epubdos : Afghanistan
SCA MORNING PRESS CLIPS
Prepared for the U.S. Department of State
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
TO:
SCA & Staff
DATE:
Friday, April 5, 2024 6:30 AM ET

Afghanistan
Taliban sentence 3 Afghans to lengthy terms, flogging for political activism (VOA)
VOA [4/4/2024 3:00 PM, Ayaz Gul, 761K, Negative]
Afghanistan’s Islamist Taliban rulers Thursday sentenced two people to 15 years each for engaging in political activity, while a third person was flogged 30 times and jailed for similar charges.

The de facto government in Kabul, yet to be formally recognized by the international community, has banned all political parties and activities nationwide, deeming them as unIslamic.

The Taliban Supreme Court said in a statement that Thursday’s judicial actions were carried out in the southern province of Kandahar. Without further details, it said a fourth individual was sentenced to eight months for “moral corruption.”

The reclusive Taliban supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, lives and governs the country from Kandahar, which is known as the birthplace and political base of his fundamentalist group.

"There is no Sharia basis for political parties to operate in the country. They do not serve the national interest, nor does the nation appreciate them,” Abdul Hakim Sharaee, the Taliban minister of justice, said while announcing the ban on political activities last year.

Until the Taliban seized power in August 2021, around 70 major and small political parties were formally registered with the ministry.

Akhundzada is governing the impoverished, war-ravaged South Asian nation through his strict interpretation of Islamic law, or Sharia. He has banned girls from attending schools beyond the sixth grade and forbidden most Afghan women from public and private workplaces.

The Taliban have carried out flogging of hundreds of men and women in sports stadiums in the presence of onlookers for what they call “moral crimes” such as adultery, running away from home, and robbery. Several convicted murderers have also been executed publicly.

Late last month, Akhundzada said he was determined to enforce the Islamic criminal justice system across Afghanistan, including the public stoning of women for adultery. The United Nations decried his announcement as disturbing.

The U.N. and other global monitors have consistently criticized worsening human rights conditions after the Taliban takeover, demanding that they reverse their restrictions on women and civil liberty.

The Taliban took control of Afghanistan as the United States and NATO withdrew all their troops in August 2021 after nearly two decades of war with Taliban insurgents.
Top diplomat who ran botched Afghanistan evacuation was picked after Kabul fell, given no plan: testimony (New York Post)
New York Post [4/4/2024 6:09 PM, Caitlin Doornbos, 5087K, Neutral]
The State Department official tapped to oversee the chaotic and bloody US evacuation from Afghanistan in August 2021 told congressional investigators he was sent only after Kabul fell to the Taliban and was given no plan, no insight into who qualified for evacuation and only a basic understanding of the mission’s goals.

Though Ross Wilson had been leading the US embassy in Kabul since January 2020, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman dispatched former Ambassador to Afghanistan John Bass to help evacuate the capital city four days after the Taliban took control on Aug. 15, 2021, Bass told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in a Jan. 22 interview, according to a transcript released Thursday.

Ten hours after receiving his assignment, Bass was on a plane knowing little about what he would face and having received almost no preparation, he recalled. Neither Secretary Antony Blinken, President Biden nor anyone on the National Security Council had reached out to him prior to his arrival in Kabul.

The testimony of Bass and others released Thursday painted a vivid picture of how a lack of planning by the State Department led to major challenges that may have been preventable.

Who’s in charge here?

On Aug. 19, 2021, Bass arrived in Kabul – with the Taliban in firm control of the city – without a guide to the State Department’s role in the evacuation of Americans and their Afghan allies. He also had no sense of how long the mission would last.

“Our goal was to enable the departure of as many American citizens and Afghans with ties to the United States as we could enable within whatever time was available to us and to try to ensure good coordination with allied and partner nations who were trying to do the same thing,” he said.

However, Bass said, he had no idea who or how many Afghans could be considered to have “ties to the United States.”

“I don’t recall being given a list of those particular categories or prioritization,” he told the committee. “I, in part based on my tenure as Ambassador, understood broadly what the categories were and the kinds of people who would be at risk in that environment at that time.”

Once in place, Bass — now an acting deputy assistant secretary of state — said he faced a myriad of challenges, from crowd control to physical security.

“I was struck by the numbers of people who were seeking to depart, the challenges that the physical security infrastructure of the [Kabul] airport, which was designed to limit access, the challenges that posed for dealing with masses of people, and the challenges we faced in helping specific individuals to find ways to safely and securely access and enter the airport complex at a particular point in time,” he said.

While Wilson oversaw embassy staff still in the country, Bass said he was placed in charge of temporary personnel who had been sent to Afghanistan to help with the evacuation.

Wilson, as the chief of mission in Kabul, should have had “the overall authority” over the evacuation, according a publication by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Instead, Bass said, that was left to the Defense Department, with which Bass – not Wilson – was the main State Department point of contact.

Other then-State Department employees also told the committee that they directly reported to Bass and were unsure of Wilson’s exact purview despite his title.

Senior Foreign Service officer James DeHart, sent Aug. 20 to Kabul to serve as Bass’ assistant, said he “didn’t have a good sense of what [Wilson and his embassy staff] were doing throughout the day.”

Sam Aronson, who served as a consular volunteer during the operation, said Wilson acted as little more than the “public face of this evacuation, while, behind the scenes, you know, behind the curtain, was John Bass actually leading the evacuation.”

“He seemed overwhelmed,” Aronson added of Wilson. “His physical health did not seem great. His emotional health also did not seem great. And I did not get the vibe that he was a strong leader, or, at least at the time I was there, I do not believe he was exhibiting strong leadership.”

“State Department leadership sent in the correct officials to get the job done, but they were not able to necessarily remove the incorrect officials who were already in place,” he added.

Making it up as they went

Though the noncombatant evacuation had begun days earlier, DeHart, who described what happened in Kabul as “a spectacle the likes of which I’d never seen before,” said he and Bass were given no hard plans on what the State Department should do.

“We had to, I would say, create from scratch tactical operations that would get our priority people into the airport,” he said.

Even the most basic planning remained in flux throughout their time there. Ultimately, it wasn’t until Aug. 30 – the day the last US troops left Afghanistan – that DeHart was given a departure deadline.

The uncertainty over the mission’s end date made on-the-ground planning difficult, as “a lot of the decisions we made depended on how much time we had,” DeHart told the committee.

“The question was constantly on our minds: ‘Would they stick to this timeline … or would it get changed?’ he said. “That was a question that hung over everything we did because we had to make decisions on how we were going to …. get people into the airport.”

What’s more, the lack of clarity about who constituted a friendly Afghan meant that the evacuation process and determining who was eligible to be flown out was largely ad hoc.

“We tried to prioritize lawful permanent residents, although that could be more complicated depending on the documentation that they had with them and whether they were considered by the Taliban to be Americans, as opposed to Afghans,” Bass said.

“Beyond that, we prioritized categories of Afghans who had worked closely for or with the United States government, whether civilian or military, and prospectively were at risk as a result of those working relationships,” he added.

In fact, Bass said the State Department was continuously revising the eligibility standards as the chaos unfolded.

“Day to day, sometimes hour to hour, we were shifting priorities to reflect the realities of the circumstances on the ground with an eye to maximizing our ability to help as many people taking access to the airport complex from those categories as possible,” he said.

Eventually, Bass said he told his senior consular managers to “use their judgment” in determining who got on a flight and acknowledged “some” Afghans were evacuated without proper documentation.

“We had a set of consular professionals who had spent a lot of time making these kinds of determinations, in visa interviews, at US embassies and consulates around the world, and I trusted that they would be exercising good judgment in evaluating people’s eligibility for legal pathways to the United States,” he said.

Of the more than 120,000 people that were ultimately evacuated, Bass said roughly 6,000 were Americans and “easily 20,000” were Afghans who had worked with the US government during its two decades in the country.

“Several hundred” Americans, Bass said, elected to remain in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan “because they were part of complex families and their extended families did not have a legal pathway to the United States, or elected to stay for other reasons.

“Didn’t feel secure enough trying to get themselves to the airport.”
Afghan allies endangered: Congress grapples with the Special Immigrant Visa program’s shortcomings (Washington Examiner)
Washington Examiner [4/4/2024 9:00 PM, Beth Bailey, 554K, Neutral]
Congress is on track to authorize an additional 12,000 Special Immigrant Visas to keep the Afghan SIV program afloat after concerns that around 8,000 available visas would run out in September 2024. The stay of execution has offered some sense of relief to many of the more than 147,000 Afghans awaiting processing.

With the time clock on the SIV program temporarily reset, a handful of former and current U.S. Army Special Forces personnel are on a mad dash to get the Afghans who served beside them to safety in the United States. While they worry about Taliban kill orders and combat the exhaustion of supporting allies in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan, their most leviathan foe remains the SIV program itself, which has been beset by failures and a lack of transparency since its inception in 2009.

A decade spent helping ‘Nasib’

The U.S. Army Green Berets who spoke with the Washington Examiner about their support of Afghan allies agreed to do so on condition that they be identified only by their first names.

Todd, a Green Beret with 25 years of military experience says he has spent about a decade on the fight to gain an SIV for his former interpreter Nasib, whose name has been changed for his protection.

In January 2005, Nasib was directly hired by Green Berets in eastern Afghanistan to help them gain cultural competence and liaise with locals. In those early days, Todd explained, if an Operational Detachment Alpha found an interpreter’s work valuable, he referred him to his replacement ODA. Nasib was always referred onward.

The value of Nasib’s service is best demonstrated through letters of recommendation from eight high-ranking Special Forces personnel he worked alongside. Letters from mid-2005 recalled Nasib as a self-motivated, skilled young interpreter. A year later in 2006, a captain described how Nasib “never hesitated to return fire, assist his vehicle crew, carry a wounded soldier, or … provide additional firepower utilizing American weaponry.” By early 2007, another captain noted that Nasib “operated each of the detachment’s weapons systems” and “led other soldiers, inspiring them to fight, close with, and destroy the enemy forces.” Still another captain in 2007 called Nasib “beyond question the best interpreter” on base. He especially applauded Nasib’s discretion when handling sensitive information, including translating captured documents that “provided insight [about] enemy command and control structure.”

By the time Todd worked with Nasib in 2009, he said his interpreter was trusted to question high-value enemy detainees and “charged right next to us” in firefights. In one instance, Todd recalled how, when he began “skidding down” a steep, snow-covered slope as Green Berets moved into position, Nasib “reached back and grabbed [him] and helped [him] move up.” Todd’s was only one of the American lives Nasib saved.

Nasib’s long record of exemplary service put him in danger of Taliban retribution. Not long after he began working with the Green Berets, Nasib was featured in a documentary about Special Forces personnel in Afghanistan. Though his face was obscured, team members referred to him by an Americanized version of his last name. The documentary named Nasib’s location and showed the faces of locals with whom he interacted.

After the documentary’s release, Nasib told the Washington Examiner that he “received threat letters [and his] name was called on the Taliban radio,” with the order to kill him. To protect himself, he left Afghanistan in 2012. He attempted to return to his homeland in 2017, but by 2019, he fled to a refugee camp in a non-neighboring country, hoping that distance would make him safe. Still, he fears the Taliban.

With the help of his Green Beret supporters, Nasib has applied multiple times for chief of mission approval, the first step in the SIV process. Each application has been denied. The government insists that Nasib lacks proof that he completed the program’s requisite year of faithful and valuable service to the U.S. government. Testimonies of American service members from four ODAs who verify Nasib worked for them directly for two years and 11 months are not sufficient. Specific contract numbers are required. Nasib was only retained on contract for about nine months when Todd helped him transition into employment with Mission Essential Personnel in 2009.

Nasib’s denial also appears to be linked to a period of around 17 months when he was detained in an American facility to be questioned regarding the death of an Afghan security guard, allegedly at the hand of a Green Beret. Though Nasib told investigators he had no information about the killing, investigators held him and attempted to coerce a statement implicating Green Berets. When he was finally released in early 2009, Nasib was given a document, provided to the Washington Examiner, stating he “has been determined to pose no threat” and has not been charged by the U.S.

Nasib resumed interpreting for the Green Berets just two days after his release. He was hired by Mission Essential Personnel six months later. A major recommending Nasib to the SIV program noted that “local and national security checks” performed in 2010 revealed no derogatory information on the interpreter. The polygraph examination Nasib completed in the same year revealed no evidence of deception.

In Nasib’s most recent COM denial from December 2023, the State Department asserted that a Mission Essential Personnel rehiring process, which Nasib said was initiated per the company’s request in 2018, was “terminated due to security reasons.” The State Department provided no further details. Mission Essential Personnel said it was “unable to comment on employment specifics without the former linguist’s permission.” When Nasib requested that Mission Essential Personnel release his records for the Washington Examiner’s review, the company neglected to do so, stating that “the information [in Nasib’s file] has been verified against our records.”

Adam Bates, the supervisory policy counsel for the International Refugee Assistance Project, told the Washington Examiner that this is another example of the problematic lack of transparency in the SIV process. “The SIV statute itself very explicitly says that the applicants who are denied have to be provided with a written decision” explaining the denial to the “maximum extent feasible.” This should include “a list of any facts or inferences that were used in order to make that individual determination … and that is just uniformly not happening,” Bates explained.

In addition to presenting a “flagrant disregard for what the law actually requires,” Bates said the SIV program lacks “the requisite appreciation of the situation that these folks are in, the danger that they’re in, and what they risked and sacrificed on behalf of the U.S. mission,” Bates said. The SIV program “just functionally is designed to say no to people.”

Supporting Green Berets’ teammates

Nasib’s struggle highlights a long-standing difficulty for SIV applicants, but Green Berets working to assist another small group of Afghan allies are facing a new and particularly alarming challenge. For months, large numbers of SIV applicants with similar recommenders and employers have faced COM denials and revocations without apparent cause.

Green Beret Dave is co-founder of the 1208 Foundation, which seeks to save Special Forces allies who remain under threat in Afghanistan. Chief among those are members of the National Mine Reduction Group, elite Afghan units with expertise in detecting improvised explosive devices. Routinely subject to polygraph, NMRG personnel had an especially high level of trust and were permitted to carry weapons on base.

Dave told the Washington Examiner that NMRG personnel “were the tip of the tip of the spear. They were paid to move in front of us and find IEDs, and we would walk in their footsteps. If they didn’t find them with their tools, then they’d find them with their feet.”

On one nighttime patrol, Dave said an NMRG teammate threw him to the ground without warning after picking up on a slight ground disturbance with his green monocular night-vision goggles. Dave’s more advanced white phosphor night-vision goggles had not detected the anomaly. Beneath the ground where he was preparing to step was a pressure plate, wired to a 155-millimeter shell. The explosive was daisy-chained to a series of other 155-millimeter shells, laid out in the footprint of the Green Berets patrolling behind him. Dave’s teammate “kept me from not only killing myself but killing my entire team,” Dave said.

Because of their support of American personnel, NMRG personnel who remain in Afghanistan face a particular threat. Though the Taliban promised amnesty to their former enemies on taking over Afghanistan, reprisal campaigns soon began to target former Afghan government and military personnel, as well as U.S. allies. Human Rights Watch released evidence of these campaigns in November 2021. The New York Times released its own proof of reprisals in April 2022, while the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan followed suit in July of the same year.

Dave said he has heard about NMRG personnel being slaughtered by the Taliban in the early months following the withdrawal and has personally received “loads of pictures of guys … beaten to the verge of death.”

The situation for NMRG members became more dire after National Geographic released Retrograde, a documentary focusing on the final days of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. The documentary features unaltered images of NMRG personnel. Dave said that within a month of the film’s release on Disney+, the Taliban murdered a 21-year-old NMRG member featured prominently in the documentary. National Geographic did not respond to the Washington Examiner’s request for comment.

It is to the backdrop of horrific violence that Dave and other volunteers have been assiduously working to support allies’ attempts to find safe haven through the SIV program.

Retired Green Beret Vince Leyva spent 24 years in the military before contracting in Afghanistan for an additional 13 years as an NMRG trainer. Around the time of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Leyva began supplying his former trainees with the supervisor letters of recommendation required for their SIV applications. Leyva told the Washington Examiner that he wrote around 69 letters of recommendation for the NMRG members whom he worked with personally, as well as several additional letters for support staff members who performed vital logistical tasks that enabled their success. Though they were not leading Green Berets on patrols, those support staff had to navigate Taliban roadblocks, leading some to get “pulled out of cars and beaten or shot and killed.”

Through trial and error over 2 1/2 years, Leyva learned how to supply compliant recommendation letters. At the end of February, he was shocked to find that 17 of the NMRG personnel he recommended received COM denials on the same day. Of these, 11 had previously received COM approval, including some personnel who had been interviewed at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul prior to the withdrawal and others who had been told to prepare for resettlement in the U.S. through State Department flights.

Leyva immediately began reaching out to the State Department for an explanation. “All I get back is the blanket response: We cannot provide any additional information.”

In subsequent weeks, while he considered giving in to the insurmountable odds, Leyva learned of wider efforts to support NMRG personnel and hundreds of thousands of other Afghan SIV applicants left behind in Afghanistan. Now, with help from Dave and his 1208 Foundation co-founder Thomas Kasza, Leyva said he has “a little bit of backup.”

