in their home state of Rakhine.
Aid cuts could make refugees more vulnerable to trafficking, radicalisation and exploitation, said a Bangladesh official, who did not want to be named as he was not authorised to speak to the media.
"Our food, healthcare, and education systems are collapsing," said Mohammad Jubair, a prominent Rohingya community leader. "If this gets out of hand, it won’t just be a problem for Bangladesh - it will become a global issue.".
Shofiul Islam was bedridden after falling from a tree five years ago. The 35-year-old said his world shrunk to the four walls of his shanty until the rehabilitation centre began treating him.
"I couldn’t stand up or even turn in bed... because of them, I can move again," he said, using a forearm crutch to support himself.
"If it closes, all dreams will be shattered. People like me will have nowhere to turn.". Sri Lanka Says British Sanctions On Ex-military Unhelpful (Agence France-Presse)
Agence France-Presse [3/26/2025 8:55 AM, Staff, 52868K]
Sri Lanka’s new government on Wednesday criticised Britain’s sanctions against three retired top military commanders and a former Tamil guerrilla, saying the move complicated reconciliation after its decades-long conflict.The British government announced on Monday sanctions against the former head of Sri Lanka’s armed forces, Shavendra Silva, former navy commander Wasantha Karannagoda and former army commander Jagath Jayasuriya.A fourth Sri Lankan, former military commander of the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, was also sanctioned.London’s "unilateral action did not assist but served to complicate the national reconciliation process in Sri Lanka", the Colombo government said in a statement.The Foreign Office said that the four were responsible for "serious human rights abuses and violations" during the island’s drawn-out Tamil separatist war, which ended in May 2009.This included "extrajudicial killings, torture, and/or perpetration of sexual violence", the Foreign Office said.The sanctions include UK travel bans and asset freezes.Colombo said the sanctions came at a time when it was "in the process of strengthening domestic mechanisms on accountability and reconciliation", but did not elaborate.It added, however, that any wartime human rights violations should be dealt with through domestic accountability mechanisms.The Sri Lankan former military leaders have also been slapped with travel bans from the United States and Canada.Several former security personnel have previously been denied visas to several Western nations.Sri Lanka’s successive governments have rejected international calls, including from the United Nations, to establish an independent, credible investigative mechanism to prosecute war criminals.London’s top envoy in Colombo, Andrew Patrick, was summoned to the Foreign Ministry to convey Sri Lanka’s displeasure.In its Monday statement, the British government said it remained committed to human rights in Sri Lanka, including seeking accountability for violations and abuses that occurred during the civil war.More than 40,000 people, mostly Tamil civilians, were estimated to have been killed by government forces in the final months of the war, an allegation Colombo has consistently denied. Central Asia
Kremlin wants Kazakhstan to ease up on banking due diligence concerning trade deals (EurasiaNet)
EurasiaNet [3/26/2025 4:14 PM, Staff, 57.6K]
Russia is upset that commercial banks in Kazakhstan are exhibiting “excessive caution” in settling payments and extending loans involving companies doing business with Moscow.
A report published by the Russian media outlet RTVI claimed that entities in Kazakhstan that do business with Russia are the victims of “over-compliance,” which hinders legitimate cross-border commerce. A major source of discontent is “the fact that Kazakh banks demand from their clients ‘letters of guarantee’ on the refusal to export finished products to Russia, under the threat of closing credit lines.” Some commercial banks simply refuse to process payments involving Russia, the report added. Others require exhaustive paperwork to complete transactions.
The bankers’ caution appears rooted in concern that lax compliance on potentially illicit trade could result in the imposition of secondary sanctions on banks, and possible disconnection from the SWIFT payment system.
RTVI quoted an anonymous entrepreneur who complained bitterly about bankers’ vigilance when it comes to money moving between Kazakhstan and Russia. “This is a wave-like movement. As soon as we find options for settlements, after some point there is another tightening, and everything starts all over again,” the source told RTVI.
Several Kazakhstan-based firms operating on behalf of Russians have been slapped with sanctions for engaging in activity supportive of Russia’s war effort. The investigative outlet OCCRP published a piece in late 2023 showing how Kazakhstan has served as a critical conduit used by Russia to obtain dual-use items that help maintain the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Kazakh leaders, meanwhile, insist that the country abides by US and European Union sanctions.
Members of the Ak Zhol faction in the Kazakh parliament are said to have recently sent a letter to officials at the National Bank of Kazakhstan and other government agencies effectively asking that authorities lean on commercial bankers to loosen up their rules. The letter reportedly pointed out that Kazakh legislation does not specifically bar banks from handling transactions related to sanctions imposed by third countries, according to RTVI.In a response, National Bank officials reportedly acknowledged that commercial banks have imposed a heavy burden on those seeking to do business with individuals or entities in Russia, but it added that it is not inclined to intervene, the RTVI report indicated. The National Bank affirmed that “the risk of secondary sanctions by foreign states” is a legitimate concern for commercial banks. Uzbekistan’s Evolving Northern Afghanistan Strategy (The Diplomat)
The Diplomat [3/26/2025 4:30 PM, Hamza Boltaev and Islomkhan Gafarov, 53K]
Afghan-Uzbek relations are expected to reach to a new high in 2025. Last year, the two countries stated aims to increase bilateral trade turnover to $3 billion. The planned construction of an Uzbek trade center, covering an area of 220 square meters, in Mazar-i-Sharif along with an effort for intensifying the implementation of the Trans-Afghan transport corridor might further solidify bilateral pragmatic cooperation between the two neighbors.
Over the last three years, Uzbekistan has pursued a proactive foreign policy toward Taliban-led Afghanistan based on its own strategic interests. Tashkent’s long-lasting obsession with a security-oriented approach has been traded for a pragmatic, economy-first foreign policy in relation to Kabul. Adopting a flexible and multivector approach to its Afghan policy might incur potential reputational risks for Uzbekistan’s international image. However, the current geopolitical reality and the historical links between Afghanistan and Central Asia underscore the significance of the country for Uzbekistan’s foreign policy priorities.
Tashkent’s foreign policy orientation toward Afghanistan is largely focused on the northern provinces. Historically, the two sides of the Oxus (the modern Amu Darya) were deeply connected through ethnic, historical, and cultural ties. The Afghan provinces of Balkh, Jowzjan, Faryab, Sar-e Pol, Takhar, and Kunduz, where a significant Uzbek community resides, have long been closely connected to the civilizational space of Mavarannahr (also called Transoxiana), the legacy of which modern Uzbekistan upholds.
Some northern Afghan territories maintained administrative and political ties with the Emirate of Bukhara until the late 19th century, highlighting the longevity and depth of shared historical heritage.