Dave admitted that the process of supporting NMRG members has been exhausting. Through the 1208 Foundation, he said he “still feel[s] like [he is] serving his country every … day,” explaining that Green Berets are only able to do their overseas work by earning trust from locals who believe American promises. If the U.S. develops a reputation for neglecting its allies, “then [local forces] are never going to stay with us,” which puts future Green Berets at risk. “Our motto is to free the oppressed, not to oppress our … allies,” Dave elaborated.

A series of unexplained denials and revocations

Dave and Leyva are not alone. Bates said that IRAP has noticed “a sharp uptick” in “seemingly batched” denials. “It seems like the Department of State has a list of contractors and a list of supervisor letter writers that they simply will not accept for the program,” though no one is certain “whether they suspect some kind of malfeasance or … [the recommender] has just written too many letters.”

Andrew Sullivan, director of advocacy for nonprofit organization No One Left Behind, told the Washington Examiner that his organization has identified 240 Afghans whose COM approvals have been denied or revoked “in what appears to be a ‘batched’ manner.” “We’ve identified over 10 companies and organizations that appear to be blacklisted,” he explained. This includes “individuals who hold active security clearances with the U.S. government and have faithfully served for decades” whose “recommendations have been denied” without “a scintilla of evidence of fraud” and “with no notice or reasoning given.”

Beau Lendman told the Washington Examiner he has spent “many thousands of hours” overseeing the SIV applications process for over 5,000 former employees at Anham, which had more than 20 U.S. government contracts in Afghanistan. In December 2023, Lendman said that applicants began receiving identical COM denials, stating their letters of recommendation were invalid. As of March, around 200 former Anham employees had been denied COM approval, including 27 people who had previous approvals revoked.

Lendman has had no success gathering input from the State Department about why Anham’s recommenders have been suddenly deemed unsatisfactory. “Every day, I get these emails from [Afghan applicants] about the suffering they are experiencing,” he said, explaining that it would be “extremely distressing” to “be party to … a bait and switch on behalf of the U.S. government.”

The State Department did not provide requested statistics about the number of COM revocations issued monthly since August 2023, but a spokesperson said that of its 100,000 COM decisions since 2009, there have been 1,700 revocations of COM approval. “We only withdraw COM approval in cases where we no longer have confidence in the factual bases of the COM approval,” the spokesperson said, in cases when “new information calls into question an Afghan’s faithful and valuable service, whether their qualifying employment was for the U.S. government/ISAF/a successor mission or whether the documents the Afghan submitted are credible.”

The spokesperson rejected characterizations that recent denials have been “batched,” explaining that “all cases are reviewed and decided on their individual merits.”

A call for long-overdue change

Though the SIV program has doubtlessly changed the lives of thousands of Afghans who have found safe haven within the U.S. through its strict guidelines, many of the heroic people whom it was designed to help remain under extreme threat as they navigate a labyrinthine bureaucracy.

Congress’s authorization of 12,000 SIVs has likely bought one additional year of support for visa candidates. This seems inadequate to resolve concerns for Nasib, whose journey to receive an SIV has lasted over a decade, or for recently denied NMRG personnel, whose SIV wait times approach three years — far longer than the nine-month turnaround the program promises.

It is past time to be cleareyed about addressing the SIV program’s flaws and stand firmly beside the Afghans who risked their lives for their American partners.
Pakistan
Pakistan and Taliban to expand trade despite lingering tensions (Nikkei Asia)
Nikkei Asia [4/4/2024 10:01 PM, Zia Ur Rehman, 293K, Neutral]
Despite simmering tensions, recent agreements between Pakistan and the Taliban administration in Kabul to prioritize trade point toward a complex interplay among security concerns, economic ambitions and competition between key ports in the region, analysts and traders say.

This shift comes after a tense period that saw Pakistan conduct rare airstrikes inside Afghanistan against suspected hideouts of Pakistani militant groups on March 18, killing eight people and prompting Afghan forces to return fire on the border.

Yet a week later, a Pakistani delegation led by Commerce Secretary Muhammad Khurrum Agha met with Afghan Commerce Minister Nooruddin Azizi in Kabul to address trade issues.

The two countries agreed on the "separation of business from politics" and to pursue "uninterrupted" trade activities, said Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban administration spokesman. Echoing this sentiment, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry expressed encouragement over the "progress made on these issues."

Despite Pakistan continuing to stand as the largest importer of Afghan goods, amounting to $369 million in 2022, there has been a significant decline in bilateral trade volume over the past five years, from $2.3 billion to $1.4 billion, according to the state-run Trade Development Authority of Pakistan.

Pakistani exports are dominated by textiles, pharmaceuticals, food items and construction materials, mainly cement. Afghanistan primarily exports fruits, carpets and minerals like coal, marble and gemstones.

The two-day discussions held on March 25 to 26 focused on key areas like establishing a preferential trade agreement, facilitating the movement of air cargo, enabling 24/7 operation of border crossings for trade and addressing challenges related to trade that transits through Afghanistan and to Afghan goods that pass through Pakistani ports, according to Mujahid.

The discussions also included initial Pakistani proposals on barter trade and using local currency for buying Afghan coal, intended to alleviate pressure on their foreign exchange reserves. However, these proposals were ultimately rejected. Both countries agreed to prioritize conducting trade through banking systems, with Pakistan importing Afghan coal at international market rates.

"Both countries have ambitious plans to increase the trade volume to $5 billion, but prevailing security concerns cast doubt on the feasibility of this target," Ziaul Haq Sarhadi, director of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry, told Nikkei Asia.

A surge in terrorism in Pakistan has heightened Islamabad’s frustration over the perceived reluctance of the Taliban administration in Kabul, which took power following the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021, to curb Pakistani Taliban militants along the border.

Fatalities from militant attacks skyrocketed by nearly 56% in 2023 compared to 2022, with over 1,500 casualties, including over 500 security and law enforcement personnel, according to a report by the Islamabad-based Center for Research and Security Studies.

Following a cross-border attack by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on Pakistani security forces in October, Pakistan imposed several trade restrictions on Afghanistan, significantly impacting the landlocked nation, which is heavily reliant on neighboring countries for vital trade routes and access to international markets. These restrictions included a ban on essential transit trade items, a 10% import fee and requirements for bank guarantees equal to duties and taxes from Afghan importers.

The abrupt implementation caused significant disruption, with over 3,000 containers of Afghan traders’ goods stranded for weeks at Karachi’s port, incurring substantial fees over the delay. "These charges, typically ranging from $120 to $160 per container per day, had placed a heavy financial burden on Afghan businesses," Haji Gul Zada, a Kabul-based trader, told Nikkei Asia.

However, subsequent negotiations between Afghan Commerce Minister Azizi and Pakistani officials in Islamabad in mid-November led to the temporary removal of most of the restrictions and the release of most of the trucks that had been stranded.

Taliban officials and some analysts attributed the trade restrictions to Pakistan’s strategy to pressure the Taliban administration to address its security concerns. This perception was heightened by the simultaneous actions by Pakistan to expel irregular Afghan refugees and enforce stricter visa policies at the border crossings with Afghanistan.

Seeing the restrictions as a hindrance to Afghanistan’s economic recovery under international sanctions, the Taliban administration shifted its focus to Iran’s port of Chabahar. In recent months, senior Taliban officials, including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, visited the port and inked several projects there.

This move is also seen as part of the Taliban’s efforts to diversify Afghanistan’s port options, positioning Chabahar as a competitor to Pakistan’s ports, including Karachi as well as Gwadar, which is a key component of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Despite this, Afghan traders still view the Pakistani route as the most feasible due to distance and cost. "The situation is unfortunate," said Zada, the Afghan trader. "The route has been politicized because of tense ties between the two countries."

Pakistani officials, however, argued that the restrictions were part of a broader anti-smuggling campaign due to U.S. dollar losses and economic challenges.

"Pakistan has lost millions in taxes due to goods being sent duty-free to Afghanistan and then smuggled back across the border," said Muhammad Junaid, an official at Pakistan Customs in Karachi.
Exiled Afghan journalist shot, injured in Pakistan (VOA)
VOA [4/4/2024 2:37 PM, Staff, 761K, Negative]
An exiled Afghan journalist was shot in Pakistan on Wednesday, prompting calls from press freedom groups for the Pakistani government to investigate the incident.

Ahmad Hanayesh was shot on Wednesday evening by two gunmen on a motorcycle when he was returning home in the capital Islamabad, according to the press freedom group the Committee to Protect Journalists, or CPJ.

The journalist was taken to a hospital for surgery on his foot and treatment for a non-life threatening head injury. It’s currently unclear who targeted the reporter and whether the motive was related to his work. Pakistani police said that they are looking into the incident, according to media reports.

Hanayesh, who is also known by his birth name Abdul Aleem Saqib, owned two radio stations in northern Afghanistan before he fled to Pakistan after the Taliban returned to power in 2021. He also reported for the Afghan Service of VOA’s sister outlet Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

CPJ called for the Pakistani government to launch an investigation into the attack.

“The assault on Ahmad Hanayesh requires a thorough investigation by Pakistani authorities, who must ensure that the culprits are held to account,” Carlos Martinez de la Serna, CPJ’s program director, said in a statement.

“It is imperative for Pakistan to safeguard the hundreds of Afghan journalists who have sought refuge within its borders, out of fear for their lives, because of the Taliban’s crackdown on media freedom,” he added in the statement.

The press freedom group Reporters Without Borders estimated in 2023 that more than 200 Afghan journalists have fled to neighboring Pakistan.

Press freedom groups consider Pakistan to be quite dangerous for journalists, especially those who report critically on the Pakistani government and military. Since 1992, CPJ has documented 64 journalists who were killed in the country over their work. In many of the cases, no one has been held accountable.
RFE/RL Freelance Journalist Attacked By Armed Men In Islamabad (Radio Free Europe)
Radio Free Europe [4/4/2024 9:44 AM, Staff, 223K, Negative]
Ahmad Hanayesh, a freelance journalist for RFE/RL’s Radio Azadi, sustained injuries in an attack by unknown gunmen in Islamabad on April 3. Pakistani police said that they are investigating the incident. One of Hanayesh’s relatives told Radio Azadi that three armed men on a motorcycle attacked the Afghan national as he was returning home from a walk in the Pakistani capital. Hanayesh, who is in stable condition, worked as a reporter with Radio Azadi for several years before leaving the country for neighboring Pakistan, where he has since worked as a freelance journalist.
More than a dozen Pakistani judges receive letters with ‘toxic’ powder (Al Jazeera)
Al Jazeera [4/4/2024 7:12 AM, Abid Hussain, 2060K, Neutral]
More than a dozen senior judges in Pakistan have received letters containing a suspicious white powder since Tuesday, prompting an investigation by the authorities.

On Tuesday, all the eight judges of the Islamabad High Court received similar mails, with a note in English criticising the “justice system of Pakistan” and even mentioning the term, bacillus anthracis, according to a first information report (FIR) filed by the police in the capital, Islamabad.

Bacillus anthracis is a bacteria that can cause anthrax, a serious infection which can be fatal if immediate treatment is not given.

The next day, four Supreme Court judges, including Chief Justice of Pakistan Qazi Faez Isa, and five judges of the Lahore High Court also received similar letters with the suspected “toxic” material.

Police said a lesser-known group called Tehreek-e-Namoos Pakistan has claimed responsibility for the suspicious letters.

Police officials in Islamabad and Lahore said the letters and their contents have been sent to forensic and security experts for investigation. The authorities have not yet confirmed what the white powder was.

“We are conducting our investigation and we shall provide a prompt update as soon as we have a breakthrough,” a police official involved in the investigation told Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the media.

Tehreek-e-Namoos Pakistan was first heard of in September last year when the authorities were alerted about a suspicious bag found at an upscale hiking trail in Islamabad. The bag contained a letter, hand grenades, a pistol, some bullets and maps of sensitive buildings in the city.

In that letter as well, the obscure group had criticised the “justice system”, saying it had decided to “teach a lesson to judges and generals”. The investigation into the incident is on.

The toxic mails to the top judges came about a week after six judges of the Islamabad High Court wrote a scathing open letter to the Supreme Court, alleging interference by Pakistan’s premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in judicial matters.

The judges said the ISI had used “intimidatory” tactics such as secret surveillance and even abduction and torture of their family members to influence their decisions in “politically consequential” cases, including against jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan.

The ISI and the Pakistani military have not yet responded to the allegations.

The government, on its part, formed a one-member commission to investigate the matter. However, the retired judge appointed to the commission refused to take up the responsibility. Subsequently, the Supreme Court constituted a seven-member bench to investigate the allegations made in the unprecedented letter by the judges.

The first hearing of the bench was held on Wednesday, with Chief Justice Isa saying there will be “zero tolerance” as far as threats to the independence of the judiciary are concerned. The next top court hearing on the matter will be held on April 29.

Karachi-based lawyer Abdul Moiz Jaferii said the judges receiving allegedly toxic letters appear “rather peculiar and bizarre due to its timing”.

“From the contents of the letter that was sent, along with the so-called toxic substance in it, it is difficult to determine any commonality of motive for why these judges have been sent these missives,” Jaferii told Al Jazeera.

Imaan Zainab Mazari-Hazir, a human rights lawyer in Islamabad, said whether the letters to the judges are “substantial or a hoax” must be investigated.

Lahore-based lawyer Rida Hosain concurred, saying judges being “explicitly intimidated” is a matter that requires serious and urgent attention.

“No justice system can function if judges are being threatened. It strikes directly at the ability of the judges to decide cases before them without fear and favour,” she told Al Jazeera.
India
US has not asked India to cut Russian oil purchases, American official says (Reuters)
Reuters [4/4/2024 1:05 PM, Nidhi Verma and Krishn Kaushik, 223K, Neutral]
The United States has not asked India to cut Russian oil imports as the goal of sanctions and the G7-imposed $60 per barrel price cap is to have stable global oil supplies while hitting Moscow’s revenue, an American treasury official said on Thursday.

India has emerged as one of the top buyers of Russian sea-borne oil since Western nations imposed sanctions and halted purchases in response to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

"It is important to us to keep the oil supply on the market. But what we want to do is limit Putin’s profit from it," Eric Van Nostrand, who is performing the duties of U.S. Treasury assistant secretary for economic policy, said in New Delhi, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Van Nostrand said that buyers can purchase Russian oil at deeper discounts outside of the price cap mechanism, if they do not use Western services like insurance and broking, thus limiting Moscow’s sales avenues.

"They (Russia) have to sell oil for less," he said.

The sanctions are intended to limit the options available to Russia to three: sell its oil under the price cap, offer deeper discounts to buyers if they circumvent Western services, or shut its oil wells, Van Nostrand added.

The price cap imposed by the Group of Seven (G7) wealthy nations, the European Union and Australia bans the use of Western maritime services such as insurance, flagging the transportation when tankers carry Russian oil priced at or above $60 a barrel.

Anna Morris, acting assistant secretary for terror financing at the U.S. Treasury, said that G7 nations had the option to review the price cap depending on market conditions or other factors.

As part of its wide-ranging sanction mechanism against Russian oil trade, the United States in February imposed sanctions on Russian state-run shipper Sovcomflot (SCF) and 14 of its crude oil tankers involved in Russian oil transportation.

Morris said that SCF vessels that have been identified in the recent rounds of sanctions "certainly carry with them the sanctions risk ... the 14 vessels in particular that have been named are sanctioned vessels."

The U.S. officials are in India this week meeting with government officials and business leaders to discuss cooperation on anti-money laundering, countering the financing of terrorism, and implementation of the price cap.

Asked about the sale to Western nations of refined products produced from Russian oil, Morris said that would not breach the sanctions.

"Once Russian oil is refined, from a technical perspective it is no longer Russian oil. If it is refined in a country and then sent forward, from a sanctions perspective that is an import from the country of purchase it is not an import from Russia."
Indian government ordered killings in Pakistan, intelligence officials claim (The Guardian)
The Guardian [4/4/2024 9:02 AM, Hannah Ellis-Petersen, Aakash Hassan, and Shah Meer Baloch, 12499K, Negative]
The Indian government assassinated individuals in Pakistan as part of a wider strategy to eliminate terrorists living on foreign soil, according to Indian and Pakistani intelligence operatives who spoke to the Guardian.

Interviews with intelligence officials in both countries, as well as documents shared by Pakistani investigators, shed new light on how India’s foreign intelligence agency allegedly began to carry out assassinations abroad as part of an emboldened approach to national security after 2019. The agency, the Research & Analysis Wing (Raw), is directly controlled by the office of India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, who is running for a third term in office in elections later this month.

The accounts appear to give further weight to allegations that Delhi has implemented a policy of targeting those it considers hostile to India. While the new allegations refer to individuals charged with serious and violent terror offences, India has also been accused publicly by Washington and Ottawa of involvement in the murders of dissident figures including a Sikh activist in Canada and of a botched assassination attempt on another Sikh in the US last year.

The fresh claims relate to almost 20 killings since 2020, carried out by unknown gunmen in Pakistan. While India has previously been unofficially linked to the deaths, this is the first time Indian intelligence personnel have discussed the alleged operations in Pakistan, and detailed documentation has been seen alleging Raw’s direct involvement in the assassinations.

The allegations also suggest that Sikh separatists in the Khalistan movement were targeted as part of these Indian foreign operations, both in Pakistan and the west.

According to Pakistani investigators, these deaths were orchestrated by Indian intelligence sleeper-cells mostly operating out of the United Arab Emirates. The rise in killings in 2023 was credited to the increased activity of these cells, which are accused of paying millions of rupees to local criminals or poor Pakistanis to carry out the assassinations. Indian agents also allegedly recruited jihadists to carry out the shootings, making them believe they were killing “infidels”.

According to two Indian intelligence officers, the spy agency’s shift to focusing on dissidents abroad was triggered by the Pulwama attack in 2019, when a suicide bomber targeted a military convoy in Indian-administered Kashmir, killing 40 paramilitary personnel. The Pakistan-based terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed claimed responsibility.

Modi was running for a second term at the time and was brought back to power in the aftermath of the attack.

“After Pulwama, the approach changed to target the elements outside the country before they are able to launch an attack or create any disturbance,” one Indian intelligence operative said. “We could not stop the attacks because ultimately their safe havens were in Pakistan, so we had to get to the source.”

To conduct such operations “needed approval from the highest level of government”, he added.

The officer said India had drawn inspiration from intelligence agencies such as Israel’s the Mossad and Russia’s KGB, which have been linked to extrajudicial killings on foreign soil. He also said the killing of the Saudi journalist and dissident Jamal Khashoggi, who was murdered in 2018 in the Saudi embassy, had been directly cited by Raw officials.

“It was a few months after the killing of Jamal Khashoggi that there was a debate among the top brass of intelligence in the prime minister’s office about how something can be learned from the case. One senior officer said in a meeting that if Saudis can do this, why not us?” he recounted.

“What the Saudis did was very effective. You not only get rid of your enemy but send a chilling message, a warning to the people working against you. Every intelligence agency has been doing this. Our country cannot be strong without exerting power over our enemies.”

Senior officials from two separate Pakistani intelligence agencies said they suspected India’s involvement in up to 20 killings since 2020. They pointed to evidence relating to previously undisclosed inquiries into seven of the cases – including witness testimonies, arrest records, financial statements, WhatsApp messages and passports – which investigators say showcase in detail the operations conducted by Indian spies to assassinate targets on Pakistani soil. The Guardian has seen the documents but they could not be independently verified.

The intelligence sources claimed that targeted assassinations increased significantly in 2023, accusing India of involvement in the suspected deaths of about 15 people, most of whom were shot at close range by unknown gunmen.

In a response to the Guardian, India’s ministry of external affairs denied all the allegations, reiterating an earlier statement that they were “false and malicious anti-India propaganda”. The ministry emphasised a previous denial made by India’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, that targeted killings in other countries were “not the government of India’s policy”.

In the killing of Zahid Akhund, an alias for the convicted Kashmiri terrorist Zahoor Mistry who was involved in the deadly hijacking of an Air India flight, the Pakistani documents say a Raw handler allegedly paid for information on Akhund’s movements and location over a period of months. She then allegedly contacted him directly, pretending to be a journalist who wanted to interview a terrorist, in order to confirm his identity.

“Are you Zahid? I am a journalist from the New York Post,” read messages in the dossier shown to the Guardian. Zahid is said to have responded: “For what u r messaging me?”

Millions of rupees were then allegedly paid to Afghan nationals to carry out the shooting in Karachi in March 2022. They fled over the border but their handlers were later arrested by Pakistani security agencies.

According to the evidence gathered by Pakistan, the killings were regularly coordinated out of the UAE, where Raw established sleeper cells that would separately arrange different parts of the operation and recruit the killers.

Investigators alleged that millions of rupees would often be paid to criminals or impoverished locals to carry out the murders, with documents claiming that payments were mostly done via Dubai. Meetings of Raw handlers overseeing the killings are also said to have taken also place in Nepal, the Maldives and Mauritius.

“This policy of Indian agents organising killings in Pakistan hasn’t been developed overnight,” said a Pakistani official. “We believe they have worked for around two years to establish these sleeper cells in the UAE who are mostly organising the executions. After that, we began witnessing many killings.”

In the case of Shahid Latif, the commander of Jaish-e-Mohammed and one of India’s most notorious militants, several attempts were allegedly made to kill him. In the end, the documents claim, it was an illiterate 20-year-old Pakistani who carried out the assassination in Pakistan in October, allegedly recruited by Raw in the UAE, where he was working for a minimal salary in an Amazon packing warehouse.

Pakistani investigators found that the man had allegedly been paid 1.5m Pakistani rupees (£4,000) by an undercover Indian agent to track down Latif and later was promised 15m Pakistani rupees and his own catering company in the UAE if he carried out the killing. The young man shot Latif dead in a mosque in Sialkot but was arrested soon after, along with accomplices.

The killings of Bashir Ahmad Peer, commander of the militant outfit Hizbul Mujahideen, and Saleem Rehmani, who was on India’s most-wanted list, were also allegedly planned out of the UAE, with transaction receipts from Dubai appearing to show payments of millions of rupees to the killers. Rehmani’s death had previously been reported as the result of a suspected armed robbery.

Analysts believe Pakistani authorities have been reluctant to publicly acknowledge the killings as most of the targets are known terrorists and associates of outlawed militant groups that Islamabad has long denied sheltering.

In most cases, public information about their deaths has been scant. However, Pakistani agencies showed evidence they had conducted investigations and arrests behind closed doors.

The figures given to the Guardian match up with those collated by analysts who have been tracking unclaimed militant killings in Pakistan. Ajay Sahni, the executive director of the Institute for Conflict Management in Delhi, said his organisation had documented 20 suspicious fatalities in Pakistan by unknown attackers since 2020, though two had been claimed by local militant groups. He emphasised that because of Pakistan’s refusal to publicly investigate the cases – or even acknowledge that these individuals had been living in their jurisdiction – “we have no way of knowing the cause”.

“If you look at the numbers, there is clearly a shift in intent by someone or other,” said Sahni. “It would be in Pakistan’s interest to say this has been done by India. Equally, one of the legitimate lines of inquiry would be possible involvement of the Indian agencies.”

Pakistan’s foreign secretary, Muhammad Syrus Sajjad Qazi, publicly acknowledged two of the killings in a press conference in January, where he accused India of carrying out a “sophisticated and sinister” campaign of “extraterritorial and extrajudicial killings” in Pakistan.

Islamabad’s accusations were met with scepticism by others, due to the longstanding animosity between the two neighbouring countries who have gone to war four times and have often made unsubstantiated accusations against the other.

For decades India has accused Pakistan of bankrolling a violent militant insurgency in the disputed region of Indian-administered Kashmir and of giving a safe haven to terrorists. In the early 2000s, India was hit by successive terrorist attacks orchestrated by Pakistan-based Islamist militant groups, including the 2006 Mumbai train blasts, which killed more than 160 people, and the 2008 Mumbai bombings, which killed 172 people.

Both countries are known to have carried out cross-border intelligence operations, including small bomb blasts. However, analysts and Pakistani officials described the alleged systematic targeted killings of dissidents by Indian agents on Pakistani soil since 2020 as “new and unprecedented”.

The majority of those allegedly killed by Raw in Pakistan in the past three years have been individuals associated with militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, and in several cases have convictions or proven links to some of India’s deadliest terrorist incidents, which have killed hundreds of people. Others were seen to be “handlers” of Kashmiri militants who helped coordinate attacks and spread information from afar.

According to one of the Indian intelligence officers, the Pulwama attack in 2019 prompted fears that militant groups in Pakistan were planning a repeat of attacks such as the 2008 Mumbai bombings.

“The previous approach had been to foil terrorist attacks,” he said. “But while we were able to make significant progress in bringing the terrorist numbers down in Kashmir, the problem was the handlers in Pakistan. We could not just wait for another Mumbai or an attack on parliament when we are aware that the planners were still operating in Pakistan.”

In September, the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau, told parliament there were “credible allegations” that Indian agents had orchestrated the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a prominent Sikh activist who was gunned down in Vancouver. Weeks later, the US Department of Justice released an indictment vividly detailing how an Indian agent had attempted to recruit a hitman in New York to kill another Sikh activist, later named as Gurpatwant Singh Pannun.

Both men had been major advocates of the Khalistan movement, which seeks to create an independent Sikh state and is illegal in India. India denied any involvement in the killing of Nijjar, while according to a recent report, India’s own investigation into the Pannun plot concluded that it had been carried out by a rogue agent who was no longer working for Raw.

According to one Indian intelligence official, Delhi recently ordered the suspension of targeted killings in Pakistan after Canada and the US went public with their allegations. No suspicious killings have taken place so far this year.

Two Indian operatives separately confirmed that diaspora Khalistani activists had become a focus of India’s foreign operations after hundreds of thousands of farmers, mostly Sikhs from Punjab, descended on Delhi to protest against new farm laws. The protest ultimately forced the government into a rare policy U-turn, which was seen as an embarrassment.

The suspicion in Delhi was that firebrand Sikh activists living abroad, particularly those in Canada, the US and the UK, were fuelling the farmers’ protests and stirring up international support through their strong global networks. It stoked fears that these activists could be a destabilising force and were capable of reviving Khalistani militancy in India.

“Places were raided and people were arrested in Punjab, but things were actually being controlled from places like Canada,” said one of the Indian intelligence operatives. “Like other intelligence agencies, we had to deal with it.”

In the UK, Sikhs in the West Midlands were issued “threat to life” warnings, amid growing concern about the safety of separatist campaigners who Sikhs claim are being targeted by the Indian government.

Before the US and Canadian cases, a high-profile Khalistani leader, Paramjit Singh Panjwar, was shot dead in Lahore last May. Pakistani investigators claimed they had warned Panjwar that his life was in danger a month before he was killed and said another Khalistani activist living in Pakistan has also faced threats to his life.

Panjwar’s assassination is among those alleged to have been carried out by Indian operatives using what Pakistani agencies described as the “religious method”. According to the documents, Indian agents used social media to infiltrate networks of Islamic State (IS) and units connected to the Taliban, where they recruited and groomed Pakistani Islamist radicals to carry out hit jobs on Indian dissidents by telling them they were carrying out “sacred killings” of “infidels”.

These agents allegedly sought help from former IS fighters from the Indian state of Kerala – who had travelled to Afghanistan to fight for IS but surrendered after 2019 and were brought back through diplomatic channels – to get access to these jihadist networks.

According to an investigation by the Pakistani agencies, Panjwar’s killer, who was later caught, allegedly thought he was working on the instructions of the Pakistan Taliban affiliate Badri 313 Battalion and had to prove himself by killing an enemy of Islam.

The killing of Riyaz Ahmed, a top Lashkar-e-Taiba commander, in September last year was allegedly carried out by Raw in a similar manner. His killer, Pakistan believes, was recruited through a Telegram channel for those who wanted to fight for IS, and which had been infiltrated by Raw agents.

They have claimed the assassin was Muhammad Abdullah, a 20-year-old from Lahore. He allegedly told Pakistani investigators he was promised he would be sent to Afghanistan to fight for IS if he passed the test of killing an “infidel” in Pakistan, with Ahmed presented as the target. Abdullah shot and killed Ahmed during early morning prayers at a mosque in Rawalkot, but was later arrested by Pakistani authorities.

Walter Ladwig, a political scientist at King’s College London, said the alleged shift in strategy was in line with Modi’s more aggressive approach to foreign policy and that just as western states have been accused of extrajudicial killings abroad in the name of national security, there were those in Delhi who felt “India reserves the right to do the same”.

Daniel Markey, a senior adviser on south Asia at the United States Institute of Peace, said: “In terms of India’s involvement, it all kind of adds up. It’s utterly consistent with this framing of India having arrived on the world stage. Being willing to take this kind of action against perceived threats has been interpreted, at least by some Indians, as a marker of great power status.”

The allegations of extrajudicial killings, which would violate international law, could raise difficult questions for western countries that have pursued an increasingly close strategic and economic relationship with Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) government, including pushing for intelligence-sharing agreements.

A former senior Raw official who served before Modi’s premiership denied that extrajudicial killings were part of the agency’s remit. He confirmed that nothing would be done without the knowledge of the national security adviser, who would then report it to the prime minister, and on occasion they would report directly to the prime minister. “I could not do anything without their approval,” he said.

The former Raw official claimed that the killings were more likely to have been carried out by Pakistan themselves, a view that has been echoed by others in India.

Pakistani agencies denied this, pointing to a list of more than two dozen dissidents living in Pakistan to whom they had recently issued direct warnings of threats to their lives and instructed them to go into hiding. Three individuals in Pakistan said they had been given these warnings. They claimed others who had not heeded the threats and continued their normal routines were now dead.
Modi sets ambitious India economic goals for probable third term (Reuters)
Reuters [4/4/2024 12:35 PM, Sarita Chaganti Singh, 5239K, Neutral]
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, confident of winning a national election starting this month, has set an ambitious target of roughly doubling the economy and exports this decade, according to a government document seen by Reuters.

Modi has highlighted economic growth as one of his biggest achievements in election rallies and has "guaranteed" making the economy the third largest in the world from fifth now if he wins a third term in a row as polls predict.

He has already asked officials to finalise plans by around May to expand the economy to $6.69 trillion in nominal terms by 2030, from around $3.51 trillion currently, according to the October document. Though short on concrete details of how to achieve that, it has been a basis for officials’ meetings.

When he took office for a second term five years ago, Modi promised to take the economy to $5 trillion by the current fiscal year, but partly due to COVID-19 related disruptions, meeting that target is virtually impossible now.

For the next six years, Modi’s goal is to raise per capita income to $4,418 from around $2,500, the document says, without specifying the spending or reforms needed to achieve that.

Modi’s office and the finance ministry did not reply to requests seeking comment.

Independent economist Saugata Bhattacharya said if the real GDP can grow by 6-6.5%, inflation stays around 4.5% and the rupee continues to depreciate against the dollar by 1-1.5% every year, the economy can double in seven years in nominal dollar terms.

"The issue that a vision document should address is the set of structural reforms required to sustain this or a higher real GDP growth rate over a long time, a very difficult feat," he said.

The economy is, however, expected to have grown by around 8% in the last fiscal year ended March 31, the fastest among major countries, on the back of strong manufacturing and construction activity driven by government spending.

A former senior finance ministry official, Subhash Chandra Garg, said growth projections like those in the document are mostly based on "backward arithmetical calculations" and lack any "reform and investment plan".

"Usually such mental gymnastics based on arithmetic calculations and assumptions are meaningless unless there is serious reform and investment plan to test it for real economy dynamics," said Garg, the Modi government’s finance secretary until 2019.

The main opposition Congress party says India’s economic growth in the past few years under Modi has done little to create jobs and alleviate rural distress, while the disparity between rich and poor has widened.

The document says Modi’s government wants exports of goods and services to jump to $1.58 trillion by 2030 from around $700 billion, which could double the share of Indian exports in global trade to more than 4%.

The government also plans to focus on 70 areas of improvement including workforce skills and vocational training, critical demands of industry leaders who often complain about the skill levels of the labour force.
It wants the literacy rate to rise to 82% by 2030 from about 78% now, unemployment to fall to less than 5% from 8%, and labour force participation rate to jump to more than 50% from 46% now.

Modi has said in rallies he needs to remain in power to implement measures to take India towards a developed economy by 2047, the 100th year of independence, from mid-income levels now. He has not spelt out the measures.

Opinion polls show he will win big in the elections starting on April 19 and ending after seven phases on June 1, with vote counting on June 4.

A coalition led by Modi’s Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) could win nearly three-fourths of parliamentary seats in the nation of 1.42 billion people, according to a survey on Wednesday, while Congress could hit a record low.

He would be the first person since India’s post-independence Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to win three consecutive terms.
India’s Largest Opposition Congress Party Pledges Jobs, Farmer Welfare in Manifesto (Bloomberg)
Bloomberg [4/5/2024 3:24 AM, Swati Gupta, 5.5M, Neutral]
India’s largest opposition party released its political manifesto on Friday, two weeks before the world’s biggest election, promising more employment support and farmer incomes.

The Indian National Congress described what it calls an alternative vision for the country and outlined, what it said, were measures to rectify the damage inflicted on India by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decade in power.

Congress party president Mallikarjun Kharge and senior party leader Rahul Gandhi released the manifesto at the party’s Delhi headquarters.

Senior Congress leader P. Chidambaram, who headed the party committee that drafted the manifesto, decried the lack of jobs and employment opportunities for the country’s population.

Spanning 48 pages, the manifesto includes sections on justice for women, farmers, youth, laborers and socially and economically backward members of the society.

The manifesto also includes a section on “Defending the Constitution,” where the manifesto says that the country’s “democracy has been reduced to an empty shell” and its institutions have “become subservient to the executive government.”

Gandhi, speaking at the press conference, described the election as a “fundamentally different election” with the country’s “constitution at risk.” Earlier, party president Kharge described Modi as “autocratic.”

The party, again, lamented the alleged misuse of central investigative agencies and the freezing of some of its bank accounts by the country’s tax agency.