This factor plays a crucial role in shaping contemporary Afghan-Uzbek relations, providing a foundation for sustainable partnership. Even during the tenure of Uzbekistan’s first president, when Tashkent officially exercised caution regarding Afghanistan, engagement with northern Afghanistan – particularly with the leader of the Uzbek community, Abdul Rashid Dostum – remained stable.
Over time, historical-cultural ties led to practical steps. A key contribution by Uzbekistan to the region’s infrastructure development was the construction of the 75-km Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif railway, completed in 2011 using its own funds. However, during that period, Tashkent’s priorities were primarily focused on security issues, and northern Afghanistan was regarded as a buffer zone ensuring strategic stability along Uzbekistan’s southern borders from the early 1990s to 2021.
Economic factors are playing a significant role in contemporary Afghan-Uzbek relations, shifting the focus away from security concerns. In recent years, Uzbekistan has actively expanded trade and economic cooperation with Afghanistan, establishing an International Trade Center in Termez, at the border, which has significantly boosted bilateral trade turnover. As part of furthering economic engagement, plans are under consideration to open a similar center in Mazar-i-Sharif, creating additional conditions for expanding trade and investment cooperation between the two countries.
Afghanistan, with its population of 41 million, represents a promising market for Uzbek goods. Currently, multiple countries – including China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Qatar, and the UAE – are showing interest in the Afghan market. Given the increasing competition, Tashkent faces the challenge of maintaining and strengthening its economic position in Afghanistan at a time when others are eyeing much the same.
While Afghanistan’s southern provinces are traditionally oriented toward Pakistan and its western regions toward Iran, Uzbekistan has the opportunity to sustain and expand its economic influence in the north. In this context, cultural and historical ties play a crucial role, fostering local preference for Uzbek goods and services in northern Afghanistan. This factor provides Tashkent with a strategic advantage in the competition for the Afghan market.
The transformation of Uzbek foreign policy toward Afghanistan has manifested in its approach to the Qosh-Tepa Canal project. The Uzbek government has notably refrained from emphasizing the potential water-related tensions that may arise from the initiative. This careful approach can be attributed to the recognition that, for the sake of its own security, Tashkent has come to understanding the importance of fostering economic development in northern Afghanistan as a means of ensuring regional stability. Consequently, the prevailing consensus in Tashkent underscores the prioritization of security through economic cooperation and socio-economic development strategies. Uzbekistan’s approach to the canal project arguably demonstrates the evolving trajectory of Uzbek foreign policy toward Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, the development of agriculture and irrigation infrastructure in Afghanistan’s northern provinces contributes to improving living standards of local communities, and thereby strengthens bilateral relations between Tashkent and Kabul. In this context, Uzbekistan supports the implementation of the Qosh-Tepa project, provided it adheres to international norms and standards, ensuring the minimization of potential environmental risks and long-term benefits for all stakeholders.
Uzbekistan has placed a significant emphasis on educational initiatives in northern Afghanistan, viewing them as key factors in mutual understanding and eventually fostering the regional stability. In this regard, Tashkent has sponsored the construction of the "Khair al-Mudaris Imam Bukhari" madrassa in Mazar-i-Sharif. The institution is reportedly planned to be built with Uzbek-backed financial support amounting to $6 million and accommodating 1,000 students.
Tashkent believes that establishing such a joint educational institution might facilitate the development of a unified approach to religious education, which will eventually minimize the risk of radical ideologies spreading and strengthen the region’s spiritual security. Additionally, such a madrassa’s activities appear to foster a positive perception of Uzbekistan among Afghanistan’s religious community, which plays a crucial role in socio-political processes and governance. Thus, Uzbekistan’s involvement in preparing Afghanistan’s intellectual elite could become a vital instrument of its soft power strategy, contributing to the country’s long-term influence in the region.
Although the Taliban appear to view Uzbekistan’s growing interest in northern Afghanistan as a positive development and recognize Tashkent as a key economic partner, several existing challenges could impact the development of bilateral relations.
First, the Taliban’s conscious and subtle push toward changing the ethnic landscape of the northern regions of Afghanistan could shift the balance in these provinces. Pashtuns, with their distinct cultural and historical background, may be less receptive to Tashkent’s initiatives in the area. In the long run, these developments might influence Uzbekistan’s strategic approach toward northern Afghanistan and could necessitate adjustments to it.
Second, Chinese influence in the northern regions of Afghanistan is growing. Chinese investments in extracting oil from the Amu Darya delta and the development of the Wakhan Corridor project could potentially shift local economic preferences in China’s favor, which might affect conditions for Uzbek investments in the region. Nevertheless, this process might present opportunities for Chinese-Uzbek cooperation aimed at transforming northern Afghanistan into a key transit hub for international projects, thereby enhancing Tashkent’s regional influence and advancing its economic interests.
Third, the implementation of international energy projects such as TAPI and CASA-1000 could lead to the Afghan energy market’s reorientation toward Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. This, in turn, may reduce Uzbekistan’s humanitarian assistance to northern Afghanistan while simultaneously diminishing Afghanistan’s reliance on energy cooperation with Uzbekistan. A weakening of energy diplomacy could impact the overall nature of bilateral relations.
Uzbekistan has recognized Afghanistan as a part of the broader Central Asian region, at least in discourse. The primary projects being implemented and planned by Uzbekistan are concentrated in the northern parts of Afghanistan, underscoring its strategic importance within Uzbekistan’s foreign policy framework.
Notably, Uzbekistan’s approach to the Qosh-Tepa Canal project as a development issue and a potential point for bilateral collaboration overweigh, at least for now, concerns about water security. In this context, Tashkent’s policy extends beyond its traditional national security concerns to encompass broader objectives – enhancing regional stability and socio-economic development – which, in turn, contribute to the long-term strengthening of Afghan-Uzbek relations. In the end, the water from the canal feeds Uzbeks inhabiting both sides of the border. EU/Central Asia: Deepening Ties Should Center Human Rights (Human Rights Watch)
Human Rights Watch [3/27/2025 2:00 AM, Staff, 1.6M]
The European Union should put human rights at the center of its intensifying engagement with Central Asian countries at the inaugural EU-Central Asia summit on April 3 and 4, 2025 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, Human Rights Watch said today.
The EU is deepening bilateral agreements and connections to the countries in the region. Rights protections and the rule of law are essential to secure its interests in any partnership.“It is good news that the EU is engaging at a high level with Central Asia, but to be effective, the talks need to address the very serious human rights concerns across the region” said Iskra Kirova, Europe and Central Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “Jailing critics and activists and restrictions on civil society and independent media are hardly conducive to the progress the EU is seeking.”