Congress, in its manifesto, released details on its plans to boost the economy and said its goal is “full employment.” Congress says it intends to fill “vacancies” in government jobs, will launch an “urban unemployment program,” and aim for better working conditions for people employed in the gig economy.

The manifesto also promised an assured income to farmers through guaranteed minimum prices, loan waivers and immediate support for crop losses. Indian farmers from the states of Punjab and Haryana have been protesting for months but have been blocked by the Indian authorities from entering the capital.

Congress is part of a political alliance consisting of more than 20 parties. The bloc hopes to peel away votes from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party and wrest power from Modi, who’s seeking a third consecutive term.

Gandhi is a key leader in that alliance. The most prominent face of the opposition, he recently walked the length of India to drum up support for the party. The alliance earlier this week held a rally in Delhi where leaders from the bloc gathered to protest the recent arrest of Delhi chief minister Arvind Kejriwal — a key member of the alliance — and to demand a free and fair election. The rally was attended by tens of thousands of party workers and supporters.

In the 2014 and 2019 national elections, Congress was decimated by the BJP and reduced to holding just a few dozen seats in the lower house of Parliament. Since then, Modi and the BJP have campaigned on a record of delivering strong economic growth. They’ve also followed through on other key promises like stripping Kashmir’s autonomy and building a controversial Hindu temple.

Apart from India’s high unemployment rate, the Congress party has honed in on inflation, crony capitalism and the widening gap between the nation’s rich and poor.

“Look at the manifesto minutely and you will see a grand future for India in it,” said party president Kharge at the press conference.
India’s Congress pledges to step up affirmative action if voted back to power (Reuters)
Reuters [4/5/2024 4:46 AM, Shivangi Acharya, 5.2M, Neutral]
India’s opposition Congress party promised on Friday to lift a cap on affirmative action for marginalised castes if it wins power, although Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to sweep back to office in elections starting this month.

Congress, which has ruled India for more than 50 years with centre-left policies, has struggled in the past decade to compete with Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that counts the country’s Hindu majority as its main vote base.

The seven-phase election starts on April 19, with vote counting on June 4.

More help for so-called backward castes and the poor irrespective of caste were among Congress pledges in its election manifesto, including assured jobs for the young, guaranteed prices for farm produce and higher health insurance.

"Congress has been the most vocal and active champion of the progress of the backward and oppressed classes and castes over the last seven decades," said the manifesto released by party president Mallikarjun Kharge, who himself is from one of India’s most backward castes.

"However, caste discrimination is still a reality."

Kharge listed out some of the key pledges with only a feeble response from party workers at a press conference, leading him to comment: "No claps, nothing!"

Many analysts say morale is low in Congress because of the BJP’s dominance of the country’s politics. An opinion poll released on Wednesday predicted Modi’s National Democratic Alliance coalition could win 399 of the 543 seats in the lower house of parliament while the BJP alone is projected to win 342.

Congress could fall to 38 seats, a record low, it said.

Former Congress chief and frontline leader Rahul Gandhi said the election is "much closer than being propagated."

"It is a close election and we are going to fight an excellent election and we are going to win the election," he said at the event.

Congress said should it be voted back to power, it would conduct a nation-wide socio-economic and caste census to "strengthen the agenda for affirmative action", guaranteeing a constitutional amendment to raise the 50% cap on reservations for backward castes in government jobs and education.

The party said such groups make up nearly 70% of India´s 1.42 billion people but "their representation in high-ranking professions, services and businesses is disproportionately low".

The caste system has set out hierarchies in the Hindu religion for thousands of years, but it has been countered by affirmative action policies in recent decades albeit with uneven effect.

Average monthly spending by marginalised castes from India’s so-called scheduled caste, scheduled tribe and other backward classes lagged privileged castes by 27% in rural and 30% in urban India in 2022/23, according to a government survey released last month.

Such a spending gap has narrowed in over a decade but much more slowly in India’s distressed countryside where a majority of the nation’s population lives, according to a comparison with data from a similar 2011/12 survey.

Data on monthly spending is a key component in India’s poverty calculations and helps assess economic status.

India’s poorest and populous state, Bihar, has held a caste-based census which underlines the skewed representation of marginalised castes in government jobs.

Its minority so-called upper castes hold nearly a third of valued government jobs, while 95% of the state’s people are either self-employed or unemployed, according to the survey released last year.

Moreover, 88% of all poor families in Bihar, described as those earning up to $72 a month, are from marginalised castes, according to the survey seen by Reuters.

The BJP has dismissed such surveys. Modi has said in rallies this year that India’s downtrodden castes are the poor, youth, women and farmers, and that he was working tirelessly for them.
India’s remote Ladakh protests against Beijing-Delhi squeeze (Nikkei Asia)
Nikkei Asia [4/5/2024 3:04 AM, Raihana Maqbool, 293K, Neutral]
Thousands braved sub-zero temperatures across India’s remote Ladakh in recent weeks as they march for statehood and safeguards to protect a Himalayan region they say is increasingly squeezed by China and their own government.

Residents say Ladakh’s glaciers and sensitive ecology are at risk due to Chinese encroachment and India’s industrial and military buildup in the aftermath of a deadly 2020 border standoff.

The latest demonstrations stem from a 2019 decision to strip neighboring Jammu and Kashmir -- claimed by both India and Pakistan -- of its autonomy, resulting in Ladakh being separated from Indian-controlled Kashmir.

Delhi pledged to give Ladakh’s mostly indigenous population safeguards for tribal people, but the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party hasn’t followed through, critics said.

Among them is climate activist Sonam Wangchuk, who recently staged a three-week hunger strike, living on just water and salt.

"We are losing land, left, right and center," Wangchuk said in a video message to supporters. "The shepherds are losing their pasture land to China, which is encroaching from the north. The Chinese have captured huge chunks of Indian land in the last few years."

China has taken up more than 4,000 square kilometers of land, according to some critics. Wangchuk is planning another demonstration this weekend.

"To show the ground reality we’re planning a border march of 10,000 Ladakhi shepherds to show live footage of how much of the pasture land has been taken over," he said.

China has repeatedly renamed places in another Indian border region, Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing claims as its own. This month, China criticized Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s trip to the northeastern state

Earlier this year, a video surfaced on social media purportedly showing Chinese soldiers intercepting Indian shepherds in Ladakh and claiming the area belongs to Beijing.

In 2020, deadly clashes between Indian and Chinese soldiers erupted in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley, leaving two dozen Indian and four Chinese soldiers dead after close-quarter fighting with clubs and rocks.

Since that clash, thousands of soldiers have been deployed on both sides of the de facto border, the Line of Actual Control (LAC). India and China have been building infrastructure at breakneck speed near the LAC as several rounds of talks between their militaries failed to ease tensions.

Delhi, meanwhile, has built a massive military infrastructure across the region, while signing at least 10 agreements with outside companies to develop Ladakh’s natural resources.

These developments are stirring fears about outside influence and the impact on a fragile environment.

"They [the government] are planning to set up big industries in this fragile area, and if that happens it will be a disaster for this region," said Padma Stanzin, head of the Ladakh Students’ Environmental Action Forum (LEAF).

With no significant progress on reducing border tensions, the region is at risk of stepped-up conflict, warns Praveen Donthi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group.

"There are around 50 to 60,000 troops on both sides of the border, which means that the border is live, unlike the pre-2020 phase," Donthi added. "There is a possibility of accidental escalation with far-reaching consequences."

India’s Ministry of External Affairs said the countries are negotiating to reestablish calm in Ladakh.

"The discussions we had there [in Beijing] built on the previous rounds seeking complete disengagement in the remaining areas along the LAC in eastern Ladakh as an essential basis for the restoration of peace and tranquility in the India-China border areas," ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said.

Wang Wenbin, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, said China viewed the border squabbles as something that can be resolved.

"China has stressed multiple times that the boundary question does not represent the entirety of China-India relations, and it should be placed appropriately in the bilateral relations and managed properly," Wenbin told a press conference last month.

Donthi, the ICG analyst, said a political solution was crucial to ease tensions.

"It is an intractable problem and one of the longest-running border crises in the world," Donthi said. "There is a need for political leadership to take the initiative to resolve the crisis."
Icy Desert Ladakh Turns Up the Heat on Modi Ahead of Indian Elections (The Diplomat)
The Diplomat [4/4/2024 3:52 AM, Snigdhendu Bhattacharya, 201K, Neutral]
A group of mostly tribal protesters in Leh, the capital of Ladakh and one of India’s highest towns at an altitude of 3,500 meters, are braving sub-zero temperatures for a month to draw the government’s attention to two issues that have the potential to upset Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s electoral campaign — national security and promise fulfillment.

Campaigning for the general election has begun, with the first phase of voting scheduled to start on April 19. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which appears to be on course to win its third straight term in power, is campaigning vigorously on the fulfillment of election promises. “Modi’s guarantee means fulfillment of every guarantee,” is the BJP’s campaign slogan.

But in Leh, in north India’s cold desert of Ladakh, protesters – from teenagers to senior citizens – are thronging in the thousands to protest against the BJP turning its back on a major promise that helped the party win elections.

Ahead of the 2019 parliamentary election and the October 2020 local election in Ladakh, the BJP promised that Ladakh would be given autonomous tribal district status according to the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. This would have allowed locals to have a say in land and resources management. In August 2019, Ladakh was made a Union Territory (UT). UTs are federally controlled administrative units.

More recently, on March 4, Union Home Minister Amit Shah told a delegation from Ladakh that some other mechanism instead of the Sixth Schedule was being considered. Protesting this “betrayal,” climate activist and educator Sonam Wangchuk, a Magsaysay awardee, sat a 21-day fast, following which local women joined the protest with a 10-day hunger strike that will end on April 6.

About 300-400 people have been sitting at the protest venue, even at night when the temperature drops to as low as minus 12 degrees Celsius.

The Ladakhi protests are intensifying. Wangchuk has announced a march on April 7 to the China-bordering Changthang area, intending to highlight how Ladakh is losing thousands of acres of pastoral grazing land to Chinese incursions and Indian corporate interests. This can cause the Modi government even greater embarrassment.

While Wangchuk has remained the face of the movement, it is backed by organizations like the Apex Body, Leh (ABL) and Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA), the socio-political umbrellas representing the two districts that compose the UT of Ladakh.

“On April 7, we expect a few hundred people to reach Changthang. We plan to build awareness among local nomadic tribes about how China is occupying our land from the north, while the government is grabbing pastoral grazing land in the south in corporate interest,” ABL member Jigmet Paljor told The Diplomat.

The China Factor

Sandwiched between Pakistan to the west and China to the north and east, Ladakh is geopolitically sensitive and strategically important. Changthang, the highest plateau in India, shares its borders, peaks, and characteristics with China’s Tibet region.

National security is a sensitive issue. The BJP has consistently targeted Congress and other opposition parties for compromising national security and sought credit for building a robust security system under Modi.

Changthang is home to the Changpa tribe – the Pashmina herders who produce Kashmere, one of the finest fibers in the world. It has a long history of pastoral nomadism going back over 3,000 years.

In a video message recorded from the protest venue, Wangchuk said he feared the government would try to stop them from marching to Changthang and China-bordering areas.

“If they have nothing to hide, they should let us roam freely. If they have things to cover up, they will stop us,” he said.

Wangchuk alleged that Chanthang’s nomadic pastoralists are of late selling their goats and yaks because “thousands of acres of prime pastoral land are being encroached on.”

The Congress, India’s main opposition, has expectedly jumped on the issue, sensing an opportunity to corner the Modi government on two of their main allegations – nexus with corporates and infirm China policy.

“Ladakh is not being given its democratic rights. You know why? Because there are thousands of crores [a crore is 10 million] of solar potential in Ladakh and large Indian corporates want access to that,” Congress leader Rahul Gandhi is heard saying in a campaign video released by the party.

The video also shows Gandhi raising concerns about China occupying Indian territories in Ladakh.

U-Turns

Ladakh was part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) until August 2019, when the Modi government – three months after returning to power for a second term – revoked J&K’s statehood and bifurcated the state into two UTs, J&K and Ladakh. J&K is to have a legislature but not Ladakh.

Muslims are Ladakh’s majority community, with a 46.4 percent share of the total population, followed by Buddhists (39.6 percent) and Hindus (12.1 percent).

Initially, most of Ladakh’s Buddhist population, who live predominantly in the Leh district, welcomed the bifurcation and UT status, while the Muslim-dominated Kargil district largely opposed it.

However, in recent months, even residents of Leh have turned against the government and allege that the situation has worsened, as the rights enjoyed as part of the J&K state are no longer available, KDA leader Sajjad Kargili told The Diplomat.

“It has become clear to the Leh people now that they have lost whatever rights they used to enjoy as long as the erstwhile state of J&K enjoyed its special status,” he said, adding that “The people of Leh and Kargil are now together in fighting for full statehood with its own legislative assembly and inclusion to the Sixth Schedule.”

“Under the Sixth Schedule, land and resources cannot be taken away without consulting the local people.”

In September 2019, the National Commission for the Scheduled Tribes (NCST), a government-funded autonomous institution, recommended that the Modi government include Ladakh in the Sixth Schedule.

At that time, the BJP was still promising Sixth Schedule status.

In October 2020, the BJP’s Ladakh unit said, “Complete constitutional safeguards under the provision of 6th Schedule is promised” and that the BJP “assures people of Ladakh about the continuation of developmental works and constitutional safeguards to Ladakh under the provision of 6th Schedule.” However, it started diluting its position soon after. In 2021, the local BJP MP Jamyang Tsering Namgyal merely referred to “Constitutional Safeguards for Ladakh on the line[s] of 6th Schedule.” (emphasis added)

During the March 4 meeting, Shah said that a High Powered Committee is discussing and examining “modalities to provide such Constitutional safeguards.” In the government’s communique, Sixth Schedule and Statehood found no mention.

Paljor and Kargili told The Diplomat that Shah gave no reason for the change of stance.

Climate Politics

One of the reasons for locals stepping up their demand for Sixth Schedule status since 2022 is the development model the federal government appears to be pursuing. Wangchuk has said that the “top-down model of governance” is unfit for the Himalayan region.

In 2023, the Solar Energy Council of India (SECI) floated tenders for conducting soil investigations at proposed sites for renewable energy of 13GW capacity. For this, at least 20,000 acres of land have already been earmarked.

While the government describes the land as “free from wildlife issues,” organizations like ABL and KDA allege that nomadic pastoralists have been using these lands for grazing for many centuries.

Several large hydroelectric projects are also in the pipeline.

According to Paljor and Kargili, the government’s “aggressive bid for resource extraction” prompted all communities to join hands to protect land and resources.

The ABL and KDA had also opposed the newly framed Ladakh Industrial Land Allotment Policy 2023, which they allege bypasses the existing elected representatives in the local self-governance.

Ladakh faces multiple threats from climatic changes, including glacial melt and changing rainfall patterns. Known as a “rain shadow area,” it is already witnessing climatic changes like increased rainfall.

The climatic changes make it all the more necessary that the locals have the right to decide on the course of development, agitators have argued.

In India, environmental activism has rarely impacted elections. But the trouble in Ladakh is not just another governance issue.

First, it challenges the Modi government’s claim of creating a situation where “every child in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh is born with a clean canvas” and “development, democracy and dignity have replaced disillusionment, disappointment and despondency.” Second, it brings up the issue of Chinese aggression, something the Modi government is not fond of discussing.
Dozens of Indian workers depart for Israel to take up construction jobs (AP)
AP [4/4/2024 10:01 AM, Ashok Sharma, 22K, Neutral]
Dozens of Indian construction workers left for Israel this week to take up jobs there as the nearly six-month war between Israel and Hamas continues to rage in Gaza, officials said Thursday.

Israel is facing a labor shortage after barring tens of thousands of Palestinian workers following Hamas’ deadly attack on Oct. 7 attack on Israel that triggered the war. However, the Indian workers departing this week are going under an agreement signed by the two countries before the outbreak of hostilities, Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesman Randhir Jaiswal said.

``The first batch of people have gone to Israel. For us their safety is very important, and we have urged the Israeli authorities to do their best to take care of their safety and well-being,” Jaiswal told reporters Thursday.

Jaiswal said 18,000 Indians were currently employed in Israel, most of them caregivers.

During a visit to India last May by Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen, the two countries signed an agreement to allow about 40,000 Indians to work in the fields of construction and nursing in Israel.

An initial batch of more than 60 construction workers departed Tuesday, and the Israeli ambassador to India, Naor Gilon, posted images of a send-off ceremony for the group on the X social media website.

In January, thousands of Indian laborers had flocked to government recruitment centers that were set up in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana looking for candidates for jobs in Israel.

India has condemned the Hamas attack on Israel, but voted in favor of the U.N. General Assembly resolution last December that called on Israel to halt its fighting to allow for humanitarian assistance.

It also has reiterated its support for the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
India’s central bank holds rate, looking for inflation "elephant" to vanish (Reuters)
Reuters [4/5/2024 3:16 AM, Swati Bhat and Sudipto Ganguly, 5.2M, Neutral]
The Indian central bank’s key interest rate was kept unchanged for a seventh straight policy meeting on Friday as growth in the economy is expected to remain robust while inflation stays above the 4% target.

The six-member monetary policy committee kept the main lending rate (INREPO=ECI)
, opens new tab at 6.5%, in line with expectations. The repo rate was raised by a total of 250 basis points between May 2022 and February 2023.

"Robust growth prospects provide the policy space to remain focused on inflation and ensure its descent to the target of 4%," RBI Governor Shaktikanta Das said in his prepared statement.

Monetary policy must remain actively disinflationary at this stage, Das said.

Inflation was the "elephant in the room" for the Indian economy two years ago, Das said.

"The elephant has now gone out for a walk and appears to be returning to the forest. We would like the elephant to return to the forest and remain there on a durable basis."

But Das flagged that food price volatility remains a concern, although core inflation has fallen sharply in recent months to below 4%.

"While low core inflation provides comfort, the uncertainty on food inflation remains a worry," said Upasna Bhardwaj, chief economist at Kotak Mahindra Bank.

"We do not see much scope for any rate easing until the second quarter of 2024-25," she said, referring to the July-September quarter this year.

Five out of six members of the rate setting committee voted in favour of the rate decision while the monetary policy stance of ‘withdrawal of accommodation’ was retained with a majority of five votes.

The status quo policy left markets unmoved.

The Indian rupee gained slightly against the U.S. dollar at 83.4050, just above a record low hit on Thursday, while bond yields were unchanged at 7.10%. The NSE Nifty 50 (.NSEI), index as well as the BSE Sensex (.BSESN), traded flat.

The central bank said the Indian economy is expected to expand by 7% in the fiscal year 2025, which began on April 1, unchanged from its earlier forecast.

Strengthening rural demand, improving employment conditions, moderating inflation pressures and a sustained pick up in the manufacturing and services sectors should boost consumer demand, Das said.

India’s GDP growth is seen at 7.6% in the year ended March 31, 2024, but consumption, which forms nearly 60% of the economy, is likely to grow at just 3% - the lowest in two decades barring the pandemic period.

"We expect monetary easing either through a rate cut or change in stance to begin from October 2024," said Devendra Kumar Pant, chief economist at India Ratings & Research.
But he added that the economy’s strong growth momentum may limit rate cuts in this cycle to 50 to 75 basis points.

Retail inflation for 2024-25 is seen at 4.5%, Das said.

The committee believes that durable price stability would set strong foundations for a period of high growth, it said.

However volatile food prices could change the outlook.

"The increasing incidence of climate shocks remains a key upside risk to food prices," the rate setting panel said in its monetary policy statement.

India is likely to experience more heat-wave days than normal between April and June, the country’s weather office said earlier this week.

BUILDING STRONG BUFFERS

Despite India’s strong growth and inflows into equity and debt markets, the Indian rupee continues to trade near record lows as the central bank has chosen to absorb dollar inflows to build reserves.

Foreign exchange reserves hit a record high of $645.6 billion as of March 29, Das said.
The data is due to be formally released later on Friday.

"It is our prime focus to build a strong umbrella, a strong buffer in the form of a substantial quantum of forex reserves which will help us when the cycle turns or when it rains heavily," Das said.
Modi’s Messenger to the World (Foreign Policy)
Foreign Policy [4/5/2024 1:00 AM, Rishi Iyengar, 315K, Neutral]
It all began in Beijing. Narendra Modi was the chief minister of Gujarat when he visited in 2011 to pitch his state as a destination for Chinese investment. As India’s ambassador to China at the time, S. Jaishankar was tasked with helping to facilitate meetings with Chinese Communist Party leaders and officials, companies, and even Indian students there.

The Beijing meeting was the starting point of a close and mutually respectful partnership between Modi and Jaishankar—one that is reshaping not only India’s geopolitics but increasingly the world’s. Jaishankar himself has recounted that first meeting on multiple occasions, including in the preface of his new book, Why Bharat Matters.

Of that defining moment with Modi in the Chinese capital, Jaishankar writes, “My cumulative impression was one of strong nationalism, great purposefulness and deep attention to detail.”

The two men’s stars would rise in tandem.

Jaishankar’s Beijing tenure was followed by a move to Washington in late 2013 as India’s ambassador to the United States. Modi was still persona non grata there; his visa had been revoked in 2005 for his perceived role in enabling communal riots in Gujarat three years earlier. (The U.S. State Department termed Modi’s failure to curb the riots as bearing responsibility for “particularly severe violations of religious freedom.”) An investigative team appointed by India’s Supreme Court subsequently cleared Modi of any culpability in 2012, and soon after becoming prime minister in 2014, he was welcomed back to the United States. During his visit that September, he even addressed a packed house of Indian diaspora attendees at New York’s Madison Square Garden, an appearance Jaishankar helped facilitate that has since been replicated in arenas around the world and has become a hallmark of Modi’s foreign policy.

Four months later, days before he was due to retire from the foreign service, Jaishankar was elevated by Modi to foreign secretary—India’s top diplomat, who reports to the external affairs minister—somewhat abruptly and controversially, replacing Sujatha Singh several months before her tenure officially ended. It was only the second time a foreign secretary had been removed from the post.

Jaishankar would be at the center of another prominent “second” in India’s foreign-policy history in 2019. Soon after Modi won reelection in a landslide, he appointed Jaishankar to his cabinet as external affairs minister. It was only the second time a foreign service officer had become external affairs minister, crossing the Rubicon from diplomat to politician. Jaishankar became the first foreign secretary to do so, with a brief private-sector sojourn in between as president of global corporate affairs at the conglomerate Tata Sons.

“To me, personally, it was a surprise. I had not even thought about it,” Jaishankar said during a meeting with members of the Indian community in Seoul in early March, sitting between an Indian flag and a larger-than-life portrait of himself.

Once he did become a politician, however, Jaishankar went all in, spearheading an Indian foreign policy that has been a marked departure from that of previous governments at least in style, if not necessarily always substance.

That style is confident, assertive, proudly Hindu, and unabashedly nationalist, intended to convey that India is taking its rightful place among the major powers. Jaishankar has become known for publicly sparring with Western counterparts, think tankers, and journalists when India’s positions don’t align with theirs. He advocates principles of “multialignment” and “strategic autonomy,” in which India will be driven by its own national interest.

He has slammed a BBC documentary on Modi’s role in the 2002 Gujarat riots that India banned in early 2023 (“I don’t know if election season has started in India and Delhi or not, but for sure it has started in London and New York”); dismissed global democracy rankings that show India backsliding (“There’s an ideological agenda out there”); and defended India’s neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine war and its purchases of Russian oil (“Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems”).

All the while, Jaishankar has served as the tip of the spear for an unapologetic India, led by Modi.

Modi and Jaishankar do come from completely different worlds. Jaishankar grew up in New Delhi and studied at two of the Indian capital’s most elite educational institutions, St. Stephen’s College and Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). The latter, where Jaishankar did a Ph.D. in international relations with a focus on nuclear diplomacy, is named after India’s first prime minister, whom Modi has consistently criticized. Modi’s humble beginnings, by contrast, are a key part of his political persona. He has frequently spoken about his small-town upbringing in Vadnagar, Gujarat, where his family ran a tea shop, before joining the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a Hindu-nationalist organization and the ideological parent of his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). And while Modi predominantly speaks in Hindi both at home and abroad, Jaishankar mostly opts for English.

Jaishankar’s worldliness has served Modi’s priorities well. “If you take a look back, Mr. Modi was planning bold things on foreign policy in the second term, so he wanted someone he trusted who could actually do the big moves. I think you could say that has largely paid off,” said C. Raja Mohan, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute in New Delhi and columnist at Foreign Policy.

On paper, Jaishankar is a natural choice to spearhead a rising India’s foreign policy. His ambassadorships in Beijing and Washington gave him a keen understanding of the two major powers defining global geopolitics today, and they came as part of a four-decade diplomatic career that began in the Indian Embassy in Moscow in the late 1970s and included stints in Japan, Singapore, and the Czech Republic. As joint secretary for the Americas in India’s Ministry of External Affairs, he was also a key negotiator for the country’s landmark civilian nuclear agreement with the United States in 2005.

“He already had the reputation of being a whiz kid because he of course had a legendary pedigree,” said Ashley J. Tellis, the Tata chair for strategic affairs and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Tellis, a former U.S. government advisor and expert on India-U.S. relations, not only sat across from Jaishankar during the nuclear deal negotiations and has known him for decades but also knew his father, K. Subrahmanyam, a former bureaucrat and government advisor who played a key role in establishing India’s nuclear doctrine and is considered one of the country’s foremost strategic thinkers.

Yet Jaishankar’s transition to politics stood out because that’s not how it usually happens in India. External affairs ministers are career politicians and usually have very little actual foreign-policy experience when they take on the role. The call-up from Modi caught many off guard, according to multiple former Indian diplomats who asked to remain anonymous to speak candidly, though most described it as an inspired choice.

It is a testament to India’s increased global standing and importance, as well as Jaishankar’s easy rapport with his global counterparts, that his blunt talk hasn’t really cost the Modi government important friends. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said at last year’s Munich Security Conference that Jaishankar had a “point” with his comments on Europe. In Munich this year, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock smiled as Jaishankar, next to them on stage, parried another question about India’s purchases of Russian oil and its selective alignment with Western partners. “Why should it be a problem? If I’m smart enough to have multiple options, you should be admiring me—you shouldn’t be criticizing me,” he said before clarifying that India isn’t “purely unsentimentally transactional.”

At a high level, many of the dynamics currently governing India’s foreign policy pre-date the Modi government. The country’s close diplomatic and military partnership with Russia dates back to the Cold War, while the India-U.S. relationship has been on an upward trajectory across multiple governments since President Bill Clinton’s visit to New Delhi in 2000 ended more than two decades of tenuous relations. Meanwhile, India’s decades-long frenmity with China has ebbed since military clashes on their shared border in 2020 unraveled the bonhomie that Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping had established during the former’s first term in office.

For all Jaishankar’s proclamations, “I actually see more continuity than I do change,” said Shivshankar Menon, who served as India’s foreign secretary and national security advisor under Modi’s predecessor Manmohan Singh. “Whether you call it nonalignment or strategic autonomy or multidirectional policy, on the big things … I don’t see much difference.”

India’s policy toward the Middle East has been one notable departure, with Modi establishing far closer ties with Israel as well as Arab nations in the Gulf—particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—than any of his predecessors, even amid concerns about rising Islamophobia within India. Modi even inaugurated a Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi to great fanfare in February, embracing the Emirati president as his “brother” during his visit.

The bigger shifts have been on tenor and tone, with the message that India has changed internally, and those internal changes are what need explaining to the world. “There is certainly a difference in the way this government projects foreign policy compared to previous governments—it’s much more activist,” Menon said. “I think there’s a conscious effort to try and show that India counts in the world, that the world now looks up to it.”

In conveying this message, Jaishankar has thrived.

Lisa Curtis, a former U.S. government official who dealt with Jaishankar during the 2005 nuclear deal negotiations as well as in his time at the Indian Embassy in Washington, said he has acquired a “sharper edge” in recent years but has always been effective at communicating India’s position. “Since he’s so steeped in the issues and so articulate on global matters, that helps India to put forward a good face on the international scene,” said Curtis, now a senior fellow at the Washington-based Center for a New American Security. “I think he’s helped India immensely in being accepted as a global power.”

Jaishankar’s pugilistic zeal has also extended to defending Modi’s Hindu-nationalist ideology, including against criticism about its more illiberal elements and the treatment of minorities in India over the past decade, with increased instances of violence against Muslims in particular. “Are there people in any country, including India, who others would regard as extremist? I think it depends on your point of view,” Jaishankar said during the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi in February when asked by an FP reporter how those concerns might impact India’s global standing. “Some of it may be true. Some of it may be politics.”

Jaishankar laid out the Modi government’s position more clearly when asked a somewhat similar question during a discussion at the Royal Over-Seas League in London last November. “People today are less hypocritical about their beliefs, about their traditions, about their culture,” he said. “I would say we are more Indian. We are more authentic.”

As someone whose entire diplomatic career, by definition, was spent being apolitical, Jaishankar’s politics before he joined Modi’s government remain opaque. Until Modi made him foreign secretary, Jaishankar mostly served under governments led by the main opposition Indian National Congress party.

“The ruling political philosophy among India’s academics and among India’s bureaucracy is a socialist, left-leaning worldview. Jaishankar didn’t ever subscribe to that,” said Indrani Bagchi, the CEO of the Ananta Aspen Centre in New Delhi who previously spent nearly two decades as the diplomatic editor for the Times of India newspaper.

While Modi has established himself as a geopolitical glad-hander in his own right over the past decade—with his zealous, highly symbolic hugs of world leaders often making headlines—Jaishankar’s global experience and his ability to articulate Modi’s vision on the world stage have made him the perfect interlocutor and representative.

As Bagchi put it: “He’s able to explain Modi to the world.”

Jaishankar did not respond to multiple interview requests for this story, but the two books he has published since becoming external affairs minister provide a window into his world-view as well as the evolution of India’s foreign policy in the five years he has been in the role.

The works are bookended by two of the world’s largest elections: The first was published in 2020, just over a year after Modi was reelected to a second term and inducted Jaishankar into his cabinet. The second came out early this year, ahead of India’s upcoming national election, in which Modi is expected to cruise to a third term. The titles of Jaishankar’s books themselves are instructive, illustrating a shift in the projection of India to the world: The India Way and Why Bharat Matters. “Bharat” is the traditional Sanskrit name for India, and its use by the Modi government as the country’s official name on some invites to the G-20 summit it hosted last September caused diplomatic ripples, with some critics and political opponents suggesting it was another example of the Modi government’s effort to reshape India in its Hindu-nationalist image. Jaishankar’s riposte was that he would “invite everybody to read” the Indian Constitution, which begins with the words “India, that is Bharat,” and treats both names as official.

Speculation of an “official” name change has not come to pass, though Modi continues to use both interchangeably. India is already referred to as Bharat within the country by its native language speakers, but the two names present another internal contrast that the Modi government has been happy to exploit—in its view, “India” represents a colonial, English-speaking, out-of-touch elite, while “Bharat” represents the real, grassroots, predominantly rural majority of the nation.

Jaishankar, too, leans into that dichotomy in his second book, referring to “India” almost exclusively through most chapters but pointedly ending each chapter with an invocation of “Bharat”—often only in the last sentence. “That is why India can only rise when it is truly Bharat,” the first chapter concludes. In the chapter on India-China relations, he writes: “It is only when our approach to China is steeped in realism that we will strengthen our image before the world as Bharat.”

Stylistic choices aside, the central argument of Why Bharat Matters is that India must authentically embrace its cultural traditions and reclaim its status as a “civilizational” power—in much the way that China has—rather than remain beholden to a Western-led world order. “India matters because it is Bharat,” Jaishankar writes. He uses one of India’s most famous epics, the Ramayana, as a framework for thinking about that civilizational resurgence. The Hindu epic depicts the victory of the god Ram over the demon king Ravana after he abducted Ram’s wife, Sita, a story that in Hinduism symbolizes the triumph of good over evil.

Jaishankar posits that the Ramayana, in which Ram “sets the norms for personal conduct and promotes good governance,” offers lessons for geopolitics, too. Modi and members of his BJP often invoke Ram in heralding the government’s achievements, and many supporters declare their loyalty to the deity in troubling manifestations of the party’s political project, including during attacks on the country’s Muslims and Christians. Modi’s inauguration of a Ram temple in January in the northern Indian city of Ayodhya, considered Ram’s birthplace—on the site of a 16th-century Mughal mosque that was destroyed in 1992 by Hindu nationalists—represented the fulfillment of a key campaign promise.

Jaishankar presents the Ramayana as a lens for Indians to view their global rise and for the world to view India’s rise. Ram’s story is an “account of a rising power that is able to harmonize its particular interests with a commitment to doing global good,” he writes.

In both books, Jaishankar offers a detailed explanation of India’s realpolitik approach, with the most succinct encapsulation coming near the beginning of his first book, The India Way, a compilation of several of his speeches and analyses. India’s priorities in this era of great-power competition and growing multipolarity, he writes, should be to “engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play, draw neighbours in, extend the neighbourhood and expand traditional constituencies of support.”

Jaishankar dedicates a chapter in that first book to another Indian epic, the Mahabharata, which centers on a giant battle between five brothers, the Pandavas, and their cousins, the Kauravas. Jaishankar hails this as “the greatest story ever told” and “the most vivid distillation of Indian thoughts on statecraft.” Today’s India can learn from the Mahabharata’s central lesson of being able to implement difficult policies without being held back by a fear of collateral consequences, Jaishankar writes, albeit doing so responsibly and while retaining the moral high ground.

“Serial violators are given little credit even when they comply, while an occasional disrupter can always justify a deviation,” he writes of the global rules-based order. “Nevertheless, the advantage of being perceived as a rule-abiding and responsible player cannot be underestimated.”

Another lesson from the Mahabharata that Jaishankar draws attention to, which he and Modi have both used to great effect, is the mastery of messaging both at home and abroad. “Where the Pandavas consistently scored over their cousins was the ability to shape and control the narrative,” he writes. “Their ethical positioning was at the heart of a superior branding.”