The failure of Central Asian governments to uphold human rights, including freedoms of expression and assembly, has been at the core of instability in the region in recent years. This includes the violently suppressed unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022 as well as the deadly crackdowns on protests in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan in November 2021 and May 2022 and in the Republic of Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan in July 2022. There has been little or no accountability for police brutality in these protests.
Media freedom is another concern. Human Rights Watch has documented significant media restrictions across Central Asia, with tight government control and suppression of independent journalism.
Turkmenistan exerts total control over access to information, prohibits content deemed offensive to the government, blocks websites, including those of foreign news organizations and independent media, and limits internet access.
Kazakhstan’s June 2024 mass media law requires online publications to register and set up a physical presence in the country and grants the government expansive powers to deny accreditation to foreign media representatives. Kazakhstan’s courts have imprisoned independent journalists on dubious criminal charges. Duman Mukhammedkarim was sentenced to seven years in prison on August 2, 2024, on alleged “extremism” charges. On October 18, Daniyar Adilbekov was sentenced to four-and-a-half years in prison for allegedly disseminating false information.
Uzbekistan has harassed and imprisoned bloggers and jailed others for “insulting the president online.” Valijon Kalonov, a blogger and government critic, has been held in forced psychiatric detention since late December 2021. On January 31, 2023, the Karakalpak blogger and lawyer Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov, was sentenced to 16 years in prison for his alleged role in the July 2022 protests in the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan. The authorities have ignored his allegations of ill-treatment and torture.
Kyrgyzstan’s once vibrant media reached a new low in 2024. In January 2024, police arrested 11 journalists with the independent outlet Temirov Live on charges of “inciting mass unrest.” In October 2024, a Bishkek court sentenced two to prison terms and put two on probation. Courts have also ordered the closure of an award-winning investigative outlet, Kloop Media, alleging it failed to register as a media outlet and made “public calls for the violent seizure of power.” In January 2025, Kyrgyz authorities also recriminalized libel and insult on the internet and media.
Tajikistan has targeted journalists reporting on the crackdown in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, with seven journalists currently behind bars, including Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, who was sentenced to 21 years. In February 2025, the Tajik Supreme Court sentenced another journalist, Ruhshona Khakimova, to 8 years following a closed trial on classified charges.
Central Asian countries have also enacted restrictive legislation targeting nongovernmental organizations and have targeted independent activists for simply exercising their freedom of expression or association.
In Kyrgyzstan, a 2024 law requires foreign-funded groups to register as “foreign representatives” and submit to enhanced government oversight. The legislation mirrors Russia’s foreign agents law and has had a stifling effect on civil society, with many organizations self-liquidating or ceasing activities.
Turkmenistan has virtually no independent civil society. The state continues to groundlessly and arbitrarily bar actual and perceived critics and activists and their relatives from foreign travel. Since January 2024, authorities arbitrarily barred at least three activists from traveling abroad, Soltan Achilova, Nurgeldy Khalykov, and Pygambergeldy Allaberdyev. Turkmenistan routinely represses dissidents abroad and their families inside the country.
The authorities refuse to renew or reissue passports through consulates abroad, requiring citizens to return to Turkmenistan, where they risk arrest and persecution. This requirement violates the right to freedom of movement and is a hallmark of transnational repression.
Uzbekistan has targeted independent rights activists with unfounded criminal charges and denies registration to independent rights groups. On July 18, 2024, a Kashkadarya court sentenced the activists Dildora Khakimova and Nargiza Keldiyorova to more than six years in prison on dubious extortion charges after they criticized corruption in the education system in Kashkadarya.
Kazakhstan uses vaguely-worded extremism laws to target activists with lengthy prison sentences. On November 30, 2023, the head of the unregistered opposition party Alga, Kazakhstan! (Forward, Kazakhstan!), Marat Zhylanbaev, was sentenced to 7 years on unfounded extremism charges. Legislators are also considering foreign-agent style legislation.
In February 2025, Tajikistan’s Supreme Court found a number of prominent figures, human rights lawyers, and politicians guilty of high treason, with sentences of between 18 and 27 years in prison. A human rights lawyer, Manuchekhr Kholiqnazarov, was sentenced to 16 years for his alleged role in the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region protests.
The EU should urge Central Asian governments to release rights defenders and journalists imprisoned for their legitimate activities and to repeal repressive legislation, Human Rights Watch said.
The EU’s new generation of Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements being negotiated with Central Asian countries set clear expectations, in addition to offering trade and investment opportunities. Mutual respect and cooperation to protect human rights and the rule of law is an “essential element” of the agreement. The EU should use these agreements to seek and achieve specific advances for human rights, Human Rights Watch said.
The EU also offers preferential market access to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in exchange for implementing international conventions on labor and human rights, environmental protection, and good governance. Yet, Human Rights Watch reporting and the European Commission’s own assessment show both countries to be in serious violation of most core international human rights treaties. EU leaders should demand that partners fulfil their human rights obligations or lose trade benefits.“The first EU-Central Asia summit is an important milestone,” Kirova said. “The EU should use this moment to shape a well-rounded and sustainable partnership with Central Asian states that requires human rights to be a central part of the agenda.” Central Asian start-ups attracting growing interest from venture capitalists (EurasiaNet)
EurasiaNet [3/26/2025 4:14 PM, Staff, 57.6K]
Venture capital is increasingly flowing to start-ups in Central Asia. But the relatively low number of investors in the region still prompts many Central Asian-born entrepreneurs to relocate abroad to nurture their ideas.
A recently issued report – Venture Capital in Central Asia 2024 – measured start-up activity in four regional states – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, noting that VC deal volume for firms in the region totaled $95 million in 2024, an increase of 7 percent over the previous year’s amount.
Central Asia’s leading hubs for start-up activity are, not surprisingly, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan boasted the highest overall number of start-ups with over 1,000, but Uzbekistan registered the most impressive growth in attracting VC in 2024: 11 times more VC deal volume last year than in the year-earlier period. The VC flow to Kazakhstan declined in 2024 to $71 million, down from $80 million the previous year; Uzbekistan’s over 400 start-ups succeeded in attracting $69.5 million in VC funding last year, up from $6.3 million in 2023.
Start-up activity and VC investment is occurring on a much smaller scale in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Although Tajikistan has only about 100 registered start-ups, roughly three times fewer such firms than in Kyrgyzstan, more than double the amount of VC has flowed to Dushanbe ($6.6 million) than to Bishkek ($2.8 million) over the past two years.