It is this brand that Jaishankar is attempting to establish for Modi’s new India, or Bharat—a participant on the world stage, rather than just a bystander, that will look out foremost for its own interests but is willing to engage with multiple partners.

“India is better off being liked than just being respected,” he writes.

The take-no-prisoners approach adopted by Jaishankar on the global stage has been immensely popular back home, with hyperbolic compilations of instances when he “shut down” or “destroyed” Western reporters frequently doing the rounds on social media. This reception indicates his statements may be playing to two galleries at once.

“The constituencies on the inside are now completely convinced that India’s moment has come, that India can pursue its interests without apology and without diffidence,” said Tellis of Carnegie. “I see that external-facing behavior as being shaped very much by the compulsions of internal politics.”

It’s hard to argue that the Modi government’s nationalist persona isn’t popular among the electorate. The BJP won 282 out of 543 seats in the Indian Parliament during the 2014 election, the most by a single party in three decades, bettering that performance with 303 seats in 2019. Opinion polls for the 2024 contest so far indicate the party will match, if not surpass, that performance.

While Jaishankar is now front and center on the global stage and his trajectory is unique in many ways, he’s also part of a wider pattern of Modi bringing more technocrats into his government. The current minister of railways, technology, and communications is a former bureaucrat, while the petroleum and urban affairs minister spent nearly four decades in the diplomatic corps. Modi’s priority, particularly in his second term, has been on finding executors of his policies rather than mere political apparatchiks.

“Modi was looking for wider talent to run the government, to implement his policies,” Mohan said. “Jaishankar is just one part of it. Because he’s the foreign minister, he’s the one exposed to the world, he’s the one who’s speaking up for India at most international forums, so he gets a lot of that visibility both at home and abroad.”

It’s also more than just visibility. As the world’s most populous country with the fifth-largest economy, India’s decisions are naturally consequential, and Jaishankar has shepherded the Modi government’s efforts to be at the center of global conversations on issues such as technology, climate change, and collective security. Along with stepping up engagements with the West, the Gulf, and the global south, India has prioritized multilateral forums and partnerships such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (with Australia, Japan, and the United States), I2U2 (with Israel, the UAE, and the United States), and the G-20. And Jaishankar has balanced both sides in each of the two major conflicts roiling the world today—maintaining India’s ties with both Russia and the West amid the war in Ukraine and continuing to call for respect of humanitarian law in Gaza and a two-state solution while condemning terrorism and even reportedly sending Indian-made drones to Israel.

Jaishankar outlined his view of India’s rise in a speech at his alma mater JNU in late February. “Bharat also means being a civilizational state rather than just a national polity. It suggests a larger responsibility and contribution, one that is expressed as a first responder, development partner, peacekeeper, bridge builder, global goods contributor, and upholder of rules, norms, and law,” he said. “It mandates the influencing of the international agenda and shaping of global narratives.”

As India gears up for its next landmark national election, scheduled to take place from April to June, questions have begun to swirl around whether Jaishankar will take the final step in his political evolution and run for election to India’s lower house of Parliament, or Lok Sabha. He entered Modi’s cabinet through the Rajya Sabha, or upper house, where lawmakers are elected by state legislators, but the Lok Sabha is where the people of India decide. His plans to run have not yet been confirmed, but his near-universal popularity will likely hold him in good stead. When asked about it, he has repeatedly deflected.

Should he be preparing for a grueling campaign, however, his growing embrace of symbolism steeped in India’s dominant religion is perhaps a natural choice. For a large swath of Indian voters, wearing one’s Hindu identity on one’s sleeve is increasingly welcome. And Modi’s potential political base is enormous, given that 80 percent of India’s population is Hindu.

“Being overtly Hindu is now OK,” Bagchi said. Whether it’s building a Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi or the recent groundbreaking on the Ram temple in Ayodhya, “all of that adds to what they see Modi bringing to the table, and Jaishankar is a part of that universe.”
U.S.-India Ties Remain Fundamentally Fragile (Foreign Policy – opinion)
Foreign Policy [4/4/2024 12:36 PM, Derek Grossman, 315K, Neutral]
For the United States, foreign policy has always been a mix of securing interests and promoting values, and India checks the box on multiple counts. Washington and New Delhi routinely highlight that the world’s oldest democracy, the United States, is cooperating with the world’s largest democracy, India. Partnering with India holds immense promise for U.S. security interests as well, particularly Washington’s strategy to counter China.

But despite widespread optimism about the future of the U.S.-India partnership, relations are considerably more fragile than they might appear. Indeed, the two countries continue to experience friction in several areas that, if left unaddressed, could ultimately undermine or even derail future cooperation.

On democratic values, for instance, the United States holds deepening concerns that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are making India less tolerant of minorities, especially Muslims. In 2019, the Modi government revoked the special semi-autonomous status—granted under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution—of Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim-majority region. Since then, Kashmiris have suffered from repressive government policies that include curbs to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and other basic rights, according to Human Rights Watch.

Later that year, the Indian Parliament passed the Citizenship Amendment Act, providing a fast track for non-Muslims in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan to become Indian citizens—a move that the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom condemned as “a significant downward turn in religious freedom in India.” After being held up for years because of numerous protests, the law finally went into effect this March. In January, Modi’s inauguration of a new Hindu temple in Ayodhya, known as Ram Mandir, built on the ruins of the 16th century Babri Masjid mosque that Hindu nationalists tore down in 1992, raises fresh questions about India’s future as a secular and tolerant nation.

Many policymakers in Washington continue to be concerned that Modi and the BJP have transformed India into an illiberal democracy. In 2021, Freedom House downgraded India’s score from “free” to “partly free,” citing “rising violence and discriminatory policies affecting the Muslim population.” Freedom House further observed in this year’s report that Modi’s government engages in the “harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics” and that “the BJP has increasingly used government institutions to target political opponents.”

Notably, all of these activities have grown under Modi, who is up for reelection in April and will likely win in a landslide. For their part, Indians also worry about the state of U.S. democracy, given such events as the violent storming of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021.

Last week, the Indian government upped the ante by arresting Arvind Kejriwal, the chief minister of the Delhi capital territory, ostensibly on corruption charges; Kejriwal also happens to be an outspoken critic of Modi and a member of the opposition coalition that has seen several other arrests of prominent politicians ahead of the election. India bristled at U.S. criticism of the arrest, warning Washington not to interfere in India’s “internal affairs.” India was also angered when the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi invited several Kashmiri activists to its Iftar party last week.

Recent reports that India may have backed covert missions to commit extrajudicial killings in Canada and the United States have also shocked Washington—and called the idea of shared values into question. In the case in Canada, India is accused of using agents to murder the Sikh separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in 2023. Since Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s shocking revelation of the allegation in September, New Delhi has complained that Ottawa refuses to offer credible evidence and labeled Canada a “safe haven for terrorists.”

India swiftly retaliated by briefly suspending visa services for Canadians worldwide and demanding that Ottawa withdraw dozens of embassy staff from India to achieve parity with the number of Indian diplomats serving in Canada. In recent months, however, New Delhi has privately been more willing to assist in the investigation, though a fresh claim by Trudeau that India engaged in election meddling in Canada could create new tensions.

Meanwhile, the Biden administration has its own trouble with India over an alleged attempt to commit an extrajudicial killing on U.S. soil. In November, prosecutors in New York unsealed an indictment charging an unnamed Indian government official with hiring a hitman to kill the leader of the organization Sikhs for Justice, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, whom India considers a terrorist. India officially denies any culpability, claiming that “rogue operatives” not authorized by the Indian government were involved.

Unlike with Canada, India is reportedly cooperating with U.S. authorities on the matter. Last year, the Biden administration dispatched the directors of the CIA and FBI on separate trips to discuss the Pannun case with their Indian counterparts. In India, there is palpable disgruntlement over a perceived double standard that allows Washington to use drone strikes and other means to kill suspected terrorists and militants with relative impunity.

The full effect of the Pannun case on the bilateral partnership is still unclear. In February, an Indian media outlet reported that U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Ben Cardin planned to place a hold on the U.S. sale of MQ-9 drones to India until it was clear that Modi’s government was credibly assisting the U.S. investigation. Although Cardin ultimately decided not to place a hold on the sale after months of what he called “painstaking” negotiations with the Biden administration, it is clear that there are growing qualms on Capitol Hill about recent Indian behavior that might start impacting the relationship if the White House does not take a tougher line.

Concerns in Washington about India’s illiberalism are likely to grow in the coming years. The highly popular Modi is all but certain to be reelected this spring, and it is entirely possible that when he finally leaves office, an even more extreme Hindu nationalist successor will have emerged—such as Home Minister Amit Shah or Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. Shah, who has already been referred to as India’s “shadow prime minister,” has routinely defended Modi’s record as chief minister of Gujarat during the 2002 mass violence against Muslims, which Modi was accused of condoning.

In December, for example, Shah boasted that Modi had “taught a lesson” to Muslims. In 2019, Shah also referred to illegal Muslim immigrants as “termites” who need to be thrown into the Bay of Bengal. And Amnesty International has criticized Adityanath, a Hindu monk, calling him a leader who uses “hateful rhetoric that incites discrimination and hostility against minority groups, particularly Muslims.”

Meanwhile, in December, the BJP-led government suspended 141 mainly opposition parliamentarians for unruly behavior in parliament. One of those suspended, Indian National Congress party politician Shashi Tharoor, told the Guardian: “Unfortunately, we have to start writing obituaries for parliamentary democracy in India” as open debate and criticism of Modi’s government are squashed.

Worryingly, there are many recent examples of Modi’s crackdown on human rights and civil liberties—and no signs that India’s rising illiberalism will ebb anytime soon. When asked directly about India’s democratic backsliding during Modi’s White House visit in June, U.S. President Joe Biden refused to condemn Modi’s behavior, and Modi likewise deflected.

Further straining the relationship is the particular way in which India seeks to have a seat at the table of great powers. Of course, any move like this will cause friction, because it is antithetical to the U.S. goal of maintaining primacy in the international system. Although India participates in U.S.-led formats such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (along with Australia and Japan) and supports some of Washington’s interests, New Delhi’s desire for multipolarity sometimes manifests itself as anti-Western.

For example, India has routinely sought to engage in multilateral fora explicitly designed to counter the West—including the China- and Russia-led BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and five recently added countries), as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (comprised of China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and several Central Asian states). India also continues to maintain a strong strategic partnership with Russia, a top geostrategic adversary of the United States and its allies—for which Russian President Vladimir Putin has thanked India by calling India a “true friend.”

On the economic side, India has benefited from Russian oil sales, which help India meet its fast-growing energy needs. Since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, New Delhi has increasingly purchased discounted barrels of Russian oil in contravention of U.S.-led sanctions; it is now Russia’s number one export destination. India has also purchased Russian arms for decades, meaning that the majority of India’s military hardware is of Soviet or Russian build.

Thus far, Washington has looked the other way on enforcing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which penalizes countries that purchase weapons from sanctioned Russian defense suppliers, with respect to New Delhi’s purchase of Moscow’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system. This suggests that the Biden administration views India as too important to the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy to risk angering it with sanctions.

When Russia invaded Ukraine, Washington was hoping that New Delhi would distance itself from the Kremlin. However, India has done nothing of the sort: Rather than condemning Russia for invading and seeking to destroy a sovereign neighbor—an indisputable violation of the rules-based global order—India has retained close ties to its Cold War ally. At first, Modi’s strategy appeared destined to damage the U.S.-India partnership. In early April 2022, U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor Daleep Singh visited New Delhi and warned of potential “consequences” for countries that attempted to undermine U.S. sanctions.

By mid-April, however, the Biden administration had dramatically changed its tune. Prior to a virtual meeting between Biden and Modi in April 2022, Biden’s press secretary noted that the two leaders would continue their “close consultations” on Russia, with no indication that Washington was prepared to take any action against New Delhi. India did not have to condemn Russia or make any other concessions, such as curbing its massive imports of cheap Russian oil. On the contrary, India has continued to strengthen its ties with Russia since then.

For its part, New Delhi also has concerns about Washington’s interests misaligning with its own. India, for example, is quietly outraged at recent U.S. contacts with Pakistan, which India views as a terrorist state. Pakistan Army chief Asim Munir visited Washington in December for high-level meetings at the Pentagon and State Department, and the Biden administration has sought to widen the partnership with Pakistan since the U.S. military withdrawal of Afghanistan to include on nonsecurity issues like trade and investment. There is also a long legacy in India of distrust of the United States with regard to Pakistan. Indians recall a close U.S.-Pakistani alliance during the Cold War, including support for West Pakistan (today’s Pakistan) during the Bangladesh War of Independence in 1971, when West Pakistani forces committed massacres against then-East Pakistan’s Hindu minority.

Along the same lines, India worries that the United States could be an unreliable long-term partner. After the U.S. military hastily withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, India was left to pick up the pieces of its own policy in the region. New Delhi had maintained a strong relationship with the U.S.-backed government in Kabul. But with the return of the Taliban, India became concerned that Afghanistan could return to being a playground for terrorist recruitment and training, particularly for Islamist groups that harbor ill will toward India, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.

Initially, India may also have been concerned that Pakistan might benefit from gaining additional strategic depth in Afghanistan, but recent clashes between the Afghan Taliban and the closely affiliated Pakistani Taliban along the disputed Afghanistan-Pakistan border have probably tempered such concerns. A greater potential long-term threat to India is China’s growing influence in Afghanistan, which could have been avoided if the U.S. had stayed the course. Now, Indian ambitions in Afghanistan—including access to critical minerals—will be feverishly contested by Beijing.

If India’s own interests and questions of trust have not seriously impeded the partnership, frictions certainly persist. One growing bone of contention is climate policy, where India and Western nations have clashed over proposed emissions trajectories. India, already the world’s third-largest carbon emitter after China and the United States, has vast energy and development needs that can only be met by rapidly increasing fossil-fuel use. Arguing that the bulk of past emissions were generated by the West, India demands that the rich world bear the brunt of carbon emission reductions.

Climate policy has also become part of India’s bid to become the leading voice of the global south, which could give it a seat at the table of a new, multipolar world. India certainly shares a greater affinity for other developing countries’ policy positions than it does for those of the United States or the other great powers. Coupled with India’s engagement with U.S. adversaries—such as China, Russia, and Iran—it is conceivable that Washington could eventually become frustrated with the way that New Delhi prioritizes achieving great-power status in a multipolar world over Washington’s attempts to maintain the global status quo.

On Russia, the Biden administration has thus far allowed India to have its cake and eat it too. But if the Kremlin decides to significantly ramp up its campaign of death and destruction in Ukraine, then it is likely that the United States and other democratic countries will increase the pressure on India to make a decision on which it supports—Russia or the West. This will especially be the case if Putin decides to use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine or take a similarly violent action. If New Delhi continues to sit on the fence in such a scenario, then its credibility as a responsible and emerging democratic great power will likely be at stake. If it sides with its longtime partner, Russia, it could signal the demise of the U.S.-India partnership.

Washington could also take actions that push New Delhi to the brink. If the U.S.-Pakistan partnership is revived, for example, India will find it difficult to trust the United States as a close partner—even in countering China, their common adversary. Thus far, U.S.-Pakistan ties remain circumscribed mostly to counterterrorism, and the Biden administration seems to recognize the potential risks to the U.S.-India partnership. Indeed, Biden pleased Modi by calling on Pakistan in a joint statement to take “immediate action to ensure that no territory under its control is used for launching terrorist attacks.” In 2022, Biden referred to Pakistan as “one of the most dangerous nations in the world” because it has “nuclear weapons without any cohesion.”

The upcoming U.S. presidential election adds another element of uncertainty over Washington’s Indo-Pacific commitments. If Biden is reelected, then New Delhi can expect more of the same from his administration. If former President Donald Trump emerges victorious, one can expect a similarly close U.S.-India partnership, but other outcomes are in the cards as well. Trump’s “America First” policies tend to advocate withdrawing from global affairs; leading up to the election in 2016, for example, Trump included India among the countries he accused of stealing U.S. jobs. And while his administration formulated an Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China, Trump himself seemed less keen and instead sought to forge a working relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping through a bilateral trade deal. The bottom line is that the impact of a future Trump administration on the U.S.-India partnership is simply unknown.

While it is likely that the U.S.-India relationship will continue to improve, there are many potential challenges that the two countries will have to either address or agree to ignore. Whether Washington and New Delhi can maintain and build on their tenuous partnership will shape geopolitics for the rest of the 21st century.
NSB
Bangladesh power system gets dirtier on rapid coal use growth (Reuters – opinion)
Reuters [4/4/2024 6:08 AM, Gavin Maguire, 11975K, Neutral]
Coal is on course to overtake natural gas as the primary source of electricity in Bangladesh, worsening regional emissions and complicating global efforts to cut use of high-polluting fossil fuels.

Bangladesh power firms more than doubled coal-fired electricity generation in 2023 from 2022 to a record 17 terawatt hours (TWh), data from energy think tank Ember shows.

Over the same period, natural gas-fired electricity output increased by just 4.7% to 47.44 TWh.

The sharp jump in coal use relative to natural gas use resulted in a large swing in the country’s electricity generation mix, with coal accounting for a record 21.1% share of total generation, up from just 7% two years before.