Funding challenges and other issues still push a significant number of entrepreneurs to move out of the region to pursue their dreams, the report acknowledges. It highlights that Central Asian entrepreneurs have launched over 200 start-ups in the United States, and over 50 in the United Kingdom. More than 20 firms led by Central Asian citizens also call Saudi Arabia home. Many of the start-ups headquartered abroad maintain teams of employees back in Central Asia, the report adds.“Several key factors are accelerating the [Central Asian] market’s development. First, the number of startups is rising, and their business models are designed for international expansion from the outset,” says Murat Abdrakhmanov, a co-author of the report who also heads the Kazakh-based VC firm MA7 Ventures.“Second, venture investment in the region is becoming more structured: local funds are emerging, international investors are showing increasing interest, and experienced entrepreneurs are actively supporting new teams,” Abdrakhmanov adds. “This landscape is set to change in the coming years as the market matures, late-stage funds emerge, and deals become more transparent and structured.”
Transparency in deal-making has been an issue. Few of the “market leaders” interviewed for the 2024 report were willing to speak on the record or disclose details of investments. “While we collected funding data from both investors and startups, nearly 50 percent of the deals were classified as undisclosed, meaning their detailed terms were not made publicly available. Instead, we were allowed to include these deals only as aggregated figures,” the report’s authors state, referring to VC flows into Kazakhstan.
Central Asia’s large pool of tech-savvy, skilled young people, combined with an “immense, untapped demand for innovative solutions” is catalyzing the growth of the region’s start-up ecosystem, according to Yerik Aubakirov, another co-author and a venture capitalist heading EA Group. The report was prepared with support from such international entities as KPMG, Dealroom.co and Rise Research.
The report touts the success of Uzum – a digital services company that provides e-commerce, fintech and banking services for individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises – as Uzbekistan’s first unicorn, or a privately held start-up with a valuation of over $1 billion.
The Uzbek government is playing a major role in developing the country’s start-up culture. “The VC ecosystem in Uzbekistan is currently experiencing rapid deployment,” the report quotes Makhsud Yusupov, who heads a state-backed firm, UzVC. “Several state-backed VC firms have emerged, with projections indicating over $200 million will be deployed in the next 4-5 years.” Radicalization In Central Asia: From Roots To Repercussions (Eurasia Review)
Eurasia Review [3/26/2025 12:39 PM, Ayush Bhadauria, 206K]
Central Asia is a region situated between the Oxus River in the west and China’s Xinjiang province in the east, bordered by Russia to the north and Afghanistan to the south. This region has a long and rich history of settlements, dating back to the Huns, Shakas, and Parthians, followed by the spread of Islam. It later witnessed the rise of powerful empires, including those of Genghis Khan, the Timurid dynasty, and the Seljuks. In the 1860s, Tsarist Russia occupied Central Asia, eventually integrating it into the Soviet Union after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.
During the Cold War, the region became a focal point of the "Great Game" between the expansionist USSR and the British Empire. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asia gained independence, giving rise to five republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The shifts in political authority over time significantly impacted the region’s socio-political landscape, including the role and practice of Islam.
The relationship between Islam and Central Asia is both long-standing and complex. Islam entered the region during the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates in the 8th century through Arab invasions and Sufi missionary activity, becoming a key component of the region’s political and social fabric. The liberal Hanafi school of jurisprudence gained prominence across Central Asia. While the region saw various Islamic empires and dynasties, the only period when Islam’s dominance was significantly curtailed was under Mongol rule, as the Mongols adhered to their own legal code, Yassa. The decline of Islam’s political authority began in the 19th century with Tsarist Russia’s expansion into Central Asia. The October Revolution of 1917 further marginalized Islam, significantly weakening its influence in the socio-political framework of the region.
However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 triggered a rapid resurgence of Islam, driven by factors such as the Afghan crisis, the 9/11 attacks, and the subsequent U.S.-led Global War on Terror (GWOT). This article explores the theoretical frameworks, causes, and phases of Islamic revival in Central Asia, along with the factors contributing to its radicalization. Additionally, it examines the measures adopted by Central Asian regimes to curb radicalization and evaluates their effectiveness in achieving the desired outcomes.
Theoretical Framework of Radicalization
"Radicalization" is a highly contested concept, often defined and interpreted in varying ways within academic and policy literature. Many scholars conceptualize radicalization as a process marked by an increasing commitment to extremist ideologies and the use of violent means in political conflicts. From this perspective, radicalization involves a shift towards polarized and absolute interpretations of social or political issues, often leading to the adoption of radical aims and objectives. This transformation may stem from hostility towards specific social groups, institutions, or state structures and can result in an increasing reliance on violence.
Radicalization encompasses both behavioral (actions) and ideological (beliefs and perceptions) dimensions, which, while closely linked, do not necessarily correspond or depend on each other. In modern times, radicalization serves as the breeding ground for terrorism, as any violent attack against the state is classified as a terrorist act. It manifests as an extreme ideology expressed through violent means.
McCauley and Moskalenko define radicalization as follows: "Functionally, political radicalization is increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict. Descriptively, radicalization means change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the group.".
Several theoretical perspectives help explain the rise of radicalization, particularly in the Central Asian context.
Social Strain Theory
Social strain theory, developed by sociologist and criminologist Robert K. Merton and later expanded by Robert Agnew, posits that when a political system prevents individuals or groups from attaining socially accepted goals—such as political participation or access to power—it generates strain that can push individuals towards violence. This theory suggests that societal structures create conditions that may lead to criminal behavior as a response to perceived injustices.
Agnew highlights that one significant source of strain is the government’s repression of legitimate demands, particularly when citizens are denied political agency or social mobility. In the Central Asian context, social strain theory provides a framework to examine the rise of Islamic radicalization, as state-imposed restrictions on religious and political freedoms create conditions that may fuel extremism.Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis
The frustration-aggression hypothesis, as outlined by Friedman and Schustack, asserts that while frustration may not always lead to aggression, aggression is almost always a product of frustration. Behavioral psychologists argue that aggression is instinctive and that when individuals or groups encounter obstacles preventing them from fulfilling their legitimate needs or aspirations, frustration can escalate into anger and violence.
Cognitivist scholars describe this frustration as a "blocked goal." One concrete example of such obstruction is severe political repression that restricts political participation and suppresses political or religious identity. Johan Galtung’s concept of structural violence—violence embedded within social structures and institutions—further explains how systemic repression can lead to extremist responses. Galtung argues that structural violence, such as restrictions on religious practices or identity suppression, can ultimately give rise to direct violence, including religious extremism.
While scholars use this theory to explain Islamic radicalization in Central Asia, its applicability remains a subject of debate. Nonetheless, both social strain theory and the frustration-aggression hypothesis provide crucial insights into the dynamics of radicalization in the region, particularly in the context of state repression, political exclusion, and socio-economic grievances.
Phases of Radicalization in Central Asia
Islam was introduced to Central Asia in the seventh century and solidified its dominance by the mid-eighth century. Historically, two distinct variants of Islam emerged in the region: one associated with the urban centers of Samarkand and Bukhara, and the other prevalent in the tribal zones. The former, shaped by the religious institutions (madrassas) of Samarkand and Bukhara, was often characterized by a more orthodox interpretation of Islam, with the clergy playing a dominant role in religious affairs. In contrast, Islam in the tribal regions spread primarily through Sufi brotherhoods such as the Yasawiyya, which facilitated its gradual assimilation into local traditions.
The global political landscape of the late 20th century witnessed the increasing politicization of Islam, particularly following the Iranian Revolution. Events such as hostage crises, attacks on Western embassies, and other violent acts perpetrated by Islamist militants contributed to the perception of Islam as an increasingly militant force. Political unrest among Muslim populations in the former Soviet Union, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Xinjiang (China), Palestine, and North Africa reinforced fears of an emerging radical Islam. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Islam re-emerged as a potent socio-political force in Central Asia, filling the ideological vacuum left by Communist rule.
Islam under Soviet Rule
During Soviet rule, Islam was subjected to severe repression, yet it remained resilient despite state-imposed restrictions. Mosques were systematically demolished, repurposed, or closed, while young Muslims were encouraged to participate in Soviet youth organizations instead of religious institutions. Stalin’s policies were particularly harsh, with a significant crackdown on religious activities beginning in 1927. However, in 1943, the Soviet authorities established the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM) to exert control over religious practices.
Following Stalin’s death, two major offensives against Islam were undertaken. Under Khrushchev (1958–1964), approximately 25% of official mosques were closed, with Tajikistan (16 out of 34 mosques) and Uzbekistan (23 out of 90 mosques) experiencing the most severe impact. Conversely, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, only one mosque in each republic was shut down, while all four official mosques in Turkmenistan remained open. These figures illustrate the relative strength of Islamic identity in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan compared to the other Central Asian republics.
The final major Soviet crackdown on Islam occurred in 1986 under Gorbachev. However, by this period, a broader trend of liberalization had already taken hold, limiting the effectiveness of state suppression. Under Soviet rule, Central Asia remained largely peripheral to the global Islamic world, isolated from key geopolitical developments such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Iranian Revolution. Consequently, when the Central Asian republics gained independence in 1991, the majority of their populations had only a rudimentary understanding of Islamic doctrines.
With the reopening of borders in the early 1990s, Central Asia found itself reintegrated into the wider Islamic world. However, political elites in the region often lacked deep knowledge of Islam, having been shaped by decades of Soviet secularism. Amid the ideological vacuum left by the collapse of Communism, many ordinary citizens turned to religion as a means of making sense of their national identity and the uncertainties of independence.
Three key observations can be made regarding the trajectory of Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia:
1. Despite Soviet-era repression, the majority of Central Asians continued to identify as Muslims. Scholar Martha Brill Olcott argues that an awareness of Islamic heritage remained integral to Central Asian identity, even among individuals with limited religious knowledge or practice.
2. The revival of religious practices in the late 1980s was not an external imposition but rather a re-emergence of long-suppressed cultural and religious traditions. As Olivier Roy notes, this revival was an "outward manifestation of a culture and religious practice that never completely vanished.".
3. The rise of extremist Islamist organizations in the region was not entirely due to foreign influence. Several militant networks, such as Adolat (Justice), Tawba (Repentance), and Islam Lashkarlari (Warriors of Islam), had already operated underground during the Soviet era and resurfaced in the wake of political liberalization.
The Fergana Valley: A Hub of Islamic Revivalism and Radicalization.
The Fergana Valley, a fertile and densely populated region spanning Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, has been the focal point of Islamic revivalism and radical movements in Central Asia. During the Soviet era, the borders between these republics were largely symbolic, allowing for free movement across the region. However, in the post-Soviet period, as tensions between the newly independent states increased, these borders became heavily fortified with barbed wire and landmines.
As a historically significant political and cultural center, the Fergana Valley has witnessed the emergence of various nationalist and Islamist movements. The Uzbek nationalist dissident party Birlik was once active in the region but was later suppressed by the Uzbek government. More radical organizations such as Adolat, Tawba, and Islam Lashkarlari also originated in the valley, serving as precursors to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). While these groups varied in ideology and tactics, they shared a common objective of replacing secular governance with an Islamic state.
Due to sustained government crackdowns, many radical Islamists from the Fergana Valley sought refuge in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan—regions that later became crucial hubs for jihadist movements. These individuals played a key role in propagating radical Islamic ideologies among broader populations.
Scholars such as Bernard Lewis argue that Central Asian governments have often overgeneralized Islamic activism, conflating devout believers with radical militants. However, significant ideological and strategic differences exist among various Islamist groups. For instance, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) maintained strong ties with the Taliban and later with Al-Qaeda, actively engaging in violent insurgency. Conversely, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islamiyya advocated for an Islamic caliphate but officially promoted nonviolent methods.
Although some Islamist factions have found common ground in opposing secular governments, they have frequently been divided by ideological, personal, and financial disputes. This tendency toward fragmentation has made it difficult to study these movements comprehensively. Nonetheless, broad categories can be identified, distinguishing violent extremist groups from those that pursue their objectives through political or social activism.
Implications
The issue of radicalization has had a significant impact across the Central Asian region, though its effects have varied in intensity. Following the suppression of Islamist movements in the 1990s and 2000s, hundreds of individuals from the region migrated and joined transnational extremist organizations such as ISIS and the Taliban. This phenomenon has influenced Central Asia in multiple dimensions—politically, socially, and in terms of regional and international security.
Political Implications
The rise of radicalization in Central Asia has had profound political consequences, particularly in terms of governance and stability. The perceived threat of extremism provided an opportunity for authoritarian leaders to consolidate their power under the pretext of maintaining order. This was particularly evident in the regimes of Emomali Rahmon in Tajikistan and Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Uzbekistan, where autocratic measures were reinforced to suppress opposition. Consequently, political rights and civil liberties were increasingly curtailed, leading to a significant decline in democratic institutions and public participation in governance. The justification of counterterrorism measures further facilitated the suppression of political dissent and the weakening of civil society.
Social Implications
Radicalization has also had deep social repercussions in Central Asia, contributing to sectarian and ethnic divisions. The rise of religious extremism has exacerbated interfaith tensions, fostering an environment of social intolerance. Additionally, ethnic disparities have widened, particularly affecting the ethnic Russian population, whose numbers declined significantly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The phenomenon has also deepened socioeconomic inequalities, further alienating the economically weaker sections of society from the elite. In some nations, radicalization has contributed to the emergence of a more rigid and conservative societal framework, restricting social freedoms and altering traditional cultural norms.