The share of natural gas-fired output fell to around 59% in 2023 from 66% in 2021 and 76.4% in 2019.

If utilities keep increasing coal-fired generation at a faster pace than gas-fired output, coal could emerge as the primary source of electricity in Bangladesh within the current decade, undermining worldwide efforts to cut coal use.

UNDER PRESSURE

Bangladesh, among the world’s largest clothing producers and exporters, has experienced sharp growth in energy demand from its population and businesses. The country has garment factories that consume power around the clock, and overall energy use also has climbed along with economic growth.

Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth in Bangladesh has averaged 6.2% over the past five years, more than twice the global average, according to the International Monetary Fund.

The county’s power suppliers have struggled to keep up, resulting in regular power outages last year.

To avoid similar setbacks in 2024, authorities have directed electrical power generators to use more coal, and have approved record large coal imports.

The country already receives regular thermal coal supplies by truck and train from neighbour India, but in 2023 also boosted seaborne imports by 47% to a record 12.7 million metric tons, according to ship tracking data compiled by Kpler.

Bangladesh’s average annual seaborne imports from 2017 to 2021 were 6.8 million tons, so the jump to close to 13 million tons last year helped lift the country to 12th on the list of global thermal coal importers in 2023, from 14th in 2022.

With several nations taking steps to steadily reduce coal-fired power generation and imports, Bangladesh will likely rise further in coal import rankings.

EMISSIONS IMPACT

Coal-fired generation has pushed Bangladesh power sector emissions to record highs: just under 60 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions in 2023, up from 58.3 million tons in 2022, according to Ember.

That emissions load was roughly a 24% rise from 2019.

The carbon intensity of electricity generation has also climbed. Roughly 741,500 tons of carbon dioxide was emitted to generate each kilowatt hour of electricity produced in 2023, up from 723,200 tons in 2022 when coal use was roughly half of the levels seen in 2023.

Coal-fired generation is still rising, with 2.11 TWh of electricity generated from coal in January, up sharply from 0.83 TWh a year earlier.

Imports of thermal coal are also rising, with seaborne purchases through March totalling just over 3 million tons, up from around 2.5 million tons during the same period in 2023.

If Bangladesh’s coal use and imports remain strong, 2024 will likely set a record for both coal-fired generation and emissions. It could potentially offset any declines seen elsewhere in terms of coal consumption and pollution, with Bangladesh emerging as a hub for coal demand even as much of the rest of the world turns its back on the fuel.
Bhutan to Upgrade Bitcoin Mining in Himalayas as ‘Halving’ Looms (Bloomberg)
Bloomberg [4/4/2024 5:00 PM, Sidhartha Shukla, 5543K, Positive]
Bhutan’s investment arm and Bitdeer Technologies Group are planning to ramp up their Bitcoin mining operation to help offset the revenue impact of an upcoming event known as the halving.

The partnership between Druk Holding & Investments and Nasdaq-listed crypto mining firm Bitdeer aims to invest in boosting Bhutan’s mining capacity sixfold through the introduction of cutting-edge hardware.

The planned upgrades will increase the Himalayan kingdom’s mining capacity by 500 megawatts by the first half of 2025, Matt Linghui Kong, chief business officer at Bitdeer, said in an interview. That would bring Bhutan’s total capacity to 600 megawatts.

The capital will be drawn from a $500 million fund that the pair began raising in May last year, when they unveiled plans to leverage Bhutan’s abundant hydroelectric power for Bitcoin mining. Kong said he expects to close the fund by July.

Reduced Rewards

Bitcoin miners operate power-hungry computers that secure the blockchain, earning new tokens as a reward. These rewards are programmed to be cut in half every four years, part of the process of capping the total supply of the original cryptocurrency at 21 million coins.

The upcoming halving in April will see mining rewards slashed from 6.25 to 3.125 coins per block.

DHI and Bitdeer said they are confident they can maintain operational efficiency even if the price of Bitcoin declines post-halving. Bitdeer has one of the lowest costs per Bitcoin mined in the industry at $20,000 per coin, Kong said.

Some miners went bankrupt during the crypto rout of 2022, when a combination of soaring energy costs and Bitcoin’s price falling below $16,000 proved a stern test of the sector’s durability.

Bitcoin Rally

The 140% Bitcoin rally over the past 12 months brought much needed relief to firms that survived, which are once again splashing cash on hardware upgrades and capacity expansion. The digital asset was trading at $68,581 as of 7 a.m. in Sydney on Friday.

Computing costs are rising due to a surge in Bitcoin’s mining difficulty, a measure of how much computing power is needed to add a new block to the network. Network difficulty has hit record highs ahead of the halving, offsetting some of the gains from the price rally.

Ujjwal Deep Dahal, chief executive officer at DHI, said the nation’s 500-megawatt boost “will be built on Bitdeer’s latest hardware to lower costs and improve computing power.”

Singapore-based Bitdeer, controlled by Chinese entrepreneur Jihan Wu, is one of the top crypto miners by compute power globally and runs one of the largest facilities in Texas.

Sandwiched between China and India, Bhutan has long sought to diversify its hydropower-reliant economy. DHI, which manages the government’s diverse investments, sees blockchain technology as a core part of efforts to build “an innovation ecosystem for a startup economy.” The investment outfit has been experimenting with asset tokenization and is also building out “Bhutanverse,” a metaverse project.
Central Asia
8 Uzbeks Killed In Traffic Accident In Kazakhstan (Radio Free Europe)
Radio Free Europe [4/4/2024 8:01 AM, Staff, 223K, Negative]
Police in the northwestern Kazakh region of Aqtobe said on April 4 that eight Uzbek citizens had died in a traffic accident on a highway connecting with the Russian city of Samara. A truck collided with minivan near the village of Marzhanbulaq on April 3, killing all seven passengers and the driver of the minivan, police said. The Shymkent-Samara highway is one of major highways used by migrant workers from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to reach Russia by car. Deadly accidents have occurred frequently on the highway in recent years.
Kyrgyzstan: China solidifying economic hold on Bishkek (EurasiaNet)
EurasiaNet [4/5/2024 12:00 AM, Staff, 57.6K, Neutral]
Politically, Kyrgyzstan may be mimicking Russia, but when it comes to trade and investment, Bishkek is tilting toward China. Kyrgyzstan’s split geostrategic personality reflects changing circumstances wrought by the stalemated Russia-Ukraine war.

Russia clearly views Kyrgyzstan as an important client state in Central Asia, evidenced by the fact that Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin’s first trip abroad last fall, after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest for him, was to Bishkek.

Kyrgyz authorities at the same time have demonstrated an affinity for Russia’s authoritarian blueprint. On April 3, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov signed a law that requires organizations receiving funding from abroad to register as foreign agents. The legislation’s wording closely adheres to a law imposed earlier by Russia; the Kremlin used its foreign agents law to effectively handcuff the country’s non-governmental sector.

Critics of the Kyrgyz legislation fear it will open the way for a Russia-style crackdown on independent media and civil society activists in Kyrgyzstan. When signing the law, Japarov dismissed the notion that it could turn into an instrument of repression, saying that “as the Head of State, I guarantee there will be no persecution.”

The Kyrgyz penchant for following Moscow’s lead in politics does not extend to economics. China has supplanted Russia as Kyrgyzstan’s chief source of foreign direct investment (FDI), according to data compiled by Kyrgyzstan’s National Statistics Committee. Chinese FDI in 2023 totaled $220.8 million, or almost 28 percent of the country’s overall FDI total of $798.2 million. Russia’s FDI total was $147.4 million. Kazakhstan was Kyrgyzstan’s third largest foreign investor in 2023 at $67.3 million.

Manufacturing ($226.4 million) and mining ($169.2) were the most attractive Kyrgyz sectors in the eyes of foreign investors last year. That interest appears to be carrying over into 2024: in early April, the Chinese mining concern Huaxin signed a deal with a Kyrgyz state enterprise to develop the Kol-Jangak coal field.

In commerce, China also eclipsed Russia in 2023 as Kyrgyzstan’s top trade partner, even though Bishkek is a member of the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). China accounted for almost 35 percent share of Kyrgyzstan’s annual trade turnover total of $15.7 billion in 2023. The EAEU’s share was almost 28 percent.

Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, Kyrgyzstan has emerged as a key conduit for Russia for the supply of sanctions-busting goods. But there are signs that Bishkek is growing increasingly worried about the threat of secondary sanctions. Accordingly, the flow of Russia-bound illicit trade may slow in the coming months.

RFE/RL reported that Kyrgyz banks will stop processing transactions via the Russian Mir payment system as of April 5. Mir is a Russia-based alternative to Western systems managing interbank transactions. Mir’s suspension by Bishkek will make it more difficult to move money between Kyrgyzstan and Russia.
In Moscow Attack, a Handful of Suspects but a Million Tajiks Under Suspicion (New York Times)
New York Times [4/4/2024 5:33 PM, Anatoly Kurmanaev, Valeriya Safronova, and Valerie Hopkins, 441K, Negative]
Muhammad said he had found a better life in Russia. After emigrating from Tajikistan last fall, he began driving delivery vans in Siberia, enrolled his children in a local school, applied for a Russian passport and started planning to buy an apartment with the savings from his much higher salary.

The arrest of a group of Tajik citizens accused of carrying out the attack that killed 145 people at a Moscow concert hall last month has upended those plans, filling Muhammad with fear of being swept up in the ensuing crackdown on the Central Asian migrants who prop up Russia’s economy.

The attack, he said, has erased all the efforts his family made to fit into society. In a phone interview from the city of Novosibirsk, he added that he would move back to Tajikistan if the police or nationalist radicals were to target him.

“I’ll only have a hunk of bread, but at least I’ll be in my homeland, living without fear that someone will bang on my door,” said Muhammad, whose last name, like those of other migrants quoted in this story, is being withheld to protect them against possible retaliation.

The Russian police have responded to the terrorist attack, the most lethal in the country in decades, by raiding thousands of construction sites, dormitories, cafes and warehouses that employ and cater to migrants. Russian courts have deported thousands of foreigners after quick hearings on alleged immigration violations. And Russian officials have proposed new measures to restrict immigration.

The official crackdown has been accompanied by a spike in xenophobic attacks across Russia, according to local news media and rights groups, which have documented beatings, verbal abuse and racist graffiti directed against migrants.

The crackdown has exposed one of the main contradictions of wartime Russia, where nationalist fervor promoted by the government has brought xenophobia to new highs even as foreign workers have become an irreplaceable part of the country’s war effort.

As blue-collar Russian workers went off to fight in Ukraine, took jobs at armaments factories or left the country to avoid being drafted, citizens of Tajikistan and two other Central Asian countries have partly filled the void.

They have kept consumer goods flowing, built houses to satisfy the real estate boom fed by military spending and rebuilt occupied Ukrainian towns pummeled during the war. Some have signed up to fight for Russia, on the promise of windfall salaries and fast-track Russian passports.

But those needs are being measured against other priorities. On Tuesday, President Vladimir V. Putin made that clear in a speech to police officials. “Respect for our traditions, language, culture and history must be the determinant factor for those who want to come and live in Russia,” he said.

Igor Efremov, a Russian demographer, estimated that there were between three and four million migrants working in Russia at any given time. He said Russia’s total population stood at about 146 million.

A majority of these migrants — most of whom come to do manual work for months at a time — are from three poor former Soviet Republics in Central Asia: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. These mostly Muslim countries have become increasingly dominant sources of migration to Russia as Western sanctions have made the country less attractive to many foreigners.

The concert hall massacre exposed the fragility of their positions. Because most migrants in Russia today come from countries with different languages and cultures and a different dominant religion, they have been especially exposed to harassment during a war that the Kremlin has presented as a struggle for the survival of Russia’s cultural identity.

While a variety of religions are practiced in Russia, the Kremlin consistently upholds the Russian Orthodox Church as a central element of Russian culture.

About a dozen Tajiks working in Russia spoke to The New York Times about their fears after the attack on March 22. Some said they had not left their houses for days to avoid possible detention or because they felt shame that their countrymen appeared to have caused so much pain.

“You walk by, and you hear these comments: ‘Get away from me, get far away from me,’” said Gulya, a Tajik house cleaner who has worked in Russia for nearly two decades. “I love Russia, I love it as my own, but people have become angry, aggressive,” said Gulya, who is considering returning home if tensions persist.

Valentina Chupik, a lawyer who provides legal aid to migrants in Russia, said on Monday that she had appealed 614 deportation orders since the terrorist attack. Another migrant-rights activist, Dmitri Zair-Bek, said he was aware of about 400 deportations in that period in St. Petersburg alone.

“We have never seen such a scale of anti-migrant operations,” Mr. Zair-Bek said in a phone interview.

Tajiks have proven especially vulnerable.

Tajikistan descended into a civil war soon after gaining independence, a conflict that has accelerated the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.

The country’s status as the poorest former Soviet state means there are few jobs available if people are sent back. And some Tajik citizens who sought refuge in Russia from the unrest at home said it was not safe for them to return.

Evgeni Varshaver, a Russian expert on migration, estimates that about a million Tajiks, or about a tenth of Tajikistan’s population, is in Russia at any given time.

Tajikistan’s poverty and political isolation make Tajiks especially likely to settle in Russia for good. Three out of four long-term foreign residents that Russia gained since invading Ukraine came from Tajikistan, according to the Russian statistical agency.

Most Tajiks in Russia are male economic migrants who do jobs that are increasingly shunned by native Russians, such as in construction and agriculture. Many speak little Russian and work on the margins of the formal economy, making them especially vulnerable to abuse by employers and corrupt officials.

Apart from seasonal laborers, Russia remains the main destination for Tajikistan’s small class of professionals, who often view the Soviet era as a period of stability and relative personal freedoms compared with the upheavals of the civil war and rising Islamic fundamentalism that followed their country’s independence.

Fluent in Russian and well educated, these middle-class Tajiks tend to face fewer instances of xenophobia.

“I have seen how Tajiks get shouted at, how officials give them the runaround, just because they can,” said Safina, a Tajik professional who has worked in Russia. “But when I go to the same places, I get treated very well.”

Still, even those who are culturally integrated have been targets of criticism since the terrorist attack.

A conservative Russian commentator reported the Tajikistan-born singer Manizha Sangin to the prosecutors’ office after the singer called the brutal beatings of the Tajik suspects in the attack “public torture.” Ms. Sangin represented Russia at Eurovision in 2021 with the song “Russian Woman.”

Rights activists fear that the government’s treatment of the suspects helped fuel recent racist attacks against Tajiks.

Russian migration experts say the concert hall attack is likely to further shift the country’s migration debate toward national security priorities, at the expense of the economy. Various policymakers and conservative commentators have called for new laws to restrict migration as supporters of foreign labor in the economic ministries and big business have largely stayed silent.

A conservative businessman, Konstantin Malofeev, has created a policy institute to lobby for ways to limit migration.

“We are ready and want to live with Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz; they are our neighbors,” Mr. Malofeev said in a video interview from a Moscow office decorated with Christian Orthodox icons. But, he added, “these migrant workers should be much more Russified.”

The need for soldiers and military factory workers pushed Russian unemployment to a record low of 2.8 percent in February, creating acute labor shortages that are fueling inflation and destabilizing the economy, according to the Central Bank of Russia. The country’s rapidly declining population makes these shortages impossible to solve without foreign workers, migration experts say.

“The needs of employers are no longer considered,” Mr. Efremov, the demographer, said. “The most important thing is that the enemy doesn’t slip through.”
Russia ‘Punishes’ Tajik Migrants With Entry Denials, Deportations After Terror Attack (Radio Free Europe)
Radio Free Europe [4/4/2024 3:07 PM, Farangis Najibullah, 223K, Negative]
Qiyomiddin Fakhriddinov, a native of the southern Tajik town of Roghun, has been coming to Moscow to work as a seasonal laborer for 22 years.

He says he has never violated any law and never faced any problem with Russian authorities. Until now.

Fakhriddinov was denied entry to Russia when he arrived at the Vnukovo Airport on a Dushanbe to Moscow flight on April 1.

“The [Russian Federal Security Service] officers seized eight people from our flight and took us to a basement for questioning,” Fakhriddinov said.

“The officers asked me if I would kill for money. When I said ‘no,’ they told me, ‘Your compatriots killed people, didn’t they?’ They kept us in the basement for eight hours. Then they held us for another 26 hours upstairs and then deported us for no reason,” Fakhriddinov told RFE/RL upon his return to Dushanbe on April 3.

Fakhriddinov and the other men have been banned from entering Russia for at least five years.

Many Tajik migrants have been facing -- or threatened with -- deportation, entry denial, beatings, and verbal assaults in Russia in recent days as anti-migrant and anti-Tajik sentiment rises in the aftermath of the March 22 terrorist attack near Moscow.

Nearly all of the suspects in the deadly assault at the Crocus City Hall, including the four men accused of carrying out the assault, are Tajik citizens.

Zikrullo Saidov, a 21-year-old Dushanbe resident, was denied entry into Russia on March 31 and was sent back to Dushanbe along with nine other Tajik citizens after several hours of interrogation at Vnukovo.