Security Implications
The security landscape of Central Asia has been profoundly affected by radicalization, with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) playing a crucial role in shaping regional security dynamics. China, under the pretext of counterterrorism, has expanded its influence in Central Asia, engaging in direct and indirect interventions to secure its strategic interests. Since 2001, Beijing has systematically increased its presence in the region, particularly in the Fergana Valley, where it has capitalized on existing vulnerabilities. The Chinese government has established a network of security and economic initiatives aimed at exerting greater control over the region, further entrenching its geopolitical ambitions under the guise of regional stabilization efforts. Indo-Pacific
Funding shortages may halt global child malnutrition programs, World Food Programme warns (Reuters)
Reuters [3/26/2025 8:30 AM, Olivia Le Poidevin, 41523K]
Programmes to help prevent malnourishment in children in Yemen, Afghanistan and Syria could be suspended within months if urgent funding is not found, the U.N.’s World Food Programme warned on Wednesday."If we fail to act, we are condemning millions of children to a lifetime of suffering", said WFP Executive Director Cindy McCain in a statement ahead of a summit in Paris on Wednesday where governments and charities will discuss tackling growing global malnutrition and hunger.The WFP has suffered severe financial setbacks after the U.S., its single largest donor, announced a 90-day pause on foreign aid assistance while it determines if programmes are aligned with the Trump administration’s "America first" policy.The U.S. provided $4.5 billion of the $9.8 billion budget last year for the WFP, which gives food and cash assistance to people suffering from hunger due to crop shortages, conflict and climate change worldwide.The organisation called on Wednesday for $1.4 billion to deliver malnutrition prevention and treatment programmes for 30 million mothers and children in 56 countries in 2025, saying malnutrition is worsening worldwide due to war, economic instability and climate change.It did not give details on its financial shortfall or mention the U.S.Prevention programmes in Yemen, where one-third of children under the age of 5 are malnourished, could stop from May if additional funding was not received, the WFP said. The U.N. children’s agency UNICEF said on Tuesday that western coastal areas of Yemen are on the verge of a catastrophe due to malnutrition.McCain said that the WFP is being forced to make tough choices such as prioritising treatment over prevention due to lack of funds. Programmes in Afghanistan could also be stopped by May, while in Syria and the Democratic Republic of Congo programmes could be reduced from June unless money is found.Earlier this month, the WFP announced potential cuts to food rations for Rohingya refugees, raising concern among aid workers of rising hunger in the overcrowded camps.The WFP said the reduction was due to a broad shortfall in donations, not the Trump administration’s move to cut foreign aid globally.But a senior Bangladeshi official told Reuters that the U.S. decision most likely played a role, as the U.S. has been the top donor for Rohingya refugee aid. Twitter
Afghanistan
UN Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett@SR_Afghanistan
[3/26/2025 4:28 AM, 43.4K followers, 24 retweets, 68 likes]
Standing w- Afghan women footballers, I support the call by @Sport_Rights for @FIFAcom to take a strong stand against systematic gender oppression & ensure that Afghan women footballers in exile, who are barred from playing in #Afghanistan, can return to international competition
Afghanistan Womens And Children S.W.O@AWCSWO
[3/27/2025 2:43 AM, 8.3K followers, 5 retweets, 3 likes]
Justice cannot be compromised for political gain; the systematic repression of human rights and women’s rights, under the guise of engaging with the Taliban, is intensifying : The removal of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani Network, and two of his close associates from the U.S. Department of State’s "Rewards for Justice" list is an endorsement of the Taliban’s crimes against humanity, a disheartening insult to the victims of terrorism, and a sign of a profit-driven approach to global politics. This reflects a world where terrorism is not defined by humanitarian principles, but by the interests of major powers, raising serious concerns about the double standards in the fight against terrorism.
While the victims of terrorism and Taliban crimes are still desperately awaiting justice, and Afghanistan women have repeatedly called for the prosecution of Taliban leaders, including Sirajuddin Haqqani, this action by the U.S. government, coinciding with the intensification of the crackdown on Afghanistan women and the widespread violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, sends a dangerous message to the international community. It shows that in political dealings, the first victim of human rights and justice is, in fact, human rights and justice themselves.
We warn against any further complicity in the fate of the Afghanistan people and the gradual legitimization of the self-proclaimed Taliban government under a new guise. The normalization of relations with the Taliban and the soft, tolerant approach toward this group only deepens the suffering of the Afghanistan people, accelerating the destruction of women’s rights, excruciating torture, and the imposition of structural discrimination in Afghanistan. Therefore, we urge the U.S. government to shift its policies from offering diplomatic opportunities to the Taliban and instead focus on accountability and the prosecution of Taliban leaders.
Emphasizing the need for global solidarity in support of human rights and women’s rights in Afghanistan, we call on the European Union and the European Parliament to take a firm and responsible stance against the normalization of relations between European countries, particularly Norway, and the Taliban. This issue is not confined to the violation of human rights and women’s rights in Afghanistan; the Taliban, by promoting extremist ideology, cross-border jihad, and providing a platform for the expansion of terrorism, pose a serious threat to global and regional stability. The international community should not normalize relations with the Taliban at the cost of global peace and security. #Right_Justice_Freedom Date: 27 Mar 2025 Purple Saturdays Movement @heatherbarr1 @Fawziakoofi77 @FereshtaAbbasi @IHRF_English @unwomenafghan @unafghanistan @amnestysasia @hrw @HRF @realDonaldTrump @elonmusk @Womens_eNews @CNN
Heather Barr@heatherbarr1
[3/27/2025 1:52 AM, 62.2K followers, 1 retweet, 1 like]
You’ll want to listen to this! @Sahar_fetrat and @karimabennoune break down what international law can do for—and what it owes—Afghan women and girls. https://www.ejiltalk.org/ejil-the-podcast-episode-32-no-country-for-women-lawyering-for-gender-justice-in-afghanistan/
Heather Barr@heatherbarr1
[3/26/2025 8:24 AM, 62.2K followers, 52 retweets, 124 likes]
Khalilzad was asked, during the US negotiations he led w/Taliban, about the consequences of that process for Afghan women. His answer was that Afghans should work that out themselves. The US played a deeply colonial role for 20 years then abandoned women. https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/south-asia/trump-taliban-zalmay-khalilzad-afghanistan-american-hostages-b2720472.html Pakistan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Pakistan@ForeignOfficePk
[3/26/2025 7:53 AM, 481.3K followers, 11 retweets, 28 likes]
Deputy Prime Minister / Foreign Minister, Senator Mohammad Ishaq Dar @MIshaqDar50 chaired a preparatory meeting on the “Pakistan Mining Investment Forum,” scheduled for April 8-9 in Islamabad. Minister of Petroleum Mr. Ali Pervaiz Malik, Special Secretary Ministry of Interior, Chairman CDA, and other officials attended the meeting. A detailed briefing was provided on the forum’s objectives, scope, program, and other logistical arrangements. DPM/FM expressed hope that the event would reshape Pakistan’s mining sector, foster foreign collaboration, and strengthen international partnerships. He assured MoFA’s full support to the Ministry of Petroleum and other stakeholders to ensure its success.
Imran Khan@ImranKhanPTI
[3/26/2025 12:58 AM, 21.1M followers, 2.2K retweets, 3.9K likes]
Former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Message from Adiala Jail - March 25, 2025 Pakistan’s challenges can only be resolved through genuinely elected public representatives. Instead of repeating the mistakes of 1971 that divided the nation, work towards uniting it!
How can an illegitimate government imposed on Balochistan possibly resolve any issues? As a Pakistani and a former Prime Minister, I am deeply concerned about the ongoing situation in Balochistan marked by sharp rise in terrorism. The firing of live ammunition on peaceful protesters, state violence and unlawful arrests are equally deeply troubling. It is the fundamental duty of the state to address the grievances of the people of Balochistan. The situation in Balochistan cannot improve unless the genuine public representatives are brought into mainstream, their voices are sincerely heard, and the fate of the region is decided in accordance with the will of the people. Sheer force can never resolve this issue. It would rather deepen crisis and fuel further instability.
The puppet government imposed through fraudulent elections (Form 47), has failed on all fronts, with its foreign policy being complete disaster. We can address terrorism by engaging in dialogue with Afghanistan. We share a 2,200-kilometer border with Afghanistan, and peaceful negotiations are the only way forward. During our tenure, despite strained relations with the Afghan government at the time, we engaged in direct talks with them. The policies we implemented over three years successfully eliminated terrorism. However, after our tenure, the adoption of Biden’s policy led to numerous issues, and today, the public is bearing the consequences in the form of increased terrorism.
The current government’s lack of seriousness is evident from the fact that neither during the PDM regime nor under the present administration has the Foreign Minister visited Afghanistan or undertaken any serious diplomatic initiatives.
The 26th Constitutional Amendment has led to the complete deterioration of our judicial system. My pre-arrest bail hearing in the fabricated May 9th (2023) cases was scheduled after months of delay, but the Lahore High Court bench was dissolved to further delay the process. Similarly, the Toshakhana case where my trial is being conducted within the jail premises has been arbitrarily halted without explanation. Previously, the verdict in the Al-Qadir Trust case was deliberately delayed so that my case could be presented before handpicked judges in the Islamabad High Court following court packing. After extensive legal efforts, when my appeal was finally scheduled for hearing, objections were raised, further, delaying the matter until after Eid.
This clearly proves that the imposed government’s primary goal is to keep me in jail at all costs, as my cases have no legal standing and will be overruled whenever they are heard on merits. This is a fixed match being played under a well-orchestrated plan.
Instead of focusing on their constitutional responsibilities, the institutions are hyper fixated on cracking down on PTI and controlling the media, prisons, and courts. Adiala Jail is also being run by a Colonel. What authority does a Colonel have to control a jail?
This week, my sisters were also denied a meeting with me. Despite multiple court orders, I am barred from meeting friends, speaking to my children on the phone, or accessing my diary and books. In six months, I had just one meeting with my political colleagues, scheduled entirely at the discretion of jail authorities. They continue to impose one restriction after another. No matter how hard they try, I have never bowed to their fascism, and I never will!
Ashok Swain@ashoswai
[3/26/2025 4:59 PM, 621.7K followers, 26 retweets, 85 likes]
When a government has nothing else to do - In Sindh, Pakistan, female teachers have been asked by the government to avoid heavy makeup, not to wear high heels or excessive jewellery, and dress with traditional clothing.
Amnesty International South Asia, Regional Office@amnestysasia
[3/26/2025 10:32 AM, 99.8K followers, 85 retweets, 210 likes]
PAKISTAN: Afghan presence, culture and craft have become an integral part of life in the capital city of Pakistan. Without Afghan nationals, Islamabad wouldn’t be the same, shares Amnesty’s campaigner who grew up in the city. An executive order is now forcing Afghan nationals, including refugees and asylum seekers, out of Islamabad and the neighbouring city Rawalpindi, by 31 March 2025. In some parts, detentions and deportations have already begun. Families who have called these cities home for generations are being torn away. Losing them means losing a part of the city itself. Pakistan must stop these unlawful deportations Read more: https://amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/opaque-illegal-foreigners-repatriation-plan-targeting-afghan-refugees-must-be-withdrawn/. #StopDeportationsNow #UndoTheDeadline
Amnesty International South Asia, Regional Office@amnestysasia
[3/26/2025 5:47 AM, 99.8K followers, 606 retweets, 1.3K likes]
PAKISTAN: The Pakistani government’s plans to arbitrarily and forcibly expel Afghan nationals, including refugees and asylum seekers, as part of the opaque ‘Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan’ will only add to their plight, Amnesty International said today, ahead of the authorities’ 31 March deadline to oust Afghan nationals from the cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. READ MORE: https://amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/opaque-illegal-foreigners-repatriation-plan-targeting-afghan-refugees-must-be-withdrawn/ #StopDeportationsNow #UndoTheDeadlineRaza Ahmad Rumi@Razarumi
[3/26/2025 3:57 PM, 572K followers, 6 retweets, 9 likes]
Pakistan: UN experts demand release of Baloch human rights defenders, and an end to crackdown on peaceful protest | OHCHR https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/pakistan-un-experts-demand-release-baloch-human-rights-defenders-and-end India
Narendra Modi@narendramodi
[3/26/2025 6:05 AM, 106M followers, 3.3K retweets, 18K likes]
I compliment all those who are strengthening the fight against TB and contributing to a #TBMuktBharat. It is noteworthy how this effort is gaining momentum at the grassroots level, thus ensuring a healthier India.
Dr. S. Jaishankar@DrSJaishankar
[3/26/2025 11:12 AM, 3.4M followers, 97 retweets, 545 likes]
Glad to converse with @AsiaSocietyCEO Dr Kyung-wha Kang this evening in Delhi. Discussed the paradigm shift underway, the new US Administration, multipolar Asia, trade, technology and Indian approach to the world order. @AsiaSociety
Dr. S. Jaishankar@DrSJaishankar
[3/26/2025 9:36 AM, 3.4M followers, 192 retweets, 1.3K likes]
Delighted to interact with a youth delegation from Central Asian countries. Glad to hear their experiences and good sentiments about our people to people bonds. And the strong interest for greater economic, health, education and connectivity linkages with India.