“We asked the officers why they were deporting us for no reason. We asked for how many years we would be barred from coming back to Russia, but they didn’t say anything,” Saidov told RFE/RL after arriving back in Dushanbe.

Saidov believes an immigration officer became suspicious when he saw Turkish arrival and departure stamps on his passport. Saidov said he was then extensively quizzed by security officers about his trip to Istanbul, which he insists was “for work.”

Russian investigators allege that some of the suspected Crocus City Hall attackers underwent weapons training in Turkey.

‘Don’t Come Back For 10 Years’

A 27-year-old Tajik construction worker who didn’t want to give his name said he has always had all his “documents in order” in Russia to avoid trouble during persistent police raids that target illegal migrants.

But despite his valid work and residency permits, a Russian immigration officer at the Vnukovo Airport put a deportation stamp on his passport this week, banning him from entering Russia for 10 years. The father of two said it happened as he was leaving Russia for Dushanbe to spend a few weeks with his family.

“I asked the officers why they were doing it to me. They just told me ‘go home and don’t come back for 10 years,’” he told RFE/RL.

A backlash against Tajiks and other Central Asian migrants began almost immediately after Russian media reported that the terrorist attack was carried out by several men from Tajikistan.

There have been numerous reports of customers canceling their taxi rides if the driver was Tajik. A cafeteria owned by Tajiks was set on fire in the Far East city of Blagoveshchensk, while there have also been many reports of Tajiks being beaten or verbally abused on the streets.

Police raids intensified across Russia in the background of calls by some politicians and ordinary Russians to scrap a visa-free travel agreement with Dushanbe.

There are no official figures about the number of Tajiks being targeted, but dozens of people have reportedly been detained, fined, and deported despite having valid documents.

An Uzbek migrant worker, who gave his first name as Shuhrat, told RFE/RL that police rounded up about 20 Tajik and Uzbek migrants for questioning.

“[Police officers] beat Tajiks. They did not beat Uzbeks, but they were rude to us, too, and they insulted us,” he said, adding that police also thoroughly checked the migrants’ phones.

Nothing To Return To

The Tajiks who were deported or denied entry to Russia described it as a financial blow to their families.

Russia is home to an estimated 1 million Tajik migrant workers and others who are dual citizens. Working in Russia provides a lifeline for them as there are not many jobs or other opportunities in impoverished Tajikistan.

Zamira, a Tajik doctor who didn’t want to give her full name, says she and all of the other fellow Tajiks she knows in Russia “have no plans to leave” despite the pressures they face.

Zamira and her husband work at a rural hospital in Russia’s Ivanovo region, where the couple have built their “forever home” and made many friends in the local community.

“No one has really said anything to my face, but when I see people being angry about the attack I feel guilty, I feel bad, I wish the [attackers] were not Tajiks, I wish it didn’t happen,” Zamira told RFE/RL by phone on April 3. She said most Tajiks in Russia felt the same.

At least two dozen people from Zamira’s extended family work in Russia with residency permits, and some have applied for Russian passports.

“None of us is going back to Tajikistan,” Zamira said. “We will stay here lying low and hoping it will pass.”
EU ‘Dithers’ As Foreign Agent Laws Spread Across Europe And Central Asia, Says Rights Watchdog (Radio Free Europe)
Radio Free Europe [4/4/2024 10:38 AM, Staff, 223K, Neutral]
The European Union’s "dithering" has allowed "foreign agent" laws to spread in Europe and Central Asia, Human Rights Watch (HRW) says, increasing the risk to civil society organizations that are already under threat from governments who are seeking to stifle democratic institutions and the free press.

The rights watchdog said in a statement on April 4 that the latest moves by Georgia and Kyrgyzstan to either adopt or declare an intent to adopt such legislation, which mirrors repressive legislation used by Russia to clamp down on free speech, are part of a trend that European lawmakers have sat by and watched without taking action.

"With civil society organizations under threat throughout Europe and Central Asia, we need an EU that in words and actions protects civic space and sets the right standards," HRW said.

HRW noted that Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov earlier this week signed into law an "abusive ‘foreign representatives law’" that would apply the "stigmatizing designation" of “foreign representative” to any nongovernmental organization that receives foreign funding and engages in "vaguely defined political activity.”

"The EU had ample opportunity to press the authorities to reject this bill," HRW said, given that Kyrgyzstan benefits from privileged access to the EU internal market tied to respect for international human rights conventions, "conventions this law clearly contravenes."

"The country is poised to sign an enhanced partnership agreement with the EU that centers democracy and fundamental rights. The EU has been silent on whether these deals would be imperiled by the bill’s adoption, despite the fact the European Commission’s own assessment highlighted Kyrgyzstan’s dire environment for civil society and the country’s breach of its obligations," it added.

Meanwhile, the ruling party in EU-candidate Georgia this week said it plans to reintroduce a bill that would oblige noncommercial organizations and media outlets that receive foreign funding and are engaged in broadly defined "political" activities to report their activities to the authorities.

The legislation, which sparked mass protests when first introduced last year, causing the government to withdraw the bill, would also give wide oversight powers to the authorities and introduce potential criminal sanctions for undefined criminal offences.

"Georgia was granted EU candidate status in December 2023 on the understanding it would improve conditions for civil society," HRW said.

"This move risks derailing its EU integration even if the EU has until now been willing to move the country forward in the accession process despite limited progress on EU reform priorities."

HRW also chided the EU for its own proposed directive in December on “transparency of interest representation” that would create a register of organizations which receive foreign funding.

The proposal has been opposed by European civil society organizations who say it risks shrinking space for independent organizations at home while diminishing the EU’s credibility in opposing such laws abroad.

"Yet the Commission forged ahead," HRW said.
Twitter
Afghanistan
Amrullah Saleh
@AmrullahSaleh2
[4/4/2024 5:40 PM, 1.1M followers, 80 retweets, 368 likes]
The ascending number of terrorist attacks in the region of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might have created a nostalgic realization on vitality & utility of the former Afghan Security Forces of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. It is evident that the Republic of Afghanistan’s Security Forces had kept most terrorist groups stuck and contained. The region was on a free ride and had taken them for granted without much appreciation for their very vital role. The re-branding of the Taliban as good & reformed terrorists has come with high cost. The very character & essence of the Taliban which glorifies suicide attacks against constitutional order is a source of inspiration and motivation for their like minded brothers including Jaish Adel group & others. They have become a role model for all the irreconcilable terrorist beasts. Perhaps they have unleashed them. Lets dig deeper. In the meantime I condemn the Jaish Adel’s terrorist attack against the Islamic Republic of Iran & have put my views in the context here.

Ziauddin Yousafzai
@ZiauddinY
[4/4/2024 6:05 PM, 157.9K followers, 40 retweets, 65 likes]
In Makkah (M) a groundbreaking convention of renowned scholars from the Muslim world have issued a unanimous declaration condemning the Taliban’s gender apartheid rule in Afghanistan. This historical consensus has effectively disarmed the Taliban ideologically. https://www.euronews.com/2024/04/03/this-ramadan-muslim-world-can-end-gender-apartheid-in-afghanistan?utm_source=yahoo&utm_campaign=feeds_articles2022&utm_medium=referral

Tajuden Soroush
@TajudenSoroush
[4/4/2024 11:39 AM, 161.3K followers, 6 retweets, 53 likes]
This evening, the Taliban and Iranian border gaurds clashed in Nimroz, which led to the closure of the Nimroz border. Local sources said the Taliban also detained an Iranian border guard. But the spokesman of the Taliban in Nimroz said that a small problem had arisen, which was resolved and the border was reopened.
Pakistan
The President of Pakistan
@PresOfPakistan
[4/4/2024 2:47 PM, 733.1K followers, 7 retweets, 14 likes]
Russian Ambassador Mr. Albert P. Khorev called on President Asif Ali Zardari.

The President of Pakistan
@PresOfPakistan
[4/4/2024 1:30 AM, 733.1K followers, 7 retweets, 37 likes]
The Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Pakistan, Mr. Jiang Zaidong, called on President Asif Ali Zardari.

The President of Pakistan
@PresOfPakistan
[4/4/2024 7:54 AM, 733.1K followers, 47 retweets, 188 likes]
Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu, called on President Asif Ali Zardari, at Aiwan-i-Sadr.

Kamran Khan
@AajKamranKhan
[4/4/2024 4:27 PM, 5.6M followers, 35 retweets, 261 likes]
Pakistan and the IMF are steadily moving ahead on the path to achieve economic recovery, consolidation, and growth for Pakistan in the not-too-distant future, Insha’Allah. Today, the IMF reaffirmed its commitment to support Pakistan in becoming a vibrant economy. The IMF’s statement a short while ago is extremely encouraging and reassuring: "On March 19, IMF staff and the Pakistani authorities reached staff level agreement on the second and final review under Pakistan’s Stand-By Arrangement, SBA... The agreement recognizes strong program implementation by the State bank of Pakistan and the caretaker government New government shows intentions for ongoing policy and reform efforts to move Pakistan from stabilization to a strong and sustainable recovery. Pakistan’s economic and financial improvement has improved in the months since the first review was completed. Growth and confidence are continuing to recover… The authorities have expressed interest in a successor IMF supported program with the aim of resolving Pakistan’s fiscal and external stability challenges Imf stand ready to engage in program discussions in the coming months."
India
Narendra Modi
@narendramodi
[4/4/2024 12:54 PM, 96.9M followers, 1.9K retweets, 9.9K likes]
Great fervour for @BJP4Bengal in Cooch Behar. People from all walks of life came to bless us.

Narendra Modi
@narendramodi
[4/4/2024 6:19 AM, 96.9M followers, 2.9K retweets, 9.5K likes]
The politics of TMC, Congress and Left is based on lies, deceit and false propaganda. Addressing a massive @BJP4Bengal rally in Cooch Behar.

Narendra Modi
@narendramodi
[4/4/2024 6:02 AM, 96.9M followers, 6.8K retweets, 42K likes]
Exceptional enthusiasm at Jamui. The NDA is all set to sweep Bihar. Sharing some pictures from today’s rally.

Dr. S. Jaishankar
@DrSJaishankar
[4/5/2024 12:21 AM, 3.1M followers, 130 retweets, 806 likes]
The BJP Lok Sabha candidate from Attingal @VMBJP ji has served India and Kerala well as MoS in Ministry of External Affairs. He has been at the centre of numerous rescue and relief operations. He was invaluable in organizing Covid support. His oversight of our passport services has contributed to their great improvement.

Dr. S. Jaishankar
@DrSJaishankar
[4/4/2024 10:49 AM, 3.1M followers, 221 retweets, 1.1K likes]
PM @narendramodi’s vision for 2047. An interaction in Thiruvananthapuram.

Dr. S. Jaishankar
@DrSJaishankar
[4/4/2024 7:39 AM, 3.1M followers, 556 retweets, 3.5K likes]
Joined @Rajeev_GoI ji as he filed his nomination in Thiruvananthapuram today. Wish him all success.

Sadanand Dhume
@dhume
[4/4/2024 3:41 PM, 171.2K followers, 16 likes]
Does anyone seriously believe that Gen. Asim Munir will do what none of his predecessors managed and turn Pakistan’s focus toward economic development? I’m skeptical, but this appears to be a central argument of those opposed to an Imran Khan comeback. v @YousufNazar

Sadanand Dhume
@dhume
[4/4/2024 3:41 PM, 171.2K followers, 16 likes]
Does anyone seriously believe that Gen. Asim Munir will do what none of his predecessors managed and turn Pakistan’s focus toward economic development? I’m skeptical, but this appears to be a central argument of those opposed to an Imran Khan comeback. v @YousufNazar

Michael Kugelman
@MichaelKugelman
[4/4/2024 11:56 AM, 209.9K followers, 90 retweets, 377 likes]
The terrorist attack in Chabahar has implications that extend beyond the Middle East. Chabahar is home to a port project backed by India, which views it as a potential counter to Pakistan’s China-backed Gwadar port. China has also eyed investments in Chabahar, since inking a strategic partnership with Iran several years ago. And the group behind the Chabahar attack was the one Iran targeted with cross-border strikes in Pakistan earlier this year.
NSB
Awami League
@albd1971
[4/4/2024 1:20 PM, 637.1K followers, 25 retweets, 66 likes]
HPM #SheikhHasina said that the #AwamiLeague government made the development of every area in the country and the grassroots people are the focus of the development works. She said that the changes are already there. https://albd.org/articles/news/41378 #Bangladesh #RuralDevelopment

Awami League
@albd1971
[4/4/2024 12:25 PM, 637.1K followers, 27 retweets, 65 likes]
HPM #SheikhHasina has told the public representatives that to ensure people’s mandate for the future, they have to serve their constituents now. She was speaking at the oath-taking ceremony of newly elected city Mayors, Chairmen and councillors today. https://albd.org/articles/news/41378 #Bangladesh #LocalGovernment #PeoplesMandate

Awami League
@albd1971
[4/4/2024 7:45 AM, 637.1K followers, 25 retweets, 72 likes]
Mentioning the southern region as more vulnerable and neglected, PM #SheikhHasina seeks #Chinese cooperation for this region’s #development. She made the remarks when the Chinese Ambassador to 🇧🇩 Yao WEN paid her a visit at Ganabhaban yesterday. https://daily-sun.com/post/742415

Harsha de Silva
@HarshadeSilvaMP
[4/4/2024 8:27 AM, 357.2K followers, 9 retweets, 79 likes]
1/ @sjbsrilanka economics team of @KabirHashimLK, @EranWick and I invited the #NPP #JVP 3-person econ council to a debate proposed econ policies and strategies to get #SriLanka back on a strong footing. This will help voters understand the differences b/w the two on critically…

Harsha de Silva
@HarshadeSilvaMP
[4/4/2024 8:32 AM, 357.2K followers, 1 retweet, 28 likes]
2/ important matters, say on @IMFNews program, debt restructure, independence of @CBSL, taxes, #SOEReform and privatisation, policy on energy and utility pricing and on non state higher education and much more. But unfortunately they are not accepting… giving excuses

Michael Kugelman
@MichaelKugelman
[4/4/2024 9:04 AM, 209.9K followers, 15 retweets, 59 likes]
In the last two years, Sri Lanka has quietly and successfully navigated global conflict and great power rivalry, thereby demonstrating the capacity of global south states to reinforce multipolarity in the current world order. My latest @ForeignPolicy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/03/sri-lanka-strategic-autonomy-diplomacy-us-china-india/
Central Asia
MFA Kazakhstan
@MFA_KZ
[4/4/2024 10:34 AM, 51.1K followers, 6 retweets, 5 likes]
Kazakh #MFA with the support of the #CoE and #EU organized a two-day seminar for representatives of Kazakhstan’s governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations titled “Protection of Women’s Rights: International and European Approaches" https://gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa/press/news/details/742516?lang=en

MFA Tajikistan
@MOFA_Tajikistan
[4/4/2024 11:55 PM, 4.6K followers, 1 like]
Participation in the cultural program of artists of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan “Evening of Friendship” https://mfa.tj/en/main/view/14760/participation-in-the-cultural-program-of-artists-of-tajikistan-and-turkmenistan-evening-of-friendship

MFA Tajikistan
@MOFA_Tajikistan
[4/4/2024 11:41 PM, 4.6K followers, 2 likes]
Signing ceremony of new cooperation documents https://mfa.tj/en/main/view/14758/signing-ceremony-of-new-cooperation-documents

MFA Tajikistan
@MOFA_Tajikistan
[4/4/2024 7:11 AM, 4.6K followers, 1 retweet]
Meeting of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs with the newly appointed Chairman of the IFAS Executive Committee https://mfa.tj/en/main/view/14757/meeting-of-the-deputy-minister-of-foreign-affairs-with-the-newly-appointed-chairman-of-the-ifas-executive-committee

MFA Tajikistan
@MOFA_Tajikistan
[4/4/2024 5:33 AM, 4.6K followers, 3 retweets, 2 likes]
Top-level meetings and negotiations between Tajikistan and Turkmenistan https://mfa.tj/en/main/view/14756/top-level-meetings-and-negotiations-between-tajikistan-and-turkmenistan

MFA Tajikistan
@MOFA_Tajikistan
[4/4/2024 5:32 AM, 4.6K followers, 1 retweet, 1 like]
Commencement of the official visit of the National Leader of the Turkmen people, Chairman of the Halk Maslakhaty of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov https://mfa.tj/en/main/view/14755/commencement-of-the-official-visit-of-the-national-leader-of-the-turkmen-people-chairman-of-the-halk-maslakhaty-of-turkmenistan-gurbanguly-berdimuhamedov

Navbahor Imamova
@Navbahor
[4/5/2024 1:39 AM, 23K followers, 1 retweet, 2 likes]
Wear long ... was the message from the Uzbek designers showcasing their collections in Washington last night. Golden was the dominant color. @UZEmbassyDC @AmerikaOvoz

Navbahor Imamova
@Navbahor
[4/4/2024 5:51 PM, 23K followers, 1 retweet, 8 likes]
Don’t you underestimate Uzbekistan armed forces … Quite a spirit from Uzbekistan’s #military singer Marat Hakimov. Ethnic instrumental with a drop of heavy rock?!

{End of Report}
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