Dr. S. Jaishankar@DrSJaishankar
[3/26/2025 8:31 AM, 3.4M followers, 138 retweets, 544 likes]
In conversation with Dr. Kyung-wha Kang of @AsiaSociety. https://x.com/i/broadcasts/1jMKgkMEagYKL
Dr. S. Jaishankar@DrSJaishankar
[3/26/2025 3:59 AM, 3.4M followers, 169 retweets, 1.4K likes]
Glad to meet President & CEO @USChamber @SuzanneUSCC today. A useful exchange on deepening trade and investments, building resilient supply chains and strengthening IN-US strategic partnership.
Ashok Swain@ashoswai
[3/26/2025 9:55 AM, 621.7K followers, 102 retweets, 334 likes]
When you elect a criminal, country becomes a crime scene - The US panel on Religious Freedom says India is seeing rising minority abuse: It asks sanctions to be imposed on India’s external spy agency RAW over its alleged involvement in plots to kill Sikh separatists. NSB
Chief Adviser of the Government of Bangladesh@ChiefAdviserGoB
[3/27/2025 1:43 AM, 127.9K followers, 7 retweets, 110 likes]
Chen Huaiyu, Chairman, The Export-Import Bank of China called on Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus at Bo’ao State Guest House, Hainan, on Thursday on the sideline of Bo’ao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2025.
Chief Adviser of the Government of Bangladesh@ChiefAdviserGoB
[3/27/2025 1:39 AM, 127.9K followers, 10 retweets, 109 likes]
Ding Xuexiang, Executive Vice Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China called on Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus at Bo’ao State Guest House, Hainan, on Thursday on the sideline of Bo’ao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2025.
Chief Adviser of the Government of Bangladesh@ChiefAdviserGoB
[3/26/2025 8:34 AM, 127.9K followers, 296 retweets, 2.8K likes]
Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus arrived in Hainan, China at 4:15pm Bangladesh Standard Time on Wednesday. Md. Nazmul Islam, Bangladesh Ambassador China,and Vice Governor of Hainan Province received him at Qionghai Bo’ao International Airport, Hainan.
Dipanjan R Chaudhury@DipanjanET
[3/26/2025 11:28 PM, 6K followers, 1 retweet, 3 likes]
Russian assisted nuclear power plant in Bangladesh gets big boost with supply of key component despite witch hunting by interim regime about project cost — My report @ETPolitics @RosatomGlobal — https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/russian-assisted-nuclear-power-plant-in-bangladesh-gets-big-boost/articleshow/119570280.cms
Dipanjan R Chaudhury@DipanjanET
[3/26/2025 10:56 PM, 6K followers, 1 retweet, 2 likes]
Bangladesh’s Yunus plans to sign slew of MoUs during China trip to boost sagging economy. All eyes on any green signal to China for use of airfield close to India border & role in Teesta water management— My report @ETPolitics— https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/bangladeshs-yunus-plans-to-sign-slew-of-mous-during-china-trip-to-boost-sagging-economy/articleshow/119568482.cms
Tshering Tobgay@tsheringtobgay
[3/26/2025 11:05 PM, 101.6K followers, 1 retweet, 15 likes]
Attended the celebration of the Independence & National Day of Bangladesh yesterday, in the gracious presence of Her Royal Highness Princess Sonam Dechan Wangchuck. Bhutan values 54 years of friendship & cooperation with Bangladesh & we look forward to further strengthening our ties.The President’s Office, Maldives@presidencymv
[3/26/2025 1:23 PM, 112.5K followers, 154 retweets, 160 likes]
President Dr @MMuizzu and First Lady Madam @sajidhaamohamed attend the Graduation Ceremony for Huffaz, celebrating their remarkable milestone of memorising the Holy Quran. This marks the first time Huffaz have been recognised and honoured at a national-level ceremony dedicated to them. #RoadhaigeRoohu
The President’s Office, Maldives@presidencymv
[3/26/2025 7:46 AM, 112.5K followers, 128 retweets, 122 likes]
President Dr @MMuizzu visits Hulhumalé to inspect the progress of the new premises for the Criminal Court and Drug Court. During his visit, he toured the facilities, reviewed the ongoing construction and development work, and engaged with relevant officials to gain insights into the latest advancements. The expansion of court infrastructure is a key initiative in the President’s broader commitment to strengthening the judicial system, addressing long-standing challenges, improving access to justice, and ensuring a more efficient and effective legal process. #RoadhaigeRoohu
Karu Jayasuriya@KaruOnline
[3/26/2025 8:05 AM, 53.8K followers, 7 retweets, 24 likes]
A report on the health of Sri Lanka’s school children claims nearly a third of them do not go to school. If true, this threatens the human capital built in the last century since universal franchise. Let’s hope the government studies the facts and responds swiftly and decisively. Central Asia
MFA Tajikistan@MOFA_Tajikistan
[3/26/2025 7:18 AM, 5.3K followers, 2 retweets, 2 likes]
Meeting with the Secretary General of the Economic Cooperation Organization Asad Majid Khan https://mfa.tj/en/main/view/16795/meeting-with-the-secretary-general-of-the-economic-cooperation-organization-asad-majid-khan
Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s Press-service@president_uz
[3/26/2025 1:47 PM, 214.7K followers, 3 retweets, 10 likes]
President Shavkat #Mirziyoyev reviewed progress on highway construction projects aimed at improving transportation and logistics. The Tashkent-Andijan high-speed road, developed with the World Bank, will span 314 kilometers, reducing travel time from 5 to 3 hours, boosting GDP by 2.6%, and cutting road accidents by 40%. A Tashkent-Samarkand highway, approximately 300 kilometers long, is also planned to shorten travel time and ease congestion. The projects will feature toll services for drivers and passengers, with domestic construction companies actively involved.
Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s Press-service@president_uz
[3/26/2025 1:01 PM, 214.7K followers, 2 retweets, 14 likes] President Shavkat #Mirziyoyev held a meeting on enhancing energy efficiency and resource conservation. Plans include building small solar power plants to save 45 million cubic meters of gas and micro-hydropower plants to generate 175 million kilowatt-hours, using solar-powered streetlights to halve energy consumption, upgrading outdated industrial equipment. A special energy supply strategy will be developed for Fergana Valley, with plans to expand it nationwide.{End of Report} To subscribe to the SCA Morning Press Clips, please email SCA-PressOfficers@state.gov. Please do not reply directly to this email